ISRAEL/DOCUMENTS ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS 1949 COMPANION VOLUME 3

STATE OF ISRAEL

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES
DECEMBER 1948—JULY 1949

COMPANION VOLUME

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ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES

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VOLUME 3
Armistice Negotiations with the Arab States
December 1948—July 1949

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FOREWORD

The third volume in this series covers a single subject — the negotiations which led to the signing of armistice agreements between Israel and four Arab states in 1949. Chronologically, this volume corresponds to the second part of the second volume and the first part of the fourth volume. As the armistice negotiations were concerned exclusively with questions relating to their declared purpose and did not relate to some of the major issues of Israeli–Arab relations, the volume should be read against the background of the documents published in the two other volumes.

Most of the documents published in this volume have been selected from a very large number of papers preserved in the files of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, complemented by a number of documents from the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives. The volume includes exchanges of letters and telegrams between the Israeli delegations which conducted the negotiations on the one hand and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Army General Staff in Tel Aviv on the other, as well as between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Israeli missions in Washington and New York; memoranda; records of discussions; and working papers of the United Nations Acting Mediator. The documents were selected with a view toward presenting the reader with a full account of all stages of the negotiations.

Arrangement of the documents. The volume is divided into four sections, according to the sequence of the negotiations with the four Arab states concerned — Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. While there are some chronological overlaps between the various sections, the documents in each section are arranged in strict chronological order.

Documents composed or sent out on more than one date are placed according to the earliest date. The position of telegrams in the choronological sequence is governed by the earliest known date, in the following order: date of drafting, date of dispatch, or — if neither of these is known — date of receipt. Reports of discussions and meetings appear under the date of writing, when known. When the date of writing is not known, the chronological location of the document in question is determined on the basis of the date of the recorded discussion or meeting (the latter date always appears in the editorial heading).

The text. The text of the printed documents is identical with the original text except for the following editorial changes and corrections:

(a) Addresses of senders and addressees as well as dates in their original form have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda and minutes the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in the editorial headings in standard form (see below).

(b) A number of passages which have no direct relevance to foreign policy have been omitted, as have offensive references to individuals as well as some passages which have not been declassified. All omissions are indicated in the body of the text and explained in footnotes.

(c) Minor errors have been corrected without comment and without indication in the body of the text.

(d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been replaced by the full terms without comment and without indication in the body of the text. Abbreviations of proper names and abbreviations employed for reasons of secrecy have been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., U.N., UNO, U.S.A.), have not been altered. This category includes the abbreviation SUNMO (Senior United Nations Military Observer).

(e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets and preceded by a question mark) or on the basis of a corresponding text of the same document (within square brackets and with an explanation in a footnote).

(f) English spelling has been standardized to conform with British usage except in documents originating in American institutions or written by Americans.

(g) Faulty punctuation has been corrected. Punctuation words used in telegrams (e.g., *stop, comma*) have been replaced by punctuation marks, and the words *quote* and *unquote* by quotation marks.

(h) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant.

Names. Israeli personalities who changed their names in the course of the period documented in this volume are referred to by their new Hebrew names in the editorial headings and in the annotation. Names appearing in the text, including signatures, have not been changed.

The Kingdom of Jordan is referred to by its official name in the editorial headings and in the annotation, although in 1949 the old name — Transjordan — was still widely used.

Signatures. Signatures appended in the writer's own hand are printed in bold type.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia*, the file reference of the document. References to files of the Israel State Archives give only the reference numbers of the record group, the series, the box and the file. (See list of record groups and series on p. LXXI.)

The destination of a document is noted in the editorial heading except when the document is addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or other central government bodies. The place of origin and the date are printed in standard form at the head of the text.

Editorial notes provide information on important events or developments. They usually precede the earliest document which contains a reference to the subject.

Footnotes. The annotation consists mainly of numbered footnotes. The main purpose of the footnotes is to elucidate the text where necessary and to call attention to other relevant documents. There are a few references to documents and files which have not yet been declassified but which will eventually become available to researchers.

Biographical footnotes have been provided where necessary for a proper understanding the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the documents is included in the index. The index does not provide information on persons mentioned only in the footnotes.

Appendices. There are nine appendices in the Main Volume, including a number of basic documents involved in the armistice negotiations as well as the full text of the armistice agreements. The documents published here as Appendices A, B and C are often referred to in the text in shortened form, sometimes merely by their dates — 4 November, 16 November and 13 November — representing, respectively, resolutions of the Security Council and the Acting

Mediator's memorandum of those dates. Because of the large number of such references, no explanation is given in the footnotes except where the respective document is first mentioned.

Maps. There are seven maps in the Main Volume, showing the fighting, truce and armistice lines in the various sectors. Lines proposed in the course of the negotiations have not been delineated, but the maps enable the reader to locate most of the places mentioned in the documents.

Although only some of the maps used by the Israeli delegations and none of the maps presented by the Acting Mediator have been found, the editors were able to make use of several original maps preserved in the Israel State Archives and in the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives as well as the official maps annexed to the armistice agreements with Jordan and Syria.

We would like to thank the following people for their assistance: Dr Zehava Ostfeld, the Deputy Director of the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, for her help in locating important complementary documentation; Professor Yehoshua Porath, for his guidance with regard to the transliteration of Arabic names; Mrs. Nehama Chalom, Director of the Weizmann Archives, for her general assistance and for her supervision of the proof-reading of the English documents and the English Companion Volume; Miss Batsheva Taube, who prepared the English translation of the summaries of the Hebrew documents and the introduction; Mrs. Michal Engel, for her general assistance, the preparation of the Hebrew and English indices and for her proof-reading of the Hebrew documents; Shlomit and Yuval Greenbaum, who prepared the maps and Mrs Vera Eden, who prepared the typescripts of the documents and the annotation.

We are also indebted to all those who provided us with biographical information on persons mentioned in the documents.

INTRODUCTION

The Armistice Negotiations Between Israel and the Arab States

During the period covered by the present volume (December 1948–July 1949), armistice negotiations were held and agreements signed with four Arab states bordering on Israel: first Egypt, followed by Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, in that order. Discussions with each of Israel's neighbours were conducted separately, each bearing its own peculiar character. These differences were due to the diverse military and geo-political situations on the various fronts, the nature and temperament of the people who participated in them, and the degree to which the U.N. Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was involved in directing the talks.

These discussions were held in pursuance of a Security Council resolution, under the auspices of the United Nations Organization and through the mediation of its representative. This factor, which distinguished them from similar negotiations in the past, was of no little importance in determining their course and shaping their results.

The Israeli–Egyptian Negotiations

Shifting military fronts, compounded by various Security Council resolutions resulting from that unstable situation, provided the background for the armistice negotiations with Egypt, and gave rise to problems such as the Faluja pocket, the demand for the Israeli evacuation of Beersheba, and the question of the mobility of Israeli troops in the northern Negev.

In two campaigns, conducted between October 1948 and January 1949, Israel succeeded in dislodging the Egyptian army from southern Palestine, with the exception of a narrow coastal strip around Gaza. The Arab states and Britain tried, unsuccessfully, to avail themselves of Security Council resolutions to counter this setback; these resolutions, however, enabled Egypt to demand, during the Rhodes armistice talks, the return of territories taken by Israel.

Parallel to the military moves, there were informal contacts between Israeli and Egyptian representatives in Paris. Although

these contacts marked the beginning of the end of the war, they failed to develop into formal negotiations and were overtaken by the military moves. Only on conclusion of the latter did the armistice talks actually begin.

* * *

Operation *Esser Hamakot* ("Ten Plagues"), subsequently renamed Operation *Yoav* (15–22 October 1948), smashed the Egyptian lines in the northern Negev. Israeli forces occupied Beersheba and the coastal strip from Isdud south to Yad Mordechai, as well as a strip across from Beit Jibrin to Majdal. The Israelis also expanded the territory under their control in the Hebron area and in the Jerusalem corridor. An entire Egyptian brigade was trapped in the "Faluja pocket".

The Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948 called on both sides to withdraw forces that had advanced beyond positions held on 14 October. In pursuance of this resolution Ralph Bunche, in a memorandum dated 13 November 1948, established provisional truce lines. The line of the Israeli forces was for the most part identical with the 14 October line. The Egyptian line in the west encompassed the area then beginning to be called the "Gaza Strip", while the Arab line in the east started at Jerusalem and included the Hebron area as far as the Dead Sea. A large demilitarized area was to be established between these lines, where neither side was to maintain military forces and no military movement was to be allowed except as authorized and supervised by the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. The memorandum allowed Israel to retain those forces in its northern Negev settlements stationed there before 14 October. Egyptian forces stationed in the Bir Asluj area prior to this date were permitted to remain there, except in the village of Bir Asluj itself, and to retain control of the Bir Asluj –Rafah road. Israel was ordered to evacuate Beersheba, which was to be demilitarized and run by an Egyptian civil administrator as an Arab town.

Meanwhile, Bunche worked to bring about a further Security Council resolution providing for an armistice to replace the shaky truce. Such a resolution was indeed adopted on 16 November, and called on the parties to negotiate armistice agreements, either directly or through the Acting Mediator. Under such an armistice, permanent armistice demarcation lines were to be established, and a

withdrawal and reduction of forces effected, in order to ensure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace.

The 16 November resolution, which constituted a formal basis for all the armistice discussions in 1949, also toned down the harshness of the 4 November resolution, from Israel's point of view, and facilitated the drafting of a response to Bunche's memorandum. Replying on 18 November, Israel declared its willingness to begin armistice talks immediately. It reported that the forces which had entered the Negev after 14 October had already been withdrawn, but there were mobile forces in the Negev settlements, and these, it was emphasized, had moved freely throughout the area since 15 May. Israel agreed to evacuate the Deir Suneid area, designated as Egyptian territory in the 13 November memorandum, once the necessary security arrangements were made. However, Israel refused to evacuate Beersheba and objected to the establishment of a demilitarized zone, in view of Bunche's decision to permit the Egyptians to remain in the Bir Asluj area and control the Bir Asluj–Rafah road.

Though apparently there had been a partial return to the situation existing before 15 October, Operation *Yoav* did in fact bring about a very significant change. The Egyptian lines which had separated the main Israeli force from the Negev settlements were not restored, and the area remained under the effective control of the Israeli forces.

The start of armistice negotiations with Egypt was postponed for many weeks, mainly because of Israel's refusal to accede to Egypt's demand, based on the 4 November resolution, to allow the evacuation of the besieged Egyptian garrison from Faluja prior to opening the talks. At the end of December, Israel launched a new offensive (Operation *Horev*, 22 December 1948–7 January 1949), aiming to push the Egyptian army back behind the international border. Israeli units crossed the border into Sinai and reached the outskirts of Al-Arish, but American pressure forced Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory. The main objectives of the campaign were achieved, except for an unsuccessful attempt to sever the Gaza strip from Sinai in the Rafah area.

Both countries responded to the Security Council appeal to cease hostilities on 7 January; the Egyptians simultaneously announcing their agreement to immediate armistice talks. These opened officially in Rhodes on 13 January 1949.

The Rhodes negotiations lasted six weeks. The Israeli representatives came bolstered by the advantage of military control of the

area claimed by Israel and victory in the war. As the talks progressed, it became clear that this advantage, important as it was, did not suffice to guarantee the realization of all Israeli expectations, and that the Egyptians were capable of capitalizing both on their very willingness to negotiate, and on the authority of Security Council resolutions. Both sides had to accustom themselves to the fact that mutual concessions were inevitable, and that each held some advantages in the bargaining. They also had difficulties to contend with at home.

Thus, on the eve of the talks, a unique balance existed between the Israeli and Egyptian positions. Some factors to be reckoned with were the former Palestinian–Egyptian border, the November 1947 partition borders, the fighting line and the lines established in Bunche's 13 November memorandum. The Egyptians based their stand mainly on Bunche's memorandum, while Israel based its demands principally on the actual military situation. The partition plan, though not mentioned explicitly, frustrated the realization of the Israeli demands on the Gaza strip and the Auja area.

The Egyptians demanded that the armistice lines be determined on the basis of Bunche's memorandum of 13 November. They refused to recognize Israeli conquests resulting from Operation *Horev*, and invoked the Security Council resolution of 19 August 1948, which stipulated that no party was entitled to military or political gains through violation of the truce. Specifically, they insisted on: a) continued Egyptian presence in the Gaza strip, and Israeli withdrawal from the areas of Deir Suneid and the cemetery opposite Rafah, captured during Operation *Horev*; b) removal of Israeli forces from the northern Negev south of the 14 October line, except for defensive forces in the Jewish settlements; c) demilitarization of Beersheba and the appointment there of an Egyptian civil administrator; d) Egyptian control of the Asluj–Rafah road and the appointment of an Egyptian civilian governor in the village of Asluj; e) withdrawal of Israeli forces from the entire strip of desert on the Palestinian–Egyptian border occupied in Operation *Horev*, including Auja — junction of the roads to Beersheba and the heart of the Sinai; f) demilitarization of the southern Negev area.

Israel's opening position was determined on the eve of the delegation's departure, apparently in consultations at the political-military level. Although it was not discussed at a Cabinet session, its basic principles were accepted by all Cabinet members and approved after deliberation by the Provisional Council of State. It was decided that

the delegation should initially demand total Egyptian withdrawal from the confines of Palestine, *viz.* the Gaza strip and the Bethlehem area. The possible occupation — or even annexation — of the Gaza strip by the Egyptians gave ground for controversy in Israel. The left-wing Mapam (United Workers Party) advocated a resolution stating that "the annexation of any part of... Palestine cannot serve as a basis for negotiations," while Mapai and the rest of the coalition parties favoured the demand for withdrawal, but merely as a bargaining point and not as an irrevocable condition. The resolution finally adopted by the Provisional Council of State was formulated in accordance with the latter view.

This demand for the removal of the Egyptian forces was not linked to a further one for the entry of Israeli forces into the Strip, and left open the political future in this area, envisaged by the partition plan as part of the Arab Palestinian state. Another of Israel's basic positions was expressed in the demand for the armistice line to run along the Palestine–Egypt international border which, at its northern end, was identical with the fighting line created by Operation *Horev*, and in the decision "not to agree to withdrawal from any outpost which is held by the Israeli army". The delegation was instructed to be inflexible on this last matter, and consequently the Israeli delegates rejected Egypt's demands for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Beersheba, Asluj and Auja. On the tactical level, the delegation was directed not to deviate from the abovementioned basic framework nor to make any concessions. However, they were not to break up the negotiations without first consulting with the political and defence authorities in Israel.

The Israeli delegation was made up of a political and a military team. It was headed by the Director-General of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Dr. Walter Eytan, aided by two experts on Arab affairs — Reuven Shiloah and Eliahu Sasson — and the Ministry's legal adviser, Shabtai Rosenne. The military team was led by the Chief of Operations Colonel Yigael Yadin, aided by two officers serving in advisory and intelligence capacities — Major Arieh Simon and Major Yehoshafat Harkabi. Colonel David Shaltiel and Lieutenant-Colonel Yitzhak Rabin participated in some of the talks. Opinion among the delegates was not always unanimous. At certain stages of the talks, the Foreign Ministry personnel felt that the Cabinet was not showing enough flexibility and that stubbornness on marginal issues was liable to wreck the conference. Yigael Yadin, on the other hand, occasionally felt that the Foreign Ministry tended to make

dangerous concessions. At the last resort, problems were settled through the intervention of the Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, decisions of the Prime Minister or Cabinet resolutions.

The Egyptian delegation consisted of a military team and political advisers. Its chief was Colonel Muhammad Sayf al-Din, who was accompanied by Colonel Muhammad Kamil al-Rahmani and Colonel Ismail Sherine, a confidant of King Farouk. (Sherine's rank was conferred for the purpose of the talks.) Also participating were Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Nuh and Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmud Riad. The legal adviser was Dr. Ahmad Musa. Two political advisers — Omar Lutfi and Muhammad Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa — both senior officials in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were also present in Rhodes. They were not members of the official delegation and did not participate in the formal talks, but they acted behind the scenes and held several meetings with members of the Israeli delegation.

The United Nations' team was headed by the Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche. With him were the American General William Riley, the economist John Reedman and the Greek jurist Constantin Stavropoulos. Bunche, as chairman of the conference, steered the negotiations with singular determination and had a decisive influence on their course and outcome.

The armistice talks were divided into three main stages: the first (13–25 January) began in a congenial atmosphere and ended in dispute and crisis; in the course of the second stage, which lasted less than a week (27 January–2 February), Bunche attempted to break the deadlock by means of a compromise proposal submitted to the parties; the third, which lasted three weeks (3–24 February), witnessed gradual progress on the basis of the Mediator's compromise proposal. At its conclusion, the agreement was signed.

During the first stage progress was obstructed by the Faluja problem. The issue was not directly related to the armistice agreement, but given its importance to Egypt and Bunche's desire to remove it from the agenda, it was discussed at the very beginning of the talks.

The Egyptians, supported by Bunche, claimed that with the commencement of armistice talks, Israel was duty-bound to allow the immediate evacuation of the besieged Egyptian force. The Israeli government, fearing that this would lessen Egyptian urgency to conclude an agreement, refused to comply. Bunche succeeded in persuading the Israeli delegation to agree to an evacuation plan to be

implemented a week later, on the assumption that by then an armistice agreement would be signed. But it was soon obvious that differences could not be bridged within such a short period of time, and Israel consequently announced that it would no longer give its consent to the evacuation. This led to a serious controversy between Bunche and the Israeli delegation. The fate of the talks hung in the balance for two days, until the Egyptian delegation received instructions from Cairo to stay on despite Israel's refusal to release the Egyptian garrison. In return, the Israelis agreed to allow the passage of convoys carrying food and medical supplies to Faluja for the duration of the talks, and to sign a cease-fire agreement with Egypt.

During the first stage, discussions of the main issues proceeded according to Bunche's direction. He alone was thoroughly acquainted with the basic positions of the parties, and he shared this knowledge with the delegations only gradually. At the beginning he succeeded in creating a certain haziness and in giving both sides the impression that an agreement was imminent. The Israeli delegation, in fact, laboured for a while under the mistaken notion that the Egyptians might agree to withdraw their forces from the Gaza strip, provided the local population were not subjected to Israeli rule.

The objects of dispute at this stage were the Israeli demand for evacuation of the Gaza strip, and the Egyptian insistence on a symbolic Egyptian force in Bir Asluj, the withdrawal of the Israeli forces form Beersheba with the appointment of an Egyptian governor there, and Israeli withdrawal from the strip of territory adjacent to the international border, the Auja junction included. Bunche's attept at compromise failed and the first stage of the talks was concluded without real progress having been made, except for the removal of the Faluja question from the conference agenda.

The Israeli Cabinet reviewed the negotiations in anticipation of the second stage. It had become clear that the main point of contention between Israel and Egypt was likely to be the Auja area. The delegation members warned that this problem might destroy the chances of an agreement, and requested a reassessment. The Cabinet decided that at this stage Israel would only drop its demand for Egyptian withdrawal from the Gaza strip, but make no concession with regard to Auja. Owing to internal considerations, the decision to relent on the Gaza strip was not an easy one. Circumstances, however, forced some concession from Israel, and since the prospects of removing Egyptian forces from the Strip were slight in any

case, it was preferable to waive this demand rather than face a collapse of the talks.

Upon resumption of the talks, this concession was presented as an expression of Israel's good will, but it failed to move Bunche. He saw it as a minor concession, not weighty enough to offset Israel's adamant stand on the issues of Auja, Beersheba and Asluj. The Egyptians had indeed desisted from their original demand of an Egyptian force in Bir Asluj, and were prepared to make do with the appointment of an Egyptian governor there, but they refused to give in on the question of Beersheba and insisted on the return of an Egyptian force to Auja.

Bunche's disappointment at the parties' unwillingness to compromise led him to the conclusion that the talks should be rechannelled from the political to the military level, and should deal first with the more tractable issues. He estimated that the military were the stumbling block and that talks with them would lead to a gradual modification of their positions. Simultaneously, he tried to put pressure on both sides at diplomatic level, in Washington and in New York. The Department of State was prepared to assist, but at this stage American intervention did not produce the desired results.

The military talks were not direct, but conducted through General Riley's mediation. Under discussion were buffer zones, where only defensive forces were to be maintained, and the definition of these forces. Yadin made some concessions to the Egyptians in drawing up the buffer zone, and agreed to a reduction of forces line in the northwestern sector in accordance with the 13 November line. He consented to the inclusion of Bir Asluj in the reduced forces area, but not Beersheba. His suggested definition of defensive forces was accepted for the most part by the Egyptians, so that eventually certain progress was made. Auja was again discussed and Yadin once more presented a compromise proposal providing for a mixed armistice commission to have its seat in the village itself, but with Israeli forces continuing to hold the outposts surrounding the village, including those on its western side, on the international border. Riley neither accepted nor transmitted Yadin's proposal to the Egyptians. He wanted Israeli forces to hold outposts only on the north and the south of the village, and absolutely opposed their remaining in the western outposts. Yadin rejected this suggestion and another impasse was reached.

Bunche presently intervened with a reasoned compromise proposal for an armistice agreement. Regarding Auja, Bunche proposed

the demilitarization of the village and its environs as a Special Neutral Zone, to be placed under United Nations supervision and control. He proceeded on the assumption that neither side had a territorial claim on the area (it was not included within the borders of the Jewish state according to the 29 November 1947 resolution, nor did it form part of Egyptian territory), while it was equally vital to both from the security point of view. With regard to Beersheba and Asluj, he proposed acceptance of the Israeli demands, but attempted to compensate the Egyptians by means of a complicated formulation of one of the clauses of the armistice agreement, which would enable Egypt to reassert its demands in future. The armistice lines proposed by Bunche coincided with those of the 13 November memorandum and the buffer zone established in that document.

The Israeli delegation criticized the compromise proposal and rejected the demilitarization of Auja, offering Yadin's proposal as their final concession. Israel opposed the armistice lines that placed Beersheba within the buffer zone, as well as the formulation of the clause safeguarding the Egyptians' right to renew their claims on Beersheba and Asluj in the future. The Egyptians, on the other hand, accepted the compromise proposal as presented, thus shifting Bunche's attitude in their favour.

Though presenting a semblance of unanimity, dissension was brewing within the Israeli delegation; Eytan and Rosenne criticized Yadin's intransigence and urged Sharett to reconsider Israel's terms. Sharett agreed and managed to persuade Ben-Gurion, brieffy, to make concessions on Auja. Yadin, however, appealed to Ben-Gurion and to the Chief of Staff, and Sharett had to reverse his decision. Yadin argued that there was no military justification for the Egyptian demand or for Bunche's compromise proposal, and that having made concessions to Egypt on the Faluja pocket and the Gaza strip, Israel should not further risk weakening its position *vis-à-vis* the other Arab states. Yadin prevailed, but not for long.

Stage three of the talks then got under way. The delegations convened for a joint official meeting to discuss Bunche's proposal, but this was a failure, with each side emphasizing the extent of its concessions and minimizing those of the other. Yadin and Eytan accused the Egyptians of being unrealistic, and urged a reappraisal of the agreement, with emphasis on its long-range significance rather than its immediale military aspect.

The Egyptian representatives cited their own compromises on Bir Asluj, Beersheba and Auja, and branded the Israeli concession on

the Gaza strip a mere gesture. They again invoked Security Council resolutions and accused Israel of having violated them. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Egyptians proposed a direct meeting between the military representatives.

Three days of military talks followed, during which a certain amount of progress was made. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Beit Hanun area in the Gaza strip and to accept the 13 November line as the armistice line there. This was made contingent upon the creation of a security belt to protect Yad Mordechai, and upon the deployment of strongpoints along the Strip. The Egyptians objected to some of the outposts, particularly those deviating from the 13 November line, or distant from Jewish settlements in that area, but these problems were eventually ironed out. However, disagreement persisted regarding the Egyptian demand for Beersheba to be included in the reduced forces area. And the Auja question remained unsolved.

Simultaneously, Sasson and members of the Israeli delegation held a number of unofficial talks with the Egyptian political advisers. They succeeded in removing some of the difficulties, and appeared to be on the verge of an arrangement. Moreover, they discussed certain political problems relating to Israel's future relations with Egypt and other Arab countries. The pressure Bunche put on Israel, directly and indirectly, through the United States, also had its effect.

On 9 February, the Israeli Cabinet convened to discuss the Auja question. It decided to accept Bunche's compromise proposal on condition that the Egyptians demilitarize a similar zone on their side, that the demilitarized area be reduced, and that Auja be the seat of the Armistice Commission; however, it was stated, the area must not be placed under United Nations control. Political and military considerations tipped the scale in favour of this concession. The Cabinet realized that failure to achieve agreement with the Egyptians might be politically dangerous, should the matter be brought before the Security Council, while, it was hoped, some further concessions would make agreement on all military matters possible, thus facilitating the implementation of the General Staff's plan for an advance to Elath (Operation *Uvda*). The Cabinet decision, opposed by only one of its members, actually went further than was ultimately required, and though contested by Yadin to the very end, it eventually paved the way to agreement. Between its adoption and the signing of the agreement two weeks later, arguments continued

over the formulation of various clauses, with both parties making last-minute attempts to safeguard their interests. Generally, however, obstacles were removed, and Bunche was instrumental in finding a solution to the Beersheba problem satisfactory to Israel.

The armistice agreement, signed on 24 February 1949, formally ended hostilities between Israel and Egypt. Neither side achieved all its demands: Israel had to accept Egyptian military presence in the Gaza strip and to withdraw its troops from the Beit Hanun area and from the territory bordering on the Rafah cemetery, but it was permitted to maintain seven outposts along the Gaza strip; the besieged Egyptian brigade at Faluja was released; Israel was forced to agree to the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the Auja area, which did, however, extend over both sides of the border; Auja was to be the seat of the Mixed Armistice Commission, but Israel succeeded in preventing the placing of the area under United Nations control; the Egyptian demand that Beersheba be included within the area of defensive forces was rejected, but Bir Asluj was included within this area; Israel managed to guarantee the mobility of its forces in the northern Negev, and attained the temporary exclusion of the entire eastern sector of the southern Negev, bordering on Jordan, from the territory covered by the agreement with Egypt; it did not succeed in preventing frequent reference to the Security Council resolution of 4 November and to Bunche's 13 November memorandum in some clauses of the agreement which reserved the right of the parties to raise their political demands in the course of future negotiations.

Notwithstanding all the concessions, the agreement gave Israel considerable advantages: militarily, it guaranteed Israel's control of the northern Negev, and in fact left it free to occupy the southern Negev without violating its agreement with Egypt. Politically, it strengthened Israel's international standing and its chances for admission to the United Nations Organization. The signing of an agreement with the largest Arab state opened up possibilities for agreements with other Arab states and inspired hopes — soon dashed — that the armistice would lead to a final peace. Indeed, Ben-Gurion described this as "the greatest event in a year of great and stupendous events", following upon the establishment of the State of Israel and the Israeli victories on the battlefield.

The armistice talks with Lebanon were marked by an atmosphere and a military background substantially different from those which characterized the talks with Egypt. There appeared to be superficial similarities, as in both cases the truce had been violated and Israel had extended its control beyond the international border. On the Lebanese border this occurred at the end of October, while Operation *Hiram* was in progress and Israeli forces occupied a narrow strip of territory, across Lebanon's eastern border with Israel, including fourteen villages. In this case, however, there was no Security Council intervention nor resolutions to contend with. The French Foreign Ministry demanded Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and, in preliminary meetings with Lebanese representatives in January 1949, Israel expressed its willingness to evacuate some of the villages as a gesture of goodwill. However, though it was then agreed in principle to hold negotiations, these had to await conclusion of an agreement with Egypt.

Discussions began on 1 March 1949. The venue — near Rosh ha-Niqra (Ras al-Naqura) — inspired a very different atmosphere from that at the Hôtel des Roses in Rhodes, site of the talks with Egypt, and the procedure was quite unlike that which developed in the Greek island. Here, talks were held in a friendly spirit, very often directly, with the United Nations representatives playing a less central and essential role. Ralph Bunche did not participate, and was represented by Henri Vigier, who was occasionally assisted by General William Riley, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Observers, as well as by some of the observers in Lebanon and Israel. The participants on Israel's behalf were: Lieutenant-Colonel Mordechai Makleff (head of the delegation), Yehoshua Pellman (Palmon) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry's legal adviser, Shabtai Rosenne. The members of the Lebanese delegation were: Lieutenant-Colonel Taufiq Salim, Chief of Staff of the Lebanese army (head of the delegation), Muhammad Ali Hamada, Acting Secretary-General in the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs (legal adviser of the delegation), and two Lebanese officers: Joseph Harb and Djezl Houssami.

There were very few points of contention between Lebanon and Israel and hardly any disagreements as to the character of the desired settlement. Both agreed that the international border should serve as the armistice line, and that with the signing of the agree-

ment, Israel would withdraw from Lebanese territory. Despite this basic agreement, the negotiations lasted three full weeks, because of Israel's insistence on linking their completion with a Syrian withdrawal from Israeli territory along the Jordan River and east of the Sea of Galilee. Israel maintained that its entire northern border, from Rosh ha-Niqra to the Sea of Galilee, constitued one geographical unit and that the principle of withdrawal to the international border must be applied without exception. The Israeli stand had been formulated by the General Staff and Ben-Gurion and was predicated on the assumption that the Syrians would be persuaded to pull back if Israel did the same. Some reservations about this approach were voiced at the Foreign Ministry, reflecting differences of opinion between the military and political leadership. Similar differences surfaced between the head of the delegation, Lieutenant-Colonel Makleff, and the Foreign Ministry representatives, but this did not affect routine work; when required, problems were referred to the Prime Minister for decision.

The Israeli argument was not supported by either Bunche or Vigier, and was predictably rejected by the Lebanese. This did not prevent discussion of the various clauses of the agreement, on which good progress was made at the beginning. However, Israeli apprehensions lest accord on all other points — without concomitant fulfilment of this condition — bring about international pressure on Israel to sign the agreement, made a change of tactics imperative. Israel therefore declared that it would sign, provided one of the clauses set a schedule for Israel's withdrawal and made this contingent on the achievement of an armistice agreement with the Syrians. This demand met with strong opposition from Vigier, who was kept from adjourning the talks by Riley. However, the momentum of the talks had been lost and it seemed that only a change in Israel's attitude could extricate them from the ensuing deadlock.

The change emerged shortly thereafter, on 17 March — in consultations at the political-military level — when it was decided to sign the agreement with Lebanon immediately and drop the demand for linkage to an eventual agreement with the Syrians. Several considerations prompted this decision. Political quarters had earlier voiced two arguments in favour of signing: a) pressure by Bunche, coupled with his threat to blame Israel for the collapse of the talks, gave rise to misgivings about possible damage to Israel's position at the United Nations; b) in view of the forthcoming conference of Arab heads of state in Beirut on 21 March, on the initiative of the United

Nations Conciliation Commission, it was thought politically preferable for Egypt not to appear at this conference as the sole state to have concluded an armistice with Israel. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion held that signature would strengthen Israel's claim to the southern Negev in international circles and at the United Nations, as well as serve Israel's interests in the negotiations with Jordan, particularly if resort to military action in the Triangle became necessary, to push back the line on the Iraqi front (see below).

The delegation was accordingly instructed: a) to sign forthwith, and undertake to evacuate the Lebanese villages on condition that the agreement guaranteed Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory; b) to seek a temporary arrangement providing for Israeli civilian traffic on the Metulla–Misgav-Am road; c) to demand Lebanese withdrawal from Rosh ha-Niqra, as well as minor border rectifications in the Malikiya area. Makleff resented these instructions, holding that an armistice agreement on these terms deprived Israel of the leverage to force Syrian pullback to the international border. Bunche and Vigier, conversely, felt that Israel's conditions were still too rigid. An accommodation was finally reached in direct negotiations with the Lebanese representatives, but Israel had to waive some of its demands. The Lebanese insisted that the armistice line must be absolutely identical with the international border, and as for the Syrian army in Lebanon, Israel had to content itself with an arrangement concluded between Riley and the Lebanese Government and providing for the withdrawal of the Syrians to the "Tripoli–Haleb [Aleppo] line."

The Israeli and Lebanese representatives signed the armistice agreement on 23 March.

The Israeli–Jordanian Negotiations

The negotiations with Jordan differed both from preceding and subsequent ones. The peculiar character of the Jordanian front, the Iraqi army's partial control of it, and the pattern of political relations between Israel and King Abdallah of Jordan accounted for this difference.

The Jordanian front stretched along an extensive and tortuous line, flanked on both sides by most of the Jewish and Arab population centres in Palestine. Its northern and central sections were held by the Iraqi army, with Egyptian forces holding some of its southern

sections. In Jerusalem, the front line separated the two populations, effectively dividing the city. Here, around this front, was the focus of the Arab–Jewish conflict.

Major fighting on the Jordanian front ceased with the Second Truce, on 18 July 1948. Numerous clashes occurred during the truce, the most serious in Jerusalem and its environs, but there were no large-scale military operations. The truce lines remained in force until the opening of the armistice talks, except on the southern side of the Jerusalem corridor and in the Hebron area,where Egyptian forces were stationed, and where changes were executed through Operations *Hahar* and *Yekev* (19–22 October 1948), conducted simultaneously with Operation *Yoav*. In many sectors the truce lines diverged from the partition borders and established a new military reality in Palestine: western Galilee, Lydda, Ramle, Jaffa, parts of southern Judea and the northern Negev, including the town of Beersheba, all originally assigned to the Arab State, were now in Israeli hands. The Gaza strip, cut off from the centre of the country, was occupied by Egyptian troops, and in the Plain of Sharon, the Iraqis were able to occupy a small area which had been allotted to the Jewish state.

Most of Judea and Samaria (later called "The West Bank"), intended for the Arab State, was under the control of the Jordanian Arab Legion and the Iraqi army; and, though the fate of the area had not been decided, the establishment of an independent Arab state there was very much in doubt. King Abdallah sought to annex the Arab parts of Palestine to his kingdom, while the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee wanted to establish its own independent Arab state. In the summer of 1948, the Committee set up the "Gaza Government" as a representative government of the Palestinian Arabs, but its influence was confined to the Gaza strip. In Judea and Samaria, Abdallah's influence, fortified by actual occupation, naturally grew stronger, until it was decreed, at a meeting of Arab notables in Jericho in December 1948, to unite Jordan and Palestine as the "Arab Hashemite Kingdom". The King was authorized to solve the Palestinian problem as he saw fit, and he took the first steps toward annexation, which was formally completed a year and a half later. The Arab states denounced Abdallah's moves, but the King was not deterred, and sought Israeli support to obtain international backing, particularly from the United States. Abdallah's contacts, with the Jewish Agency before the war and with the Israeli representatives during the Second Truce, must be viewed in the light of his

intention to annex parts of Palestine. Israeli–Jordanian contacts were resumed during the United Nations General Assembly session in Paris, in autumn 1948, and gained new momentum during the last months of 1948 and the beginning of 1949.

In November 1948, direct contact on a local level was established between the Jordanian and Israeli military commanders in Jerusalem — Abdallah al-Tall and Moshe Dayan. The two met several times in the presence of United Nations representatives in an effort to stop the frequent exchanges of fire in the divided city. On 30 November they signed the "Sincere Truce Agreement", which put an end to the incidents and fixed an agreed truce line in the city. The success of these contacts encouraged the parties and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to try to extend the scope of the agreement. Tall and Dayan met indeed several times with U.N. personnel to examine a number of proposals, but the talks were not successful, and in mid-December the Israelis decided to terminate them. Contact was not entirely cut off, but the opinion was gaining ground in Israel that a reassessment was necessary, to alter the scope and level of the negotiations and upgrade them to actual armistice talks. The matter was debated throughout December, and considered by the Cabinet.

Two major issues — the Negev and the Iraqi front — impeded the development of relations with Abdallah, while another problem — Jordan's declared intention to annex parts of Palestine — still needed fundamental clarification. At the start of consultations, Israel occupied the northern Negev and was on the point of launching Operation *Horev*, aimed at extending its control over the central and western Negev. The southern Negev was being claimed by both Israel and Jordan; the latter, supported by Britain, wished to annex it, while Israel considered it its own and hoped to establish title to this claim. Supporters of negotiations with Abdallah argued that talks would ensure quiet on the Jordanian front during Operation *Horev*, as well as elucidate the King's intentions regarding the southern Negev.

The question of the Iraqi front was more complicated: the truce line there left a narrow Israeli corridor in the coastal plain, with the Iraqis holding the Wadi Ara area and the chain of hills overlooking Israeli territory to the east. Security considerations made this line unacceptable, and consequently Israel had been seeking ways to change it ever since the fighting ended. Plans for military action were considered several times but, though not entirely shelved, they did

not materialize because of priority accorded to the military operations in the Negev (*Yoav*, *Horev* and *Uvda*). Military and defence personnel estimated that ultimately no choice would be left other than military action, and they feared that negotiations with King Abdallah would undermine Israel's military option.

As to the annexation of the Jordanian-controlled parts of Palestine, opinions in Israel's policy-making circles were far from unanimous. Elias Sasson, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East division, was in favour of annexation and advocated that, at least as a tactical measure, Israel should support the realization of Abdallah's plans. He advocated the start of talks with the King. Ben-Gurion differed. He doubted Abdallah's ability to act without British backing or Britain's willingness to encourage his contacts with Israel. He was also concerned lest overt Israeli support for the annexation plans might damage Israel's relations with the Soviet Union and other countries. Mapam members in the Cabinet and in the Provisional Council of State vehemently opposed peace talks based on annexation. They favoured the establishment of an independent Arab state and wanted the talks with the Jordanians to be based on such a policy.

It was consequently agreed, both at the Cabinet and in political consultations, to begin talks with Jordan without commitment to support the King's annexation plans, and without ruling out the possibility of military action.

Negotiations, which began on 26 December, were defined as armistice talks, to be subsequently expanded into peace talks. The participants for Israel were Moshe Dayan and Reuven Shiloah, and for Jordan — Abdallah al-Tall and Shaukal al-Saty. Sasson and Dayan met with King Abdallah himself later on, and Yaacov Shimoni replaced Shiloah. Letters of credentials were exchanged, and the parties presented their basic positions. The King wanted an arrangement based on a combination of the 1947 partition plan and the Bernadotte plan, while the Israeli representatives held that the agreement must be based principally on the actual military situation. Apart from his designs on the southern Negev — he was prepared to recognize some Israeli interests in the area — the King asked for Lydda and Ramle, or at least the repatriation of the refugees from those towns to their homes. Early in the contacts, the King's representatives wanted Jaffa to be granted the status of an Arab enclave with arrangements for free passage, but this demand was subsequently dropped. Jordanian interests in Gaza were

emphasized and, in personal meetings with the Israeli representatives, the King sought to prevent the Egyptian annexation of the region that he thought might result from the Israeli–Egyptian negotiations in Rhodes. The King rejected the idea of the internationalization of Jerusalem and proposed dividing the city, with a buffer zone under international supervision. The Jordanians proposed an exchange of territory in Jerusalem, where the truce lines cut the Bethlehem road off from the Arab area and the Mount Scopus road from the Jewish area. But all the city quarters the Jordanians suggested for barter — though some formerly inhabited by Arabs — were now in Israeli hands, and the King's representatives rejected an Israeli counter-proposal for the exchange of Israeli-held territory in the south of the city for Jordanian-held territory in its north. Jordan nevertheless expressed willingness to hand the Jewish Quarter of the Old City over to the Israelis, with arrangements for access to the Quarter.

The Israeli representatives made the following demands: that the armistice line in Wadi Araba coincide with the Palestine–Jordan border, i.e., that the southern Negev be entirely under Israeli control; that the armistice line on the Iraqi front be modified; that the Latrun salient on the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road be evacuated; that railway traffic to Jerusalem be resumed. They wanted to discuss the problem of Jewish economic enterprises in Jordanian-held territory, such as the hydroelectric power plant at Naharayim, and the Palestine Potash Company at the northern end of the Dead Sea. As for Jerusalem, the Israeli representatives were inclined to agree to territorial exchange, but only on a reciprocal basis. The Jordanians were also told that Israel had not yet decided its policy on annexation of the West Bank and that the matter was open for discussion.

There was a considerable gap between the positions of the two parties, but the stage of practical discussions had not been reached. Meanwhile, armistice negotiations with Egypt had begun, and official talks with Jordan were expected to follow. With the King's encouragement, further — but otherwise inconclusive — meetings were held, and the only intelligence gained by Israeli policy makers from these was that the King would not willingly waive his demands on the Negev; thus only a military operation would guarantee full Israeli control of the area. Political considerations determined the timing of the action, which was named Operation *Uvda* ("Fact"). It was originally scheduled for the period between the signing of the armistice agreement with Egypt (to avert possible Egyptian inter-

vention) and the beginning of official talks with Jordan. However, Israeli attempts to stall the latter failed, and the operation — bringing the Israelis to the southern tip of Palestine at Elath — was finally carried out during the first days of the armistice talks. The resulting recriminations had a disturbing effect on the initial meetings.

Official talks with Jordan began on 4 March in Rhodes. The Israeli participants were: Reuven Shiloah (head of the delegation); Lieutenant-Colonel Moshe Dayan; Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Loehner (Laner); and the Foreign Ministry's legal adviser, Shabtai Rosenne. At a later date, Yaacov Shimoni joined the delegation. Two Israeli officers, Yehoshafat Harkabi and Shaul Ramati, also attended, though not as official members.

The participants on the Jordanian side were: Colonel Ahmed Sidki al-Jundi (head of the delegation); Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad al-Ma'ayita; Captain Ali Abu Nawar; Major Radi Hindawi; and the legal adviser, Riyad al-Muflih.

Ralph Bunche directed the negotiations on behalf of the United Nations. These were conducted in a friendly spirit. However, the Jordanian delegation was made up of relatively low-ranking personalities, lacking real authority, and unable to decide on major issues. Decisive discussions were held not in Rhodes but with King Abdallah himself, therefore limiting Bunche's role as mediator, and preventing him from exerting his influence, as he did in the negotiations with Egypt and with Syria.

The Israeli delegation was given clear instructions, approved by the Cabinet. Israel's basic positions, previously presented at the preliminary talks, had in the meantime undergone elaboration and precise definition: in the Iraqi-held sector of the Sharon area the armistice line to be drawn east of the fighting line, with the villages of Tira and Qalansuwa included within Israel's borders; demand for evacuation of Qalqiliya at the initial stage to be left to the delegation's discretion; in the Wadi Ara area the armistice line to be drawn south–east of the fighting line, so as to bring the entire Afula-Hadera road under Israeli control; evacuation of the Latrun salient; fixing of the international border as the armistice line in the Araba; in Jerusalem — free access to Mount Scopus, to the Mount of Olives cemetery, and to the Wailing Wall; operation of the Jerusalem railroad; free access to Naharayim and possible reactivation of the station; resumption of the water supply to the Dead Sea Potash Works and free movement in the Dead Sea for its sailing vessels, as well as transport of produce in Israeli vehicles to Jerusalem. The

delegation was warned not to commit Israel to reciprocal concessions, whether territorial exchange or the return of refugees, without express orders, as well as to ensure the inclusion of a clause in the armistice agreement stipulating that Israel's signature did not constitute recognition of Jordanian sovereignty over territories west of the Jordan.

Deliberations lasted a month, and were divided into four stages: 4–11 March, 12–18 March, 18–23 March, 24 March — 3 April.

The first stage, which began with a discussion of the armistice lines in the Jordanian-held sector, was soon brought to a crisis by Operation *Uvda.* The Jordanians denounced the truce violations and Israeli attacks on the Arab Legion and, supported by Bunche, demanded immediate signing of the armistice agreement — which Israel stalled till the Operation was over. The armistice agreement for the Jordanian sector was signed on 11 March. U.N. observers were sent to the Araba region and shortly thereafter certified the location of the Israeli positions in the southern Negev.

During the second stage, owing to the fact that the Iraqis had neither sent representatives to the talks nor authorized the Jordanians to negotiate on their behalf, discussion centred on Jordanian-held sectors. Notwithstanding long discussions, Bunche failed to persuade the Israelis to moderate their demands on Latrun, Mount Scopus and the Jerusalem railway, or the Arabs' insistence on free access to Bethlehem. He tried to break the impasse by means of a compromise proposal, whose main feature was the demilitarization of Jerusalem accompanied by mixed supervision, with United Nations participation, of the contested roads and railway. Both sides rejected the proposal. The Israeli delegates regarded it as a ploy to implement U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem by capitalizing on the dispute between the two parties, and they gradually concluded that it was preferable to deal with Jerusalem and its environs in talks outside Rhodes, and to sign an armistice agreement based on the lines of the "Sincere Truce". The Jordanians concurred, and thus this item was removed from the agenda; discussions then turned to the reduction and deployment of forces, and other military matters.

Meanwhile, the third stage began, away from Rhodes, in direct top-level political talks devoted to the Iraqi front. The Jordanians and Iraqis agreed in mid-March on the transfer of Iraqi positions to the Arab Legion. This provided Israel with a convenient excuse to achieve, by political means, the desired modifications in the Sharon and Wadi Ara lines. As soon as the exchange became known, Israel

took several steps: it notified Bunche that this constituted a breach of the truce, inadmissible to Israel; it proposed to King Abdallah a meeting with an Israeli representative, to settle the matter amicably, and made preparations for military action, should political efforts fail. The King, aware of the military preparations, appealed to the British for help and urged the Americans to restrain Israel, while agreeing to receive the Israeli representatives. Moshe Dayan and Y. Harkabi set out immediately to meet him. Dayan reiterated Israeli demands on the Sharon–Wadi Ara area as specified in the instructions to the delegation. In exchange for territorial concessions, Israel would consent to the projected exchange of forces in the "Triangle" (i.e. the northern part of the Jordanian-held area west of the Jordan River). To forestall criticism of the King by his Arab colleagues, Dayan proposed that the agreement be kept secret, and that the exchange be carried out immediately following the signing of the armistice agreement, but that the border changes be implemented gradually over a period of some months. The King agreed in principle, and left details to be discussed subsequently by his representatives. These (the Minister of Justice, the Assistant Foreign Minister, A. al-Tall) met in Jerusalem with their Israeli counterparts (Dayan, Yadin, Eytan, Harkabi).

Careful study of the maps revealed the extent of territory claimed by Israel, which included several Arab villages, of concern to the Jordanian representatives. Bargaining ensued about the size of the area, the fate of the local population and the nature of Israel's recompense to Jordan. The Jordanians hesitated to sign, while the Israelis warned that if no agreement were reached within twenty-four hours, Israel would reverse its position. The Jordanians, apprehensive of the consequences, suggested a further meeting between the King and the Israeli representatives, which took place on 23 March, with a British officer representing the Arab Legion also in attendance.

Abdallah was in a predicament: the British claimed that the Anglo-Jordanian treaty committed them to the defence of his kingdom in Transjordan only, and not of the area he controlled west of the Jordan; the Americans would not undertake to prevent the military action that the King anticipated Israel would initiate in order to occupy the whole of Samaria, should he refuse to sign the agreement. He hoped that compliance would satisfy Israel's demands and preclude further claims.

The King's representatives managed to insert several mitigating

clauses in the agreement: Israel made slight concessions in drawing up the line and undertook to give Jordan other areas in return. A special clause safeguarded the rights of the residents in the Arab villages Israel was to receive, and Israel agreed to defray the cost of a new road between Tulkarm and Qalqiliya. A schedule was set for the transfer of territories, to be completed within approximately four months. A map, with the new lines drawn in, was signed by the Israeli and Arab Legion representatives and attached to the agreement. This was signed on 23 March, but required the approval of Jordan's Prime Minister. The deadline for ratification was set as 30 March, thus allowing Abdallah more time to weigh its significance, to gauge British and American reactions, and perhaps enlist their intervention to prevent ratification, as well as providing time for diplomatic steps to protect Jordan against any breach of the agreement on further Israeli military threat. The King wrote to President Truman and the accredited American representative in Amman tried to influence the State Department, but America kept out, limiting itself to a general declaration of its opposition to any breach of the agreement. The Jordanian Prime Minister tried to use the time to improve some of its terms. Israel rejected his proposals for further modifications in the Iraqi sector, but consented to some changes in the final agreement, signed on 30 March, following an additional meeting with the King. It was decided that the agreement would be made public and that it would be incorporated into the armistice agreement. The Jordanian Prime Minister thus endeavoured to give it a military character and to avoid criticism that Jordan had made a political settlement with Israel. The direct negotiations were to remain secret; in the final agreement it was stated specifically that Israel was compensating Jordan with territories in the Hebron area, and the corresponding new line was drawn on a map signed by both parties. Israel also agreed not to station troops within the Arab villages it was getting, but to leave local forces to police them.

Israeli policy succeeded beyond expectations: modification of the Sharon and Wadi Ara line was achieved without resort to military action, which might have damaged Israel's international standing. Conversely, the agreement also gave King Abdallah clear advantages: further military confrontation might have cancelled out his territorial gains and even shaken his position — whereas, by signing the agreement, Israel actually recognized his control of Palestinian territory not formally his.

The fourth and final stage of the Rhodes talks began with initial

approval of the agreement with Abdallah and concluded with the signing of the armistice agreement. No official report of the negotiations outside the Rhodes framework was given to Bunche, although he in fact knew all about them, and waited patiently for the outcome. Meanwhile, the representatives in Rhodes discussed the reduction of forces and their distribution in the various sectors. Disagreements on these matters did not constitute a serious obstacle to the successful conclusion of the talks.

The armistice agreement was signed on 3 April — a few days following the approval of the special agreement. It established the armistice line between Israel and Jordan, with maps approved by both sides: in the Araba (although not specifically mentioned) the line coincided with the international border; on the Iraqi front, it corresponded to the agreement with Abdallah, and in the Jerusalem sector, to the "Sincere Truce" agreement; in the Jerusalem-Hebron-Dead Sea sector, it was a combination of the 18 July truce lines, those of the agreement with Abdallah, and the Dead Sea lines certified by United Nations observers. The agreement did not tackle the complex problems of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Latrun and the economic enterprises. A special clause (clause 8) authorized a joint committee, without U.N. representatives, to deal with those matters. But in the event, except for resumed railway traffic, these remained unsolved throughout the eighteen years during which the armistice agreement with Jordan was in force.

The agreement with Jordan was an impressive achievement for Israeli policy. Through a successful combination of political and limited military moves, Israel extended its border to Elath, and gained an improved line of defence in the centre of the country. Only in Jerusalem and its environs were the objectives of the negotiations not attained, and temporary truce arrangements became permanent ones, notwithstanding the fact that a political arrangement with the Jordanian kingdom had then seemed feasible. Indeed, the two sides continued to maintain contacts designed to promote peace, and these were only severed two years later, following the assassination of King Abdallah in the summer of 1951.

THE ISRAELI–SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS

The armistice talks with Syria were difficult and protracted. They lasted over three months, with diplomatic action shifting back and

forth between Tel Aviv–Damascus and New York–Washington. Both sides remained inflexible, allowing little room for compromise. Bitter disputes arose out of the military facts in the field following cessation of hostilities, since the Syrians had managed to entrench themselves in areas west of the international border. Israeli attempts to push the Syrians back from Israeli territory, during ten days of fighting between the first and second truces, were unsuccessful. Plans for a renewed campaign were discussed several times during April–May 1949, before and during the negotiations, but rejected because of military and political considerations. The Syrians therefore enjoyed the advantage of controlling important territories, including a Jewish settlement, which Israel claimed as her own.

On the other hand, Israel was in a slightly better political position than it had been at the time of the negotiations with Egypt and Jordan: the armistice agreements it had signed with three of its neighbours enhanced its international standing, which was further consolidated, while the talks were in progress, upon its admission as a full-fledged member of the United Nations. Syria, by contrast, was bogged down in internal and external difficulties: a military coup in Damascus, led by Col. Husni al-Zaim, overthrew the government a few days after it had consented to start negotiations with Israel. The new ruler's need to establish his authority, both at home and abroad, decisively influenced his conduct of the talks. A further political factor of considerable relevance were the conciliation talks in Lausanne, begun at the end of April, and exploited by both sides as a means of pressure.

Officially, discussions began on 5 April 1949 and took place at Khirbet Yarda in no-man's-land between Mahanayim and Mishmar ha-Yarden. On Israel's side, the participants were: Lieutenant-Colonel Mordechai Makleff (head of the delegation), Yehoshua Pellman (Palmon) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Shabtai Rosenne, the legal adviser. Two Israeli officers, Gershon Gilead and Joseph Schnurman, joined the delegation's military team. The Syrians were represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Silu Fawzi, Commander Muhammad Nasir, Captain Bizri Afif and Salah al-Din Tarazi, the legal adviser. Henri Vigier, assisted by General William Riley, conducted the negotiations on behalf of the United Nations. Bunche did not participate in the actual talks, though he was actively involved and steered them, particularly through moments of crisis, from New York. He had frequent consultations with Israel's representatives at the U.N., was in communication with both govern-

ments, and drafted a compromise proposal that broke the stalemate and paved the way for the conclusion of the talks.

Israel's starting point was known to Bunche and to Syria prior to the opening of the talks: uncompromising demand for Syrian withdrawal to the international border, and fixing of that border as the armistice line. Israeli delegates categorically rejected every solution that did not include a total Syrian withdrawal. They founded their claim on several facts, mainly that the international border was recognized in the south and the north as the border between Israel and its neighbours: in two cases (Lebanon and Egypt), Israeli forces had had to pull back behind the international border to honour this principle. Israel insisted that the same criterion now be applied to Syria, with an imposed Syrian withdrawal. Israel also claimed that the absence of a significant Arab population in the territories held by the Syrians made Arab control unjustified, unlike the case of the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The threat to Israel's security posed by Syrian troops west of the border was emphasized, as was the fact that water resources vital to Israel's economy were located in areas held by Syria.

The Syrian starting point was based on the actual military situation: they demanded that the fighting line be recognized as the armistice line and rejected the principle of withdrawal to the international border, citing the 15 July 1948 Security Council truce resolution. In the course of the talks, they moderated their position and submitted a number of proposals for the armistice line, including partial — though never complete and unconditional — withdrawal.

The negotiations therefore focused on the search for an arrangement that would satisfy the Israeli demand, while compensating the Syrians. This entailed drawn-out and difficult negotiations, which can be divided into four main stages: from the beginning of the talks on 5 April to their disruption on 18 May; from 17 May until resumption on 16 June; from 16 June to 3 July; and from 3 July to the signing of the agreement on 20 July.

The first item on the agenda was the signing of a cease-fire agreement. The Syrians proposed an agreement that froze the fighting lines, thereby protecting themselves against any Israeli move during the negotiations. They justified their proposal on similar agreements signed at the beginning of the talks with Egypt and with Jordan. Israel rejected this formulation and the validity of the Egyptian and Jordanian precedents, claiming that the quiet on the Syrian front since 15 July obviated the need for a special agreement.

In truth, Israel did not want to be bound by an agreement that would proscribe any possible military action, should the Syrians insist on their refusal to withdraw to the border. Finally, apprehensive of creating a negative image on the eve of its admittance to the U.N., Israel agreed to a compromise. Instead of a signed agreement, the two sides exchanged letters whereby the governments committed themselves to continue honouring the Security Council resolution.

Once this compromise was reached, discussion of the armistice lines began. At an official meeting on 21 April, Israel presented its irrevocable demand for Syrian withdrawal and the Syrians presented theirs on the armistice line, covering the entire northern border, from Rosh ha-Niqra to the southern part of the Sea of Galilee, and in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948. The Syrians demanded Israeli withdrawal from Upper Galilee and from territories occupied in Operation *Hiram*, plus a freeze on the Syrian front lines, with some adjustments in their favour. The Israeli delegation rejected both the proposal and its rationale. At Vigier's initiative, a meeting limited to the military representatives, with the legal advisers in attendance, was convened on 26 April. This time, the Syrians agreed to the designation of the international border as the armistice line, but only in the Banias –Lake Hula sector. For the southern sector they proposed the water line of the Hula and the Jordan and the eastern bank of the Sea of Galilee. The Israeli representatives rejected this proposal as well, and the talks reached a deadlock. On 29 April, the parties agreed on a temporary suspension.

On the basis of a Syrian initiative, the U.N. mediators proposed a direct meeting with al-Zaim, to break the impasse, and this suggestion was discussed at high-level political consultations in Israel. The military option was raised, but was then dismissed for fear of political and military complications. It was decided to bring influence to bear on Bunche and the State Department while at the same time responding to the Syrian initiative, and sending Yadin and Shiloah to meet with al-Zaim's representatives. Al-Zaim sent two members of the Syrian delegation, armed with authority to make decisions, to the meeting. This was held on 2 June in Rosh Pinna, and was inconclusive, with the Syrians reiterating their demand for the water line to serve as the armistice line, and the Israeli representatives once again insisting on total Syrian withdrawal to the international border. However, it was agreed that the Syrians would bring a new proposal to the next official meeting.

On another plane — simultaneous diplomatic activity in New York — some progress was made towards a settlement. Bunche held consultations with Israeli and Syrian representatives and began working on a compromise proposal. He suggested Syrian withdrawal without concomitant Israeli advance into the evacuated areas, as well as demilitarization of those areas. The Syrians expressed willingness to consider the proposal, provided they could keep outposts in the evacuated area, while the Israeli representatives made it clear that Israel's support would be contingent on total Syrian withdrawal, return of Mishmar ha-Yarden residents to their homes and civilian administration in the demilitarized areas under Israeli control. Bunche was walking a tightrope: he intimated to the Israelis that their stand was acceptable to him, whereas Vigier, in presenting the proposal to the parties, gave it the Syrian interpretation.

On 10 May, the talks were resumed, and the Syrians, as agreed, presented a new proposal — which admitted no change in their previously proposed armistice line. They agreed to withdrawal from the bridgeheads at Mishmar ha-Yarden and the influx of the Jordan into the Sea of Galilee, but demanded compensatory Israeli withdrawal from Ein Gev and Dardara. They proposed that all the evacuated areas become no-man's-land and that Kibbutz Ein Gev be left under Syrian civilian control. They also demanded demilitarization of the entire western Galilee. The Israelis accepted only the Syrian withdrawal part of the proposal but rejected the deal as a whole, thus eliminating it from the agenda. This left the way clear for submission of the Mediator's compromise proposal. This was done by Vigier, who added a vague statement to the effect that the parties could maintain "defensive outposts" in the demilitarized zone.

Israel agreed to accept the proposal on condition that the Syrians forgo their demand for "defensive outposts" in the demilitarized zone, and on the assumption that civilian life there would be under Israeli control. The Syrians accepted, but managed to avoid any clear commitment to full withdrawal of their forces. At an official meeting on 17 May, another deadlock was reached. The Israeli delegation received orders to break off the talks unless there was a firm Syrian undertaking to withdraw — while the Syrian delegation was instructed to withhold such a commitment. Further fruitless bargaining prompted the Israeli delegation to call for a halt in the talks, which were adjourned indefinitely, pending Bunche's instructions.

The second stage developed entirely outside the framework of the

official talks, with the focus shifting to New York, though Damascus was also involved. Bunche, Vigier and the Syrians were seeking a way out of the crisis. The Syrians came up with a new initiative: linking the Lausanne meetings with the armistice talks, and proposing a comprehensive settlement for Both. Through Riley, they transmitted to the Israelis a secret proposal: an armistice based on the fighting lines; a peace arrangement based on the international border, to be reached within three months in the framework of the Lausanne talks; and Syrian willingness to absorb about one-quarter million refugees in return for financial aid. A meeting between Ben-Gurion and al-Zaim was again mentioned. Bunche had earlier suggested such a meeting to Ben-Gurion, and he now pressed it more insistently.

The Syrian move called for a carefully considered Israeli response. The question was whether this was merely a Syrian trick and a trap for Israel, or whether, particularly with regard to the refugees, this constituted a real breakthrough on the way to peace with Syria. Ben-Gurion doubted the reliability of the proposal and feared a diplomatic trap; he saw no reason for a meeting with al-Zaim prior to an unequivocal pledge to total withdrawal by the Syrians. Sharett disagreed, and estimated that the possibility of a solution to the refugee problem implicit in the proposal should be assessed in direct contact with al-Zaim. His readiness to explore this approach led only to complications, and the meeting did not eventuate.

Bunche intervened then. On 8 June he sent the Israeli and Syrian governments a revised compromise proposal, which was carefully worded, for possible incorporation into the armistice agreement. He suggested that the truce line be fixed as the armistice line, and that the zone between it and the international border be demilitarized. To compensate the Syrians for withdrawal from Israeli territory, he proposed demilitarization of the Ein Gev and Dardara areas, which were under Israeli control. He also proposed areas on either side of the demilitarized zone where the parties would be allowed to maintain defensive forces only. According to this, the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission would supervise the return of the civilian population to the demilitarized areas and organize a local police force there. The political future of those areas would remain open until a peace settlement was achieved. His proposal paved the way for renewal of the talks, and for the next stage of negotiations.

On 16 June, the delegations reconvened after a month-long break. Bunche's proposal had been duly studied by the respective govern-

ments. Both delegations agreed to accept it in principle, but differences of opinion remained regarding the status of the demilitarized zones, with each delegation interpreting the various clauses according to its own lights. The Israeli delegation understood that the international frontier was to be to all intents and purposes the border between the two countries, and that Israel would exercise sovereignty over the demilitarized areas; that there would be a return to normal civilian life under Israeli civilian administration; that Israel would continue to cultivate the soil and to establish settlements, and that the inhabitants of the Arab village of Samra would become Israeli citizens; and that the U.N. role would be limited to observation. The Syrians rejected the Israeli interpretation, and thought that the demilitarized zones would be surrendered to the U.N. for supervision until achievement of a final settlement; that no side would gain political advantage for the duration of the armistice; that no new settlements or agricultural work would be undertaken; that Israeli civilians would be under Israeli administration and Arab ones under local Arab administration.

The negotiators failed to reach agreement and requested clarifications from Bunche. His reply was guarded: in an effort to satisfy both sides, he offered a very vague explanatory note, and managed to persuade the Israeli representatives in New York to accept his explanation. The explanatory note submitted to the parties on 26 June clarified Bunche's basic position that civilian administration within the demilitarized zone, police included, would be on a local basis: in the Jewish settlements it would be Israeli, and in the Arab villages, it would be Arab; the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission would be responsible for arrangements guaranteeing the return to normal civilian life, but not for the direct administration of the area.

Bunche stressed to Israeli representatives the desirability of avoiding specific mention of Israeli sovereignty, as Israel would in any case control the demilitarized areas after the Syrian withdrawal.

Israel and Syria decided to accept Bunche's explanation and on 3 July, the fourth and last stage of the talks began. A military subcommittee worked out the drawing of the armistice line and discussed additional military matters, while a drafting committee worked on the final wording of the agreement. In deliberations of the military committee, the Syrians tried to enlarge the demilitarized zone, by inclusion of parts of Lake Hula and the Sea of Galilee, and even the town of Samakh and its environs. The Israeli delegates did not

budge from their original position and Bunche's guideline, and succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory armistice line.

The complex arrangements and vague formulations that resulted from compromises were much more evident in the armistice agreement between Israel and Syria, signed on 20 July 1949, than they had been in the other agreements. These shortcomings fostered innumerable conflicts during the succeeding eighteen years. However, the agreement closed the circle of agreements between Israel and its neighbours, thus releasing Israel from active military confrontation and enabling it to devote a larger portion of its resources to development, the absorption of immigrants and the consolidation of its social and economic structure.

Yemima Rosenthal

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND MAIN SUBJECTS

ABBREVIATIONS

CZA	Central Zionist Archives
Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Recd.	Received
Tel.	Telegram

Note: References which do not include the name of the archives are to documents in possession of the Israel State Archives.

EGYPT

1949

1. 6 Jan. **M. Sharett to A. Lourie.**
Tel. LS/6; Outg. 130.09/2328/6.
Cease-fire and opening of armistice talks.

2. 7 Jan. **Meeting: W. Eytan, R. Shiloah — H. Vigier.**
Report. 130.02/2442/10.
Level and venue of talks.

3. 10 Jan. **W. Eytan to W. Iversen.**
Copy. 130.02/2425/7.
Level of talks; cease-fire violation.

4. 12 Jan. **Meeting: Israeli Delegation — R. Bunche and Staff.**
Report. 130.02/2442/10. (Hebrew)
Agenda.

5. 13 Jan. **Statements by United Nations Acting Mediator and Heads of Egyptian and Israeli Delegations at Opening Meeting of Rhodes Negotiations.**
130.02/2442/10.
Text of statements.

6. 13 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. RH4; Recd. 13 Jan.; Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3.
Agenda.

7. 13 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/10.
Opening of talks; U.N. representatives; Egyptian delegation.

8. [14 Jan.] **Draft Declaration on Assurances as Regards Action by Armed Forces and Security.**
130.02/2442/10.
Text of declaration.

9. 14 Jan. **M. Sharett to Israeli Delegation at Rhodes.**
Orig. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conduct of negotiations; negotiations with King Abdallah; proposal for exchange of prisoners of war.

10. 15 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. RH10; Sent and Recd. 16 Jan.; Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3.
Evacuation of Faluja.

11. 16 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Tel. LS/46; Recd. 17 Jan. (05.15); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15.
Evacuation of Faluja.

12. 16 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Tel. LS/48; Recd. 17 Jan. (06.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15.
Level of talks.

13. 16 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/10.
Significance of armistice agreement with Egypt.

14. 16 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. RH11; Recd. 17 Jan.; Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3.
Armistice talks with Arab states; progress of talks with Egypt.

15. 16 Jan. **W. Eytan and R. Shiloah to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Jan. (00.35); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1054. (Hebrew)
Evacuation of Faluja.

16. 16 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel. TR4; Recd. 17 Jan.; Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15.
Instructions for conduct of negotiations.

17. 17 Jan. **B. Baruch to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Jan. (04.16); Outg. I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1054; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Evacuation of Faluja.

18. 17 Jan. **Members of Israeli Delegation at Rhodes to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett, Y. Dori and Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Jan (06.25); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Evacuation of Faluja.

19. 17 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Jan. (12.35); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
British pressure on Egypt.

20. 17 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan, R. Shiloah and D. Shaltiel.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Jan. (13.15); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Evacuation of Faluja.

34. 19 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 19 Jan. (20.10); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/16. (Hebrew)
Gaza strip.

35. 20 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/10.
Egyptian claim on Bir Asluj; Israel's condition for armistice agreement.

36. 21 Jan. **Working Paper of the United Nations Acting Mediator.**
Submitted 21 Jan.; 130.02/2453/16.
Armistice lines — points in dispute.

37. 21 Jan. **W. Eytan to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 21 Jan. (20.30, 22.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Alternative courses open to Israeli delegation.

38. 22 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 22 Jan. (05.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/16. (Hebrew)
Instructions to delegation.

39. 22 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 22 Jan. (09.10); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Egypt's basic demands.

40. 22 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/10.
Determination of delegation's position regarding Faluja and continuation of negotiations.
Appendices: (i) Working Paper Submitted by the United Nations Acting Mediator and Advisers, 22 Jan.
(ii) Second Draft of Israel — Egypt Armistice Agreement and Draft of Accompanying Letters Prepared by S. Rosenne, 22 Jan.

41. 23 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W105; Recd. 24 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Arguments in favour of a compromise.

42. 23 Jan. **W. Eytan to R. Bunche.**
Copy. 130.02/2442/10.
Postponement of Faluja evacuation.

43. 23 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 23 Jan (19.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Pressure by Bunche to allow evacuation of Faluja.

44. 24 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W109; Recd. 25 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with State Department officials.

45. 24 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/10.
Bunche's argumentation in favour of evacuation of Faluja.

60. 28 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (01.15); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah; diplomatic activity in Washington.

61. 28 Jan. **Y. Yadin to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (03.30); Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Israeli proposal for defensive area and definition of Defensive Forces.

62. 28 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W122; Recd. 29 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with State Department officials.

63. 29 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W125; Recd. 30 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with M. Ethridge, the American member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and State Department officials.

64. 29 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (16.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Gaza strip.

65. 29 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (15.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Israeli proposal regarding Auja and environs.

66. 29 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (15.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3 (Hebrew)
Arguments against Egyptian attitude to negotiations.

67. 29 Jan. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (17.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Armistice talks with Arab states.

68. 29 Jan. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Jan. (23.45); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Israeli proposal regarding Auja and environs.

69. 29 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W126; Recd. 30 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with State Department officials.

70. 29 Jan. **Y. Yadin to W. Riley.**
Submitted 30 Jan. (00.01); Copy. 130.02/2442/10.
Israeli proposal regarding defensive area and Auja.

71. 30 Jan. **M. Sharett to E. Elath.**
Coded Tel. IW27; Outg. 130.09/2308/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/32.
Evacuation of Faluja; diplomatic efforts of State Department.

72. 30 Jan. **M. Sharett to J. Robinson.**
Coded Tel. LS/95; Outg. 130.09/2328/6; Inc. 93.03/67/5.
Time-limit on armistice agreement.

85. 1 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 1 Feb. (12.43, 15.05); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2453/17. (Hebrew)
Suggested arguments *vis-à-vis* State Department regarding Beersheba.

86. 1 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 1 Feb. (15.25); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Cancellation of Security Council resolutions.

87. 1 Feb. **Y. Yadin to Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 1 Feb. (17.25); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Opposition to concessions with regard to Auja.

88. 1 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Sent 16.50; Recd. 1 Feb. (18.55); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Instructions regarding Auja.

89. 1 Feb. **Y. Yadin to Y. Dori, D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 1 Feb. (22.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Arguments against concessions with regard to Auja.

90. 1 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/10.
Report on progress of negotiations.

91. 1 Feb. **Working Paper of the United Nations Acting Mediator.**
Submitted 2 Feb.; 130.02/2442/10.
Withdrawal of forces; Auja; reduction of forces.

92. 3 Feb. **G. Rafael to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X201; Recd. 4 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/3.
Meeting with J. Reedman.

93. 3 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X203; Recd. 4 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with J. Ross.

94. 3 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.02/2454/4.
Egyptian reply to Bunche's compromise proposal.
Appendix: Seif al-Dine to R. Bunche, 3 Feb.

95. 3 Feb. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 4 Feb. (00.21); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Ben-Gurion's instruction concerning Auja.

96. 4 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Submitted 4 Feb. (11.00); Copy. 130.02/2442/10.
Covering letter.
Appendix: Composite Version of the Draft Egyptian — Israeli General Armistice Agreement Incorporating Amendments Proposed by the two Delegations.

97. 4 Feb. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Egyptian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/10.
Discussion of Bunche's draft armistice agreement.

98. 4 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 4 Feb. (21.15); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Inflexibility of Egyptian delegation.

99. 5 Feb. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Egyptian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/10.
Discussion of Bunche's draft armistice agreement.

100. 5 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.02/2454/4.
Desirability of Israeli concessions.

101. 5 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
State and prospects of negotiations.

102. 5 Feb. **Y. Yadin to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 6 Feb. (01.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting of military delegations.

103. 5 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W53T; Recd. 6 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with Secretary of State Acheson: President Truman's position.

104. 6 Feb. **W. Eytan to R. Bunche.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/4.
Explanation of Israeli position.

105. 6 Feb. **Y. Yadin to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 6 Feb. (22.30); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Gaza strip armistice lines; reduction of forces line.

106. 7 Feb. **A. Eban to J. Ross.**
Copy. 130.02/2414/22.
State of armistice talks.

107. 7 Feb. **M. Sharett to E. Elath.**
Coded Tel. T17W; Recd. 7 Feb.; Outg. 130.09/2308/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/32.
Arguments against Bunche's draft agreement.

108. 7 Feb. **W. Eytan to R. Bunche.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/4.
Israel's reasons for rejecting Bunche's draft agreement.

109. 7 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.02/2454/4.
Security Council resolutions and armistice agreement.

110. 7 Feb. **R. Bunche to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Reply to Sharett's criticism of Bunche's draft agreement.

111. 7 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Arguments in favour of Israeli concessions on Auja.

112. 8 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 8 Feb. (17.50); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Points in dispute between Israel and Egypt.

113. 8 Feb. **Y. Yadin to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 8 Feb. (23.05); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Discussion of reduction of forces line; Beersheba.

114. 8 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X205; Recd. 9 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
The British forces at Aqaba and the question of Beersheba.

115. 8 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X207; Recd. 9 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with D. Niles and C. Clifford.

116. 8 Feb. **U. Heyd to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 9 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
White House opposition to one-sided pressure on Israel.

117. 9 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 9 Feb. (19.45); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Political and military considerations against Bunche's compromise proposal; instructions for conduct of negotiations.

118. 9 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11. (Hebrew)
Talks with Egyptian political advisers.

119. 9 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X209; Recd. 10 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with J. Reedman.

120. 9 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Sent 10 Feb. (01.15); Recd. 10 Feb. (10.20); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Government decision on Auja; instructions for conduct of negotiations.

121. 10 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 10 Feb. (13.50); Outg. 130.02/2453/15; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Egyptian political advisers.

122. 10 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 10 Feb. (13.40); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Bunche's appeal to Security Council.

123. 10 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Submitted 10 Feb. (16.00); Copy. 130.02/2442/11.
Covering letter.
Appendices: (i) Draft of Article VI.
(ii) Draft of Article VII.
(iii) Summary of Remaining Points of Difference between Israelis and Egyptians Following Military Discussions 5-8 Feb.

124. 10 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 10 Feb. (19.37); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Criticism of Government decision.

125. 10 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Submitted 10 Feb. (19.30); Copy. 130.02/2442/11.
Explanations regarding Appendix I.
Appendices: (i) Draft of Article VIII.
(ii) Draft of Article IX.

126. 10 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Criticism of Government position.

127. 11 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 11 Feb. (14.10); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Analysis of Egyptian position; desirability of concessions with regard to Auja and Rafah.

128. 11 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 11 Feb. (14.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Explanation of Government decision.

129. 11 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 11 Feb. (18.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3 (Hebrew)
Defects of Government decision.

130. 12 Feb. **Working Paper Submitted by the United Nations Acting Mediator.**
130.02/2442/11.
Draft Preamble and Articles I-V of agreement.

131. 12 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Copy. I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1054.
Covering letter.
Appendix: Draft of Article VIII.

132. 12 Feb. **Y. Yadin to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 12 Feb. (20.05); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conclusion of negotiations.

133. 13 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Egyptian political advisers.

134. 14 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 14 Feb. (13.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
Rejection of Bunche's draft of Article V.

135. 14 Feb. **R. Bunche to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Covering letter.
Appendices: (i) Second Revision of Article VIII.
(ii) Second Revision of Article V.

136. 14 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Meeting with Egyptian delegation and progress of talks.
Appendix: Draft of Article VII.

137. 15 Feb. **W. Eytan to R. Bunche.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/4.
Comment on Article X.

138. 15 Feb. **R. Shiloah to E. Elath.**
Coded Tel. T27W; Outg. 130.09/2308/2.
Meeting with U.S. Special Representative and staff.

139. 16 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X215; Recd. 17 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Meeting with J. Ross.

140. 16 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Progress of talks; armistice talks with Arab states.

141. 17 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Egyptian demands regarding Beersheba; attitude of Israeli press; talks with Jordan.

142. 18 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. T93H; Recd. 19 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
International status of armistice agreement.

143. 20 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 20 Feb. (03.45); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Faluja civilian population.

144. 20 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Concluding stages of negotiations with Egypt.

145. 21 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X220; Recd. 22 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/3.
Bunche's communications to U.N. Secretary-General regarding Beersheba.

146. 21 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X221; Recd. 22 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Diplomatic activity at U.N.

147. 21 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2442/11.
Israeli concession on Bir Asluj; preparation of press for publication of armistice agreement; balance of respective achievements of Israel and Egypt.

148. 22 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 22 Feb. (16.10); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
The Israeli reaction in case of rejection of armistice agreement by Egypt.

149. 22 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 22 Feb. (16.33); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Possible rejection of the armistice agreement by Egypt.

150. 22 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 22 Feb. (22.30); Inc. 130.02/2453/15. (Hebrew)
The Israeli reaction in case of rejection of the armistice agreement by Egypt; diplomatic activity in New York.

151. 22 Feb. **S. Rosenne to J. Robinson.**
Copy. 130.16/2951/1. (Hebrew)
Legal questions involved in armistice agreement.

152. 23 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Outg. 130.02/2453/17. (Hebrew)
Congratulations on conclusion of armistice negotiations with Egypt.

153. 24 Feb. **P. Mohn to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2425/7.
Message from Bunche and Riley on conclusion of armistice negotiations with Egypt.

154. 24 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2425/7. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Egyptian political advisers.

155. 25 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 25 Feb. (15.00); Inc. 130.16/2951/1. (Hebrew)
Appeal to Ben-Gurion and Sharett to devote themselves to cause of peace.

156. 25 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. W137; Recd. 26 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
American pressure on Egypt with regard to Beersheba.

157. 3 Mar. **A. Eban to W. Eytan.**
Memorandum. 130.02/2424/23.
Conclusions and lessons of armistice negotiations with Egypt.

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170. 16 Mar. **S. Rosenne to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 93.03/67/5. (Hebrew)
Progress of talks.
Appendix: New Article V proposed by Israeli Delegation, 15 Mar.

171. 16 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 16 Mar. (19.15); Outg. 130.02/2454/10; Inc. 130.02/2425/5. (Hebrew)
Bunche's criticism of Israeli position; British force in Aqaba.

172. 18 Mar. **E. Sasson to W. Eytan.**
Draft. 93.03/87/24.
Meeting with Lebanese Minister in Paris.

173. 18 Mar. **W. Eytan to M. Makleff.**
Draft. 130.16/2950/2. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conduct of negotiations.

174. 18 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 18 Mar. (20.00); Outg. 130.16/2950/2; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Bunche; armistice talks with Syria.

175. 18 Mar. **A. Eban to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel. X250; Recd. 19 Mar.; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Bunche's communication to U.N. Secretary-General; conclusions from consultation with Sharett.

176. 19 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 19 Mar. (04.30); Outg. 130.02/2425/5; Inc. 130.16/2950/2. (Hebrew)
Vigier's criticism of Israel's condition for signing the armistice.

177. 21 Mar. **S. Rosenne to M. Sharett, E. Sasson and R. Shiloah.**
Orig. 130.02/2425/5. (Hebrew)
Progress of talks.

178. 23 Mar. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Lebanese Delegations.**
130.02/2425/5.
Signing of armistice agreement; closing of conference.

179. 24 Mar. **S. Rosenne to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and others.**
Orig. 130.02/2425/5. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Lebanese delegation member Muhammad Ali Hamada.

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180. 11 Dec. **Meeting: E. Sasson — A. al-Tall.**
Report. 130.15/3738/8I. (Hebrew)
First feelers concerning armistice negotiations.

181. 13 Dec. **Telephone Conversation: E. Sasson — A. al-Tall.**
Report. 130.15/3738/8I. (Hebrew)
King Abdallah's reply regarding armistice and peace negotiations; Jericho Conference; Iraqi forces in Triangle.

182. 26 Dec. **R. Shiloah to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.15/3738/8I. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah's representatives.

183. 31 Dec. **Meeting: R. Shiloah, M. Dayan — A. al-Tall.**
Report. 130.15/3738/8. (Hebrew)
Presentation of positions and principal problems.

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184. 6 Jan. **R. Shiloah to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Report. 130.15/3738/8. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah's representative: clarification of King's proposals.

185. 18 Jan. **M. Sharett to E. Elath.**
Coded Tel. IW10; Outg. 130.09/2308/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/32.
Meeting with King Abdallah.

186. 1 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Report. 130.15/3738/8I. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah.

187. 9 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 9 Feb (17.00); Outg. 130.02/2453/16; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Venue of talks with Jordan.

188. 11 Feb. **M. Dayan to Y. Dori and M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 11 Feb. (12.40); Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Exchange of prisoners; venue and level of talks; Iraqi forces in Triangle.

189. 12 Feb. **M. Dayan to Y. Dori and M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 12 Feb. (15.10 — 15.40); Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Dayan — Tall talks; convoys to Mount Scopus; Conciliation Commission.

190. 14 Feb. **Y. Shimoni to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett.**
Report. 130.15/2569/12. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah's representatives; King's demands and reaction of Israeli representatives.

191. 15 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan and E. Sasson.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 15 Feb.; Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah's representatives; Israel's interest in postponing armistice talks with Jordan.

192. 15 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 16 Feb. (06.00); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Postponement of talks.

193. 15 Feb. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 16 Feb. (09.30); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Southern Negev.

194. 16 Feb. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 16 Feb. (20.30); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2454/3. (Hebrew)
Initial Israeli demands.

195. 19 Feb. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 19 Feb. (12.45); Outg. 130.02/2453/17; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Date of opening of talks.

196. 23 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X225; Recd. 24 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Views of American U.N. delegation on Israeli—Jordanian talks.

197. 28 Feb. **Draft of Instructions to the Israeli Delegation to the Armistice Negotiations with Jordan.**
130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Text of instructions.

198. 3 Mar. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett.**
Orig. I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1057. (Hebrew)
Progress of negotiations.

199. 3 Mar. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 4 Mar. (01.00); Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Agenda; representation of Iraq.

200. 4 Mar. **M. Sharett to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 4 Mar. (16.00); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conduct of talks.

201. 4 Mar. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Jordanian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/9.
Opening Session.

202. 4 Mar. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 4 Mar. (19.07); Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Problem of protocol at opening session.

203. 7 Mar. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett.**
Draft. 130.15/3749/2. (Hebrew)
Letter to King Abdallah concerning composition of Jordanian delegation.

204. 9 Mar. **M. Sharett to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 9 Mar. (13.42); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Jordanian complaint concerning Operation *Uvda*.

205. 9 Mar. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett.**
Orig. I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1057. (Hebrew)
Armistice lines; representation of Iraqi Government.

206. 9 Mar. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett and Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 9 Mar. (24.00); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Armistice lines in Jerusalem and Latrun area.

221. 13 Mar. **Y. Shimoni to D. Ben-Gurion and W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 13 Mar. (15.30); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Discussion of armistice line in Jerusalem and environs.

222. 13 Mar. **M. Dayan to Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 13 Mar. (20.15); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Bunche's reaction to Operation *Uvda.*

223. 13 Mar. **W. Eytan to P. Mohn.**
Copy. 130.16/2948/3.
Israeli protest against planned replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces in Triangle.

224. 14 Mar. **M. Dayan to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 14 Mar. (19.30); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Armistice lines in Hebron—Dead Sea area; Bunche's proposal regarding Jerusalem.

225. 14 Mar. **King Abdallah to M. Sharett.**
Original translation from Arabic. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Complaint concerning Operation *Uvda.*

226. 15 Mar. **W. Eytan to King Abdallah.**
Original Hebrew text. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Reply to King Abdallah's complaint concerning Operation *Uvda*; replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces.

227. 15 Mar. **M. Dayan to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 15 Mar. (15.00); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Armistice lines in Hebron—Dead Sea area.

228. 15 Mar. **R. Bunche: Tentative Proposal for Jerusalem.**
130.02/2442/9.
Text of proposal.

229. 15 Mar. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Jordanian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/9.
Clarification of Bunche's proposal concerning Jerusalem.

230. 15 Mar. **W. Eytan to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 15 Mar. (21.44); Outg. and Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces.

231. 16 Mar. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Jordanian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/9.
Discussion of Bunche's proposal concerning Jerusalem.

232. 16 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 16 Mar. (22.15); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Armistice lines in Hebron area; Bunche's proposal concerning Jerusalem.

233. 17 Mar. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Jordanian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/9.
Discussion relating to reduction of forces.

234. 17 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Mar. (16.30); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Discussion relating to reduction of forces.

235. 17 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 17 Mar. (20.40); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Discussion relating to reduction of forces.

236. 18 Mar. **M. Dayan to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 18 Mar. (18.00); Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with A. al-Tall: Israel's demand for different line in Triangle.

237. 18 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 18 Mar. (19.15); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Riyad al-Muflih: replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces.

238. 18 Mar. **R. Shiloah to Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 18 Mar. (20.25); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Reduction of forces.

239. 19 Mar. **Y. Yadin to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 19 Mar. (13.50); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Reduction of forces in Jerusalem area.

240. 19 Mar. **King Abdallah to W. Eytan.**
Original translation from Arabic. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces.

241. 20 Mar. **W. Eytan to King Abdallah.**
Original Hebrew text. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces.

242. 20 Mar. **W. Eytan to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 20 Mar. (13.50); Outg. 130.16/2948/1; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
King Abdallah's consent to new line in Triangle.

243. 20 Mar. **W. Eytan to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 20 Mar. (21.10); Outg. 130.09/2329/3; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Consultation concerning line in Triangle.

244. 20 Mar. **M. Dayan to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 24 Mar. (04.00); Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
British force at Aqaba.

245. 21 Mar. **E. Sasson to W. Eytan.**
Copy. 93.03/87/24.
Contacts with King Abdallah: Operation *Uvda*; Jerusalem; Triangle.

246. 22 Mar. **E. Sasson to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.15/2565/4.
Telegram from Sasson to King Abdallah (Anglo-Jordanian Treaty; frontier between Dead Sea and Elath; Jordanian declaration concerning

British force at Aqaba); hostile activity of Haj Amin al-Husseini; Egyptian complaints concerning population of Faluja; talks with Syria.

247. 23 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 23 Mar. (22.50); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/1. (Hebrew)
Impossible situation created by instruction not to divulge agreement with King Abdallah.

248. 23-24 Mar. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 93.03/64/1.
Progress of negotiations with King Abdallah on new line in Triangle. Appendix: Agreement between the Hashimite Jordan Kingdom and the State of Israel.

249. 24 Mar. **W. Eytan to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 24 Mar. (17.40); Outg. 130.16/2948/3; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conduct of negotiations.

250. 24 Mar. **W. Eytan to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 24 Mar. (18.30); Outg. 130.16/2948/3; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conduct of negotiations.

251. 24 Mar. **M. Dayan to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 24 Mar. (20.30); Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Considerations in favour of informing Bunche of agreement with King Abdallah.

252. 24 Mar. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Jordanian Delegations.**
130.02/2442/9.
Discussion of armistice lines in Hebron—Dead Sea—Elath sector and of Latrun problem.

253. 24 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 24 Mar. (20.15); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Jordanian delegation.

254. 25 Mar. **M. Dayan to Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 25 Mar. (21.45); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Discussion of Hebron—Ein Gedi line and of reduction of forces.

255. 26 Mar. **M. Dayan to Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 26 Mar. (13.20); Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Reassessment of Israel's position regarding reduction of forces.

256. 26 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Timing of disclosure to Bunche of agreement with King Abdallah; Naharayim; Jews of Iraq.

257. 27 Mar. **R. Bunche to R. Shiloah.**
Orig. 130.16/2948/3.
State of negotiations and suggested basis for agreement.

258. 27 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 27 Mar. (22.30); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc.

130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Discussion of reduction of forces.

259. 27 Mar. **Y. Harkabi to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Outg. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Jordanian demands for changes in agreement with Israel.

260. 28 Mar. **W. Eytan to R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 28 Mar. (15.35); Outg. 130.16/2948/3; Inc. 130.02/2431/1. (Hebrew)
Israeli opposition to changes in the agreement with Jordan.

261. 28 Mar. **Y. Nevo to Y. Yadin and W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Mar. (07.25); Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Arrangement of meeting with King Abdallah.

262. 29 Mar. **M. Dayan to Y. Yadin.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Mar. (03.55); Outg. 130.16/2948/3; Inc. I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055. (Hebrew)
Request for instructions.

263. 29 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 29 Mar. (15.30); Outg. 130.02/2431/2; Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Discussion of draft agreement and map of lines.

264. 30 Mar. **E. Sasson to W. Eytan.**
Copy 93.03/87/24.
Letter from Sasson to King Abdallah concerning lines in Triangle.

265. 31 Mar. **Agreement between the State of Israel and the Hashimite Jordan Kingdom.**
93.03/64/1.
Text of agreement.

266. 3 Apr. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 3 Apr. (04.30); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Last steps toward signing of armistice agreement.

267. 3 Apr. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 93.03/64/1.
Meeting with King Abdallah.

268. 3 Apr. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 3 Apr. (16.15); Outg. 130.02/2431/1; Inc. 130.16/2948/3. (Hebrew)
Definition of Defensive Forces.

269. 3 Apr. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Jordanian Delegations.**
I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1057.
Ceremony of signing the armistice agreement.

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270. 20 Mar. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 20 Mar. (19.50); Outg. 130.02/2454/10; Inc. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Syrian consent to start armistice talks.

271. 30 Mar. **Y. Shimoni to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Outg. 130.02/2454/10. (Hebrew)
Venue and opening date of talks.

272. 30 Mar. **S. Rosenne to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 30 Mar. (19.10); Outg. 130.02/2425/6; Inc. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Venue and opening date of talks.

273. 31 Mar. **S. Rosenne to W. Eytan, R. Shiloah, Y. Yadin and M. Makleff.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Talk with Bunche concerning subjects of negotiations with Syrians.

274. 31 Mar. **E. Sasson to W. Eytan.**
Tel. MA164; Inc. 130.02/2454/10.
The military coup in Syria and the armistice talks.

275. [3 Apr.?] **Syrian Proposal for Cease-Fire Agreement.**
130.16/2953/3.
Text of draft.

276. 3 Apr. **S. Rosenne to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 3 Apr. (22.35); Inc. 130.02/2454/10. (Hebrew)
Request for instructions.

277. 5 Apr. **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Syrian Delegations.**
130.02/2454/10.
Submission of letters of credentials and discussion of their validity.

278. 6 Apr. **S. Rosenne to J. Robinson and E. Sasson.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Opening session of armistice talks; discussion of cease-fire question with U.N. staff.

279. 6 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan.**
Tel.; Outg. 93.01/2205/4; Inc. 130.02/2425/6.
Israeli incursion into Syrian territory.

280. 6 Apr. **W. Eytan to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y185; Recd. 6 Apr.; Outg. 130.02/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/35.
Israeli incursion into Syrian territory.

281. 6 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan.**
Coded Tel. X279; Recd. 6 Apr.; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Israeli incursion into Syrian territory.

282. 7 Apr. **W. Eytan to A. Eban.**
Tel. MH3902; Recd. 7 Apr.; Outg. 130.09/2328/6; Inc. 93.01/2205/4.
Israeli incursion into Syrian territory.

283. 10 Apr. **S. Rosenne to J. Robinson and E. Sasson.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Discussion with U.N. staff concerning Syria's demand for a cease-fire and Israel's demand for the Syrians' withdrawal.

284. 10 Apr. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. Y202; Recd. 10 Apr.; Outg. 130.16/2953/3; Inc. 93.01/2180/35.
Israel's proposals for cease-fire agreement.

299. 9 May **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Tel. AE58; Sent and Recd. 10 May; Outg. 93.01/2205/6; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
Compromise proposal submitted by Bunche.

300. 10 May **P. Mohn to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Copy. 130.02/2425/6.
Message from Bunche to Ben-Gurion concerning meeting with Colonel Zaim.

301. 10 May **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Syrian Delegations.**
130.02/2425/6.
Clarifications and discussion of Syrian proposal for armistice lines; Bunche's compromise proposal.

302. 10 May **A. Eban to R. Bunche.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3.
Bunche's compromise proposal.

303. 12 May **R. Shiloah to R. Bunche.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3.
Ben-Gurion's reply to Bunche's message.

304. 13 May **M. Sharett to D. Ben-Gurion.**
Coded Tel. X348; Sent 16 May; Recd. 17 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Course of action *vis-à-vis* Syria.

305. 14 May **M. Sharett to S. Rosenne and R. Shiloah.**
Coded Tel. X346; Recd. 15 May (19.30); Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.02/2442/7.
Meeting with Bunche concerning his compromise proposal.

306. 15 May **S. Rosenne to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with U.N. staff concerning Bunche's proposals.

307. 15 May **S. Rosenne to W. Eytan.**
Orig. 130.02/2425/6.
Legal problems.

308. 15 May **Y. Harkabi to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y156; Recd. 15 May; Inc. 93.01/2180/37.
Instructions for conduct of negotiations.

309. 17 May **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Syrian Delegations.**
130.02/2425/6.
Discussion of Bunche's compromise proposal.

310. 18 May **S. Rosenne to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2454/10. (Hebrew)
Riley's suggestion for a settlement between Israel and Syria.

311. 18 May **A. Eban to S. Rosenne.**
Tel. 1704; Recd. 19 May; Outg. 93.01/2205/6; Inc. 130.16/2953/3.
Statement of Bunche concerning demilitarized zone.

312. 18 May **A. Eban to S. Rosenne.**
Coded Tel. NI31; Recd. 19 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.16/2953/3.
Settlement suggested by Riley.

313. 20 May **A. Eban to S. Rosenne.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 21 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.16/2953/3.
Settlement suggested by Riley.

314. 23 May **A. Eban to T. Lie.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3.
Israel's position regarding negotiations with Syria.

315. 23 May **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Tel. 1724; Outg. 93.01/2205/6; Inc. 130.16/2953/3.
Bunche's clarifications regarding his compromise proposal.

316. 23 May **A. Eban to S. Rosenne.**
Coded Tel. X356; Recd. 24 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.16/2953/3.
Request for explanation concerning Israel's reaction to Bunche's proposal.

317. 25 May **M. Sharett to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y165; Recd. 25 May; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/37.
Consent to meeting with Colonel Zaim.

318. 26 May **A. Lourie to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X358; Recd. 27-29 May; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Bunche's explanations regarding his proposal.

319. 27 May **M. Sharett to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y169; Recd. 27 May; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/37.
Deadlock in talks with Syrians.

320. 30 May **M. Sharett to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y174; Recd. 30 May; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/37.
Composition of Syrian delegation for meeting with Sharett; proposal for meeting with Colonel Zaim.

321. 31 May **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 1 June; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Failure to arrange meeting with Colonel Zaim.

322. 31 May **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X366; Recd. 1 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Diplomatic activity in New York.

323. 31 May **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X367; Recd. 1 June; Outg. 93.01/2180/37; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Meeting with Bunche.

324. 1 June **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. X368; Recd. 2 June; Outg. 93.01/2181/3; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Meeting with Bunche, Riley and Reedman.

325. 2 June **M. Sharett to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. IN78; Recd. 1 June; Outg. 130.09/2329/3; Inc.

338. 16 June **R. Bunche to A. Eban.**
Tel.; Inc. 93.03/71/25.
Bunche's explanations regarding his proposal.

339. 22 June **S. Rosenne to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y219; Recd. 22 June; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2181/3.
Meeting with Syrian delegation.

340. 24 June **M. Sharett to A. Eban.**
Coded Tel. Y224; Recd. 24 June; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2181/3.
Instructions for meeting with Bunche.

341. 24 June **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. T287; Recd. 25 June; Outg. 93.01/2181/3; Inc. 130.16/2953/3.
Bunche's explanations regarding his proposal.

342. 26 June **R. Bunche to M. Sharett.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/10.
Bunche's explanations regarding his proposal.

343. 26 June **P. Mohn to M. Sharett.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/10.
Covering letter.
Appendix: Note by R. Bunche.

344. 27 June **A. Eban to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. T294; Recd. 28 June; Outg. 93.01/2181/3; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Importance of early conclusion of negotiations.

345. 27 June **A. Eban to S. Rosenne.**
Coded Tel. T301; Recd. 28 June; Outg. 93.01/2181/3; Inc. 130.09/2329/7.
Advantage of Bunche's proposal.

346. 29 June **S. Rosenne to P. Mohn.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/10.
Israel's condition for continuation of negotiations.

347. 1 July **A. Lourie to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. T319; Recd. 1 July; Outg. 93.01/2181/4; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Bunche's appeal to continue negotiations.

348. 1 July **M. Sharett to M. Makleff.**
Copy. 130.02/2454/10. (Hebrew)
Instructions for conduct of negotiations.

349. 3 July **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Syrian Delegations.**
130.02/2425/6.
Discussion of Bunche's proposal.

350. 4 July **S. Rosenne to A. Eban, G. Hirsch and M. Fischer.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3. (Hebrew)
Covering letter.
Appendix: Israeli—Syrian Draft Armistice Agreement—Note by the Chairman.

351. 5 July — **Record of Meeting of Drafting Committee.**
130.02/2425/6.
Discussion and first reading of draft armistice agreement.

352. 6 July — **M. Makleff to Y. Dori and M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 6 July (23.00); Inc. 130.02/2454/10. (Hebrew)
Progress of talks.

353. 10 July — **M. Makleff to Y. Dori and M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel.; Recd. 10 July (22.30); Inc. 130.02/2454/10. (Hebrew)
Problem of Samakh.

354. 11 July — **G. Rafael to M. Sharett.**
Coded Tel. T349; Recd. 12 July; Outg. 93.01/2181/4; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Bunche's instruction regarding Samakh.

355. 12 July — **Record of Meeting of the Drafting Committee.**
130.02/2454/10.
Discussion and formulation of armistice agreement.

356. 14 July — **P. Mohn to M. Sharett.**
Orig. 130.02/2454/10.
Message from Bunche advocating Israeli concessions.

357. 14 July — **S. Rosenne to P. Mohn.**
Copy. 130.16/2953/3.
Message from Sharett to Vigier regarding Israel's position and consent to continue negotiations.

358. 18 July — **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Syrian Delegations.**
130.02/2425/6.
Discussion of draft agreement.

359. 20 July — **Record of Meeting of Israeli and Syrian Delegations.**
130.16/2953/3.
Letters of credentials and concluding session.

APPENDICES

Appendix A — Security Council Resolution, 4 November 1948.

Appendix B — Ralph Bunche: Provisional Truce Demarcation Lines in the Negev — Communication and Memorandum of 13 November 1948.

Appendix C — Security Council Resolution, 16 November 1948.

Appendix D — Cease-Fire Agreement for Jerusalem Area, 30 November 1948.

Appendix E — Security Council Resolution, 29 December 1948.

Appendix F — Israeli—Egyptian General Armistice Agreement, 24 February 1949.

Appendix G — Israeli—Lebanese General Armistice Agreement, 23 March 1949.

Appendix H — Israel—Hashemite Jordan Kingdom General Armistice Agreement, 3 April 1949.

Appendix J — Israeli—Syrian General Armistice Agreement, 20 July 1949.

LIST OF ARCHIVES

Israel State Archives

93. *Record Group: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Israel Missions Abroad*
    - 93.01 Coded telegrams
    - 93.02 Paris
    - 93.03 New York
    - 93.08 Washington

130. *Record Group: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Head Office*
    - 130.02 Offices of Minister and Director-General
    - 130.09 Coded Telegrams
    - 130.15 Middle East Division
    - 130.16 Armistice Affairs Division

Ben-Gurion Archives

Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives (Abbreviated reference: **I.M.D.E.A.**)

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Note: The list includes only books and publications mentioned in the annotation.

Dayan, Moshe *Story of my Life,* Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 1976

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. VI, Washington 1977

(Abbreviated reference: **FRUS, 1949, VI**)

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 460

(Abbreviated reference: **460 H.C. Deb. 5s**)

Rosenne, Shabtai *Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States; a Juridical Interpretation,* Tel Aviv 1951

State of Israel, *National Council, Provisional Council of State, Record of Discussions,* Vol. II [Hebrew]

(Abbreviated reference:
Provisional Council of State, Record of Discussions)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives / World Zionist Organization, Central Zionist Archives, *Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947 — May 1948,* Jerusalem 1979

Abbreviated reference: **Documents, December 1947 — May 1948**

State of Israel, Israel State Archives, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel,* Vol. I, Jerusalem 1981

Abbreviated reference: **Vol. I**)

Yearbook of the United Nations 1948/49, New York 1950

GLOSSARY

Dal birmiza	— Suffice to hint
L'havdil	— Radically distinguish
Memisrael (Memshelet Israel)	— The Government of Israel
Mishlatim	— Outposts
Moabit (Moetzet ha-Bitachon)	— Security Council
Peruse, peruz	— Demilitarization
Pilpulised	— Split hairs
Tanach	— Bible

SUMMARIES OF HEBREW DOCUMENTS

The serial numbers of Hebrew documents mentioned in the references are printed in italics. For English summaries of these documents as well as for footnotes and editorial notes mentioned in the references see companion volume.

4. Meeting: Israeli Delegation — R. Bunche and Staff (Rhodes, 12 January 1949)

Present: Bunche, Riley, Reedman, Vigier, Azcarate, Stavropoulos; Eytan, Yadin, Shiloah, Sasson, Rosenne, Simon, Harkabi.

Bunche reported on his talk with the Egyptian delegation, whose attitude to the Rhodes negotiations he described as "very serious".

Bunche expressed the hope that an agreement on the agenda would be reached before the official opening of the talks. He suggested that the Security Council resolutions of 4th and 16th November be seen as a single unit, so that no question of priority would arise.

Bunche proposed that precedence be given to the military discussions, which should deal with two main subjects: a) delineation of armistice lines; b) withdrawal and reduction of forces.

Bunche declared that the United Nations team was there in order to render services to the parties. It did not wish to impose ideas of its own on the parties, not even the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. The Security Council would accept any decision endorsed by the parties.

Bunche referred to the evacuation of Faluja as a subsidiary question. He recalled his last visit to Ben-Gurion [see note 1 on p. 106 below], who had told him that in view of security considerations, Israel could not agree to the evacuation of the Faluja pocket before an armistice was signed. Bunche pointed out that the situation had changed in the meantime.

Bunche suggested that communiqués approved by the two parties be issued by the U.N. press officer.

Bunche asked the Israelis to refrain from vaunting their military

successes. He had also appealed to the Egyptians to contribute to the creation of a congenial atmosphere.

Eytan expressed the hope that the talks with the Egyptians would constitute a first psychological step, to be followed by others. He stated that Israel would go more than half-way towards the Egyptians and declared that the shorter the discussions, the more productive they would be. It would be up to the Mediator to expedite the talks as much as possible.

Eytan asked Bunche to explain his reference to the Faluja problem as a subsidiary question. Israel regarded it as part and parcel of a general settlement, though incidental to the issue of the armistice. The armistice agreement would *ipso facto* solve the Faluja problem. Bunche agreed.

In response to Eytan's request, Bunche defined the term "armistice" as "a liquidation of war on a military level", while "peace" was the liquidation of war on a political level.

In reply to a question by Rosenne, Bunche suggested that no official verbal record be kept. Eytan promised to reply later. [See note 2, pp. 106-7 below.]

9. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to Israeli Delegation at Rhodes. 14 January 1949

Sharett attached the delegation's credentials [see note 2, pp. 109-10 below]. He is concerned about the detailed listing of the "plagues" of the Security Council's 4 November resolution in the conference agenda [see No. 6].

He instructs the delegation to begin negotiations with a demand for the withdrawal of the Egyptian army from Palestine. He emphasizes that this demand is absolute. The resolutions of the Provisional State Council, at its 13 January session, establish this as a parliamentary commitment which cannot be waived. He encloses the resolutions in his letter. [See editorial note, pp. 108-9 below.]

Sharett reports on King Abdallah's invitation to the Israeli representatives to visit him in Shune on 16 January, apparently in order to convince them of Jordan's sincere desire to begin negotiations [see No. 185]. Ben-Gurion and Sharett support acceptance of the invita-

tion, and E. Sasson is requested to return from Rhodes immediately in order to participate in the visit. A consultation regarding the anticipated meeting will take place on 15 January, with Dayan present.

Sharett reports on Abdallah Tall's proposal for an exchange of Egyptian prisoners for Jordanian-held Israeli prisoners. He asks Rosenne whether this would be possible under the Geneva Convention, and whether Israel has the right to exchange prisoners of war without knowledge of the International Red Cross. [See note 7, p. 110 below.]

15. W. Eytan and R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 16 January 1949 (22:30)

Shiloah and Eytan oppose Yadin's proposal [see note 1, p. 111 below] that only one-quarter of the besieged Faluja garrison be released immediately, with the rest going free only when the armistice agreement is signed. In their opinion, this would "ruin the chances of the negotiations."

They reiterate their demand that the delegation be authorized to agree to the immediate release of half the besieged. The rest will follow when the agreement is signed, or even before that, if necessary.

In their opinion, the Egyptians favour an agreement, but external factors are interfering [see note 3, p. 111 below], and time is not on Israel's side. They demand that an effort be made to conclude the negotiations successfully that very week, and request an immediate answer [see Nos. *17, 20*].

17. B. Baruch [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan and R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 17 January 1949 (03:15)

Baruch reports Sharett's agreement to the immediate release of one-third or, if necessary, even one-half of the besieged Faluja garrison. The remainder will be released after the armistice agreement is signed. Ben-Gurion opposes this suggestion.

18. W. Eytan, R. Shiloah and D. Shaltiel [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett, Y. Dori and Y. Yadin. 17 January 1949 (05:10)

Riley's proposal for implementation of the Faluja withdrawal, which was presented to the delegation at midnight [see note 1, p. 112 below] is reported. Riley is awaiting Israel's reaction before delivering the proposal to Egypt. He suggests starting the withdrawal on 23 January and enabling the Egyptians to take all their equipment.

Assuming the possibility of reaching agreement within that week, the delegation requests approval for acceptance of the proposal. The delegation will notify Bunche and Riley that if, by 23 January, there is clearly no possibility of reaching agreement, Israel will not allow evacuation of the Faluja pocket. The delegation will strongly oppose evacuation of the heavy equipment [see note 2, p. 112 below], but will not wreck the agreement on that account.

19. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 17 January 1949 (10:30)

Eytan, replying to a telegram from Sharett [see note 2, p. 112 below], reports the delegation's impression that the Egyptians want an agreement but are being subjected to British pressure and instigation. Israel must therefore act "cautiously and flexibly."

20. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan, R. Shiloah and D. Shaltiel (Rhodes). 17 January 1949 (11:35)

Sharett instructs the delegation to propose the release of one-third of the Faluja garrison on 23 January, if by that time there is clear indication that the agreement will be signed. The remainder will be released only after the signing of the agreement. The delegation should point out that the Egyptians need not fear for the fate of the besieged brigade if they sincerely intend to sign an armistice, while their insistence on the brigade's release prior to signing inevitably raises the suspicion that their main purpose is to extricate the

garrison rather than to achieve an armistice. The Mediator must understand that Israel cannot be drawn into an argument about release of the besieged without an armistice.

An order was issued to release the sick and wounded, and to allow a food convoy into Faluja.

21. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett, Y. Dori and Y. Yadin. 17 January 1949 (20:15)

Eytan reports the contents of the agreement reached between the parties regarding the evacuation of Faluja. It will begin on 24 January and be completed within five days. Evacuation will be to Rafah, under U.N. supervision. The first to be removed will be the infantry with its arms. The heavy equipment will be removed during the final stages; it will be handed over to Egypt only when the U.N. Chief of Staff rules that the armistice has been implemented. [See evacuation plan, Annex I of the Armistice Agreement, Main Volume, pp. 698-700.]

It was agreed verbally that: 1) if, by 23 January, it becomes clear that the Egyptians have no intention of agreeing to and implementing an armistice, Israel will consider itself released from fulfilment of the agreement; 2) mortars and heavy and light machine guns will also be considered heavy equipment; 3) wounded Israeli prisoners at Faluja will be handed over to Israel simultaneously with the evacuation of the Egyptian wounded; the rest will be released at the time of the general evacuation.

23. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 18 January 1949 (13:50)

Replying to Sharett's telegram [No. 22], Eytan points out that the delegation not only succeeded in preventing the full evacuation of Faluja pending the signing of an armistice, actually the evacuation will not begin until accord is reached on an armistice.

He has reservations about Sharett's proposal that he return to Israel immediately [see No. 22, note 3]; however, if requested to, he will return.

24. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to Y. Dori and D. Ben-Gurion. 18 January 1949 (14:30)

Yadin reports a U.N. promise to the Israeli delegation that "no one will leave Faluja prior to the signing of the agreement." He also reports the delegation's view that the concession regarding the heavy weapons was necessary. As this point was agreed upon at an official meeting [see editorial note, pp. 112-13 below], the delegation cannot go back on its assent.

25. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 18 January 1949 (16:45)

Eytan, having spoken to Yadin, who had returned to Rhodes from Israel, clarifies certain points relating to the Faluja agreement:

1) Bunche recognizes Israel's right to put off evacuation of Faluja, should the Egyptians place obstacles in the path of an agreement. He promised that in such case, he would report Egypt to the Security Council as the guilty party, and undertook to make this clear to the Egyptian delegation.

2) The delegation feels that Sharett's proposal could not have served as a basis for an agreement [see Nos. *17, 20*]. The agreement achieved by the delegation is better than that proposed by Sharett.

3) Riley refused to deliver the Israeli demand regarding the heavy weapons to the Egyptian delegation, on the ground that this was not a surrender agreement. The delegation acted in accordance with its instructions — not to come to grief over this point. The delegation achieved the maximum, i.e., the release of the heavy weapons after implementation of the armistice.

Eytan reports on talks which took place that morning, regarding the armistice lines. The Israeli delegation demanded that the Egyptians withdraw behind the international border. Bunche delivered their demand to the Egyptians. The Beersheba question has not yet been raised, but the delegation is prepared for surprises on that point.

Eytan requests Sharett to have confidence in the delegation, assuring him that he is doing his best to arrive at an armistice agreement without sacrificing vital interests.

All members of the delegation feel that his return to Israel at this juncture could be "a fatal mistake."

26. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 18 January 1949 (18:40)

Sharett points out that there are two different versions regarding the Faluja agreement in Eytan's telegrams [Nos. *21, 23*]. In his last telegram, Eytan stated that evacuation of Faluja would not begin until an armistice agreement is reached. In the previous telegram, however, a definite agreement to evacuate on 24 January was reported, as well as verbal agreement that if it became clear before 23 January that Egypt had no intention of agreeing to and implementing an armistice, Israel would be released from the agreement. Sharett's opinion is that since a date has been set for evacuation, with no such set date for an agreement, a situation could arise in which Israel would be called upon to evacuate Faluja on 24 January, even though there is no armistice agreement.

Sharett asks Eytan to return to Israel in order to clarify this point.

27. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 18 January 1949 (24:00)

Eytan reports on the first meeting with the Acting Mediator and his staff concerning the armistice lines. The Israeli delegation demanded recognition of the international border as the armistice line, and the withdrawal of all Egyptian forces from Palestine.

The Mediator's response after his talks with the Egyptians, as well as informal talks between Shiloah and the Egyptian political advisers and Shaltiel's talk with Egyptian officers, gave the Israeli delegation the impression that Egypt might agree to evacuate the coastal strip, provided this does not involve the handing over of the Arab population to Israeli rule.

Members of the delegation made a number of alternative suggestions regarding the future of the strip: demilitarization and a U.N. administration; evacuation of the Egyptian forces and

establishment of a local administration under Israeli supervision; evacuation of the Egyptians except for a military commander and an Egyptian police force for local security purposes.

Most of the members have serious reservations about the first suggestion because it might establish a precedent for U.N. rule within the confines of Palestine.

Eytan requests clarification of Ben-Gurion's and Sharett's attitude to these suggestions. [See No. *34*.]

28. R. Shiloah (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 18 January 1949

Shiloah reports on an unofficial talk with the Egyptian delegation's political advisers on 17 January:

He explained Israel's stand on the Faluja question, making it clear that Israel has no intention of using Faluja as a political weapon. Nonetheless, military security considerations prevent it from releasing the garrison unless fully convinced of the Egyptian desire for peace.

Abd al-Muni'm emphasized that Egypt wished to liquidate the war, and that the Egyptians realized that they had made a serious mistake in getting involved in it. They admitted that Egypt and the Middle East required years of peace and stability, and that the Arabs and Jews, being relatives, ought to help one another.

The Egyptians made it clear that, regarding the armistice lines, they had come to Rhodes with specific instructions to reach an agreement based on the Security Council resolutions. Asked by the Egyptians whether Israel would honour the Council's resolutions, Shiloah replied that certain resolutions were adopted under specific circumstances, and were meaningless unless implemented immediately.

Shiloah argued that Egypt had no right to occupy Palestinian territory, just as Israel has no right to encroach on Egyptian territory. Israel had withdrawn its forces from Egypt, and Egypt must reciprocate.

Abd al-Mun'im differentiated between Israeli territory and the Gaza Strip, which the 29 November resolution did not include within the borders of the Jewish state. He pointed out that Egypt

would find it difficult to agree that the Strip's Arab population be placed under Israeli rule. Shiloah replied that if the Egyptians agreed to withdraw from the Strip, Israel would be willing to make a joint effort to find a fair solution for the area's Arab population. The Egyptians replied that this was a matter for peace negotiations, while the Rhodes talks were confined to negotiating a military armistice.

Shiloah was impressed by the sincerity of the Egyptian intention to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. He opines that they will hardly yield with regard to the evacuation of their troops from the Strip; they may, however, agree to a temporary international regime in the area.

Shiloah does not favour placing the Strip under international rule.

30. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 19 January 1949 (09:30)

Sharett requests clarification as to whether the armistice agreement will include a paragraph on the commencement of peace negotiations and whether there will be a time limit set on the armistice; if not — will that not mean approval of the Egyptian occupation as a permanent situation? He is particularly anxious to hear Rosenne's opinion [see note 1, p. 115 below].

31. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 19 January 1949 (13:45)

Eytan reports on his first detailed talk with Bunche and his advisers on the armistice lines. The withdrawal and reduction of forces was also discussed.

The delegation demanded Egyptian evacuation of the Gaza Strip. Alternative forms of rule for the Strip, after the Egyptian departure, were discussed. Three possibilities were suggested as a basis for discussion: U.N. rule; joint Israeli-Egyptian rule; Israeli rule in the northern part and Egyptian rule in the southern part.

Bunche asked whether Israel has a formal claim regarding the

political future of Beersheba, or whether, for the present, it viewed the town as occupied territory. The delegation replied that although Israel had not laid a formal claim on Beersheba, it did not recognize Egypt's right to interfere in the matter and would not discuss it with them. [See note 1, p. 115 below.] The delegation suggested to Bunche that he explain to the Egyptians that Israeli control of Beersheba was in their interest as well.

The delegation accepted Bunche's proposal regarding the reduction of forces: establishment of a buffer zone on both sides of the armistice line, in which only patrols and defensive forces would be allowed.

34. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 19 January 1949 (16:30)

Sharett is doubtful about Egyptian willingness to evacuate the Gaza Strip, but appreciates the delegation's efforts to exert pressure in that direction [see No. *27*]. Following a consultation with the Prime Minister, the delegation is advised to begin the discussion with the second of the possibilities which it suggested [*ibid.*]. Should that possibility be rejected, the delegation will present the choice between the first possibility and the proposal for joint Israeli-Egyptian rule. The following wording is suggested for the first proposal: local Arab administration under U.N. supervision.

37. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 21 January 1949 (18:00-18:15)

In view of the crisis in the talks reported in a previous telegram [No. 36, and see note 1 there] Eytan proposes three alternative modes of action: a) to continue to insist on all of Israel's demands and take responsibility for the possible failure of the negotiations; b) to sign an armistice agreement on the basis of a draft submitted by Rosenne, in which the disputed paragraphs are left to the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission [see No. 40, Appendix II, and notes 7, 9, 10 there]; c) to make a concession without exceeding the

delegation's authority, and to agree to base the armistice lines on the existing fighting lines.

Contrary to the majority of the delegates, which tends to support the third possibility, Eytan recommends the second [see note 3, pp. 116-7 below]. Pointing out the political achievement involved in the signing of an agreement with Egypt, which will be followed by other agreements, he warns against lengthy delay in reaching such agreement. Such delay could damage future relations with the Arab states and will only benefit the British.

Eytan informs Sharett of the delegation's intention to notify Bunche that, in view of the state of the talks, Israel will retract its agreement to evacuate Faluja, barring last-minute changes. He will not allow Bunche to use the Israeli elections in order to pressure the delegation into hasty decisions. [See note 7, p. 117 below.] [For Sharett's reply see note 8, p. 117 below.]

38. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 22 January 1949 (01:45)

In continuation of his previous telegram [see No. *37*, note 8], Sharett praises Eytan for not allowing Bunche to cow him with the elections, and advises him not to rush. He should stand on the essential points and, in particular, make no concessions on Faluja.

Although he agrees with Eytan's considerations in favour of signing Rosenne's draft of an armistice agreement [see No. *37*], he has reservations about the actual proposal: the signing of an agreement based on Rosenne's proposal will necessitate release of the Faluja garrison and will put Israel in an inferior position during the next stage of negotiations; better to fight out the issue earlier than later.

Sharett notes that the delegation was mistaken in its assumption that Egypt was determined to reach agreement and willing to leave the Gaza Strip. He wonders whether this was their stand from the beginning and they have concealed it, or whether Bunche has concealed it, or whether Egypt's position has changed during the last two days. Sharett warns the delegation against Bunche, who is "liable to prove extremely dangerous" during this stage of the talks.

39. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori. 22 January 1949 (02:15)

Eytan reports on a meeting that morning with the Egyptian delegation, Bunche and his advisers.

The Israeli delegation insisted on all its demands. The Egyptians demanded that the 13 November Memorandum serve as the basis for the armistice lines and that a symbolic Egyptian force or an Egyptian civilian governor be established in Bir Asluj. They made no commitments regarding the Bethlehem sector.

The Israeli delegation informed Bunche that without an agreement there would be no evacuation of the Faluja pocket. They also stated that they would not agree to sign an agreement which left the controversial questions to be decided by the Mixed Armistice Commission.

43. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori. 23 January 1949 (16:45)

Eytan reports on a meeting with Bunche, in which the latter — referring to the decision to postpone evacuation of Faluja — accused Israel of "inflexibility and lack of generosity." Bunche conceded that the Egyptian demands were "perhaps unrealistic", but tried to justify their position "which is based on fundamental needs, such as vindication of the Egyptian Government *vis-à-vis* public opinion and proving the truth of their claim of concern for the rights and security of the Arab population in the Negev." He claimed that Israel was offering no real concessions in return for Egyptian agreement to sign an armistice.

In the course of the meeting, Bunche unsuccessfully tried to get Israeli agreement for at least partial evacuation of Faluja.

Eytan asks Sharett to clarify the political importance which he attaches to the successful conclusion of the negotiations. He also wants to know whether there is any other concession to which the delegation can agree if necessary [see No. *46*].

46. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 24 January 1949 (11:15)

Sharett rejects Bunche's complaints about Israeli intransigence [see No. *43*], and presents Israel's willingness to compromise on the question of Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip as a considerable concession on its part.

He claims that Israel halted its victorious campaign to oust the Egyptians from the Negev in response to the Security Council. Giving up conquered territory might mistakenly be interpreted as an Israeli defeat or as recognition of the justness of the Egyptian invasion of Palestine.

Sharett says that Bunche must realize that the Egyptians are paying for their "criminal invasion and its failure" and that the Egyptian government must not expect Israeli assistance if it lacks courage to admit its failure to the Egyptian people.

Sharett understands the political importance of the agreement with Egypt, but emphasizes that this agreement cannot be purchased at the cost of another concession, in addition to Israel's agreement to continued Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip. The delegation must under no circumstances agree to withdrawal from territories conquered by Israel in the Negev. Sharett instructs Eytan not to break off negotiations pending further instructions from Israel.

47. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 24 January 1949 (15:15)

Eytan reports that the Egyptians have decided to continue the Rhodes talks despite the postponement of the Faluja evacuation.

In return, the Israeli delegation agreed to accept, in principle, three of Bunche's proposals: to permit the supply of food and medicines to Faluja until an armistice agreement is signed [see No. 49]; to sign a cease-fire agreement [see No. 48, and editorial note, p. 120 below]; to suspend the talks in order to clear the air and enable the parties to confer in their own countries. R. Shiloah and Y. Harkabi set out for Israel; two Egyptian officers — for Cairo.

51. S. Rosenne [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 25 January 1949 (10:15)

Rosenne expresses concern that, should the Rhodes talks fail, Britain might once again raise the question of sanctions in the Security Council, and delay release of the Cyprus detainees. He proposes speeding up the immigration of the Jews from there.

56. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 28 January 1949 (14:15)

Eytan reports Bunche's announcement that Jordan, Lebanon, and perhaps Syria as well, are willing to join the Rhodes talks. Bunche favours their participation, but wishes to know Israel's position. He feels their joining will prevent a rupture of the talks.

In view of the possibility that the presence of additional parties might stiffen Egypt's stand, the delegation is seeking a way to endorse the proposal yet postpone its implementation until an agreement with Egypt is signed or at least until the final stage of the negotiations. [For Sharett's reply see No. *59*.]

57. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 28 January 1949 (14:45)

Eytan reports on military-level talks being held at Rhodes. A programme for reduction and withdrawal of forces is being discussed as well as the definition of "defensive forces."

The delegation failed in its attempt to initiate discussions on problems of formulation because of the uncooperative attitude of the Egyptian legal adviser.

59. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 28 January 1949 (19:30)

Replying to Eytan's telegram [No. *56*], Sharett expresses his opposition to broadening the range of the Rhodes talks. He proposes informing Bunche of Israel's concern that the Egyptians might stiffen their stand if other countries join in the talks.

60. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 28 January 1949 (23:00)

Sharett reports that King Abdallah initiated the proposal to Bunche to invite Jordan to the talks. He and his colleagues hold that the proposal was sponsored by the British and is intended to give them a footing in the negotiations.

He reports on the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Tira and Qalqiliya, which have been taken over by local Arab forces. He reports that Israeli forces might enter Tira.

Sharett also reports the gist of his telegram to Elath on the question of Auja [see No. 52].

61. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 28 January 1949 (24:00)

Yadin reports on the military talks. Israel proposed Egyptian withdrawal to the following line: al-Arish—Agheila to south of Taba in the Gulf of Aqaba; on the Israeli side: the Majdal—Faluja—Tel Quneitra—Beersheba—Bir Asluj—Um Rashrash line. Each party will be allowed to maintain three battalions and eight field guns between their respective lines and the present front line.

Yadin suggests, as a possible concession to the Egyptians, that the western part of the Israeli line follow the 13 November line as far as the Jaladiya—Hatta—Faluja road.

In the course of the talks, Riley proposed that the seat of the Mixed Armistice Commission be in Auja. Israeli forces would leave the village, retaining strongpoints to north and south of Auja. Yadin agreed on condition that Israel also controls a stronghold west of Auja, but Riley opposed this suggestion.

64. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 29 January 1949 (10:30)

In reply to Sharett's questions [see No. *60*], Eytan reports on the delegation's position on the Gaza Strip, as defined by Bunche in a

summary of the parties' positions [No. 77, Appendix II]. [Continuation of report in Nos. *65* and *66*.]

65. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 29 January 1949 (11:00)

Continuing his previous telegram [No. *64*], Eytan requests clarification of Sharett's reaction to Yadin's telegram concerning Auja [No. *61*]. Eytan criticizes Bunche's procedure, which prevents direct talks between the parties.

66. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 29 January 1949 (11:30)

Eytan suggests further guidelines for Eliahu Elath: 1) Israel's basic principle — that the Egyptians must derive no political or territorial benefit from their unjustified attack on Israel — deserves American support. Also, Egypt has no right to use the armistice talks to achieve through negotiations what she failed to achieve on the battlefield. These two principles nullify Egyptian claims to Beersheba, Asluj or Auja. 2) It is unrealistic of the Egyptians to cling to all details of the 13 November Memorandum lines. The purpose of the armistice is to end the war; the only way to achieve this is to use the existing fighting lines as basis for determining the line of separation between the parties. Establishment of Egyptian lines on Palestinian territory negates the purpose of the talks. Such a solution is unacceptable, except in the case of the Gaza Strip.

67. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 29 January 1949 (14:40)

Eytan reports that Bunche decided to invite the other Arab states to join in the Rhodes talks, but not before an agreement was signed with Egypt.

In view of the progress made in the military talks, Bunche is now more optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations.

68. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 29 January 1949 (22:00)

In reply to a query of Eytan and Yadin [see note 1, pp. 124-5 below], Sharett reports that the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff have agreed to Yadin's proposal regarding Auja [No. *61*]. Yadin is empowered to decide whether or not to insist on an outpost west of the village.

Sharett proposes waiving the demand for a western outpost if it endangers the talks. In his opinion, this would offer the Egyptians a face-saving solution without undermining Israeli control of the border in that area.

75. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 30 January 1949 (16:00)

Eytan reports Bunche's intention to present the parties with a draft of new proposals, the nature of which will determine the outcome of the talks. Should there be disagreement between the parties, Bunche will adjourn the talks rather than break them off entirely. Eytan thinks adjournment will be politically less harmful to Israel than outright failure. In that case, however, Israel will have to allow continuation of supply convoys to Faluja.

79. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan and Y. Yadin (Rhodes). 31 January 1949 (19:00)

Sharett points to the discrepancies between the summary of Israel's position as presented in Bunche's working paper [No. 77, Appendix II] and Yadin's letter to Riley of 29 January [see No. 70].

80. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 31 January 1949 (22:40)

Referring to Sharett's comment in the previous telegram [No. *79*], Eytan reports that the delegation has already raised the question with Bunche.

He reports briefly on the meeting that day between the delegation and Bunche [see No. 78]. He fears that the unyielding position which the delegation has been instructed to adopt might lead to failure of the negotiations; the blame will inevitably be placed on Israel.

He asks Sharett to find out the extent of the government's willingness to accept responsibility for failure of the talks and for the consequences in the United States, Security Council and Conciliation Commission.

81. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 31 January 1949 (23:00)

Sharett instructs the delegation to agree to the first clause of Bunche's compromise version [No. 77, Appendix III], if agreement cannot be based on Yadin's letter to Riley [No. 70]. There is one essential condition: the seat of the Armistice Commission must be at Auja and nowhere else.

Sharett sees no reason for objecting to Article IV, par. 3 of the draft agreement [see No. 78, note 2]. He does, however, suggest rewording it to include possible demands of Israel, and not only those of Egypt.

85. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 1 February 1949 (11:00)

Eytan suggests that Elath explain the Beersheba question to the State Department. The following points should be emphasized: 1) The significance of the Beersheba question is not confined to the Israeli—Egyptian discussions; the town is vital to the economic development and defence of the Negev. 2) The distribution of Israeli forces in the area must take into consideration the possibility of attack by other forces. 3) Egypt has no claim — military, territorial or economic — on Beersheba, except for the artificially formulated demand, based on the 13 November Memorandum, for an Egyptian military governor. Beersheba is an Israeli town in every respect.

86. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 1 February 1949 (11:20)

In view of the Security Council's present composition [see note 1, p. 129 below], Eytan proposes working for repeal of the 4 November resolution, which determined cease-fire lines that are out of accord with the present military situation. He also suggests the possibility of cancelling all obsolete Security Council resolutions on Palestine. This would clear the air at Rhodes and remove difficulties created by senseless resolutions which impede the efforts to arrive at a final solution of the Palestine problem.

87. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to Y. Dori. 1 February 1949 (15:30)

Yadin is vehemently opposed to further concessions regarding Auja. He emphasizes that Israel has made more concessions than intended. He requests the Chief of Staff's intervention, explaining that Bunche's proposal includes not only Auja but comprises an area of 200 square kilometres. It sets a dangerous precedent for U.N. control in the Negev.

88. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 1 February 1949 (16:10)

Replying to Eytan's telegram [No. *80*], Sharett states that he and Ben-Gurion are in accord on the need to reach an agreement. For that reason they are willing to agree to evacuation and demilitarization of Auja, but only if it serves as the exclusive seat of the Armistice Commission. This is a far-reaching concession on Israel's part; it means withdrawing from a most important outpost while the Egyptians are not giving up any territory in consequence of the armistice agreement. Furthermore, the Commission's seat will be on the Israeli side of the border. The adoption of such a position is not an easy matter for Israel, and will demand government approval. Sharett instructs the delegation to begin by insisting on the proposals outlined in Yadin's letter to Riley [No. 70], and to relinquish this position only if this becomes unavoidable. Sharett hopes he will get

government approval for the proposed stand by following night. If negotiations cannot be drawn out as long as that, Eytan should notify him, and he will then request an urgent meeting of the government.

89. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to Y. Dori, D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 1 February 1949 (20:00)

Replying to Sharett's telegram [No. *88*], Yadin restates his opposition to evacuation of Auja. He repeats several considerations presented in a previous telegram [No. *87*] and adds the following: in military negotiations for an armistice there is no justification for Egypt's demand; Bunche's reason for opposing Israel's demand that Egypt evacuate the Gaza Strip, i.e., that the subject is political, while in an armistice the determining factors are of a military nature, applies to Auja as well; the abandonment of the Auja area — 200 square kilometres — involves a considerable military disadvantage: Bunche's draft agreement gives Egypt the Faluja garrison, Gaza, Rafah, Auja, and all her prisoners. Also, Egypt will be entitled to raise the Beersheba question in future. This is completely out of proportion to what Israel is getting. It will harm her in future negotiations with Arab states, which will conclude that Israel needs an armistice at any cost because of its desperate economic situation [see note 3, p. 130 below].

95. R. Shiloah [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 3 February 1949 (23:30)

Replying to Eytan's telegram [see note 1, p. 133 below], Shiloah informs him that the Prime Minister objects to the handing over of Auja or any other place in the Negev to U.N. rule. He agrees "to ease the Egyptians' position with the help of formulae, in order to cushion the path to peace for them." [See note 2, p. 133 below.]

98. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 4 February 1949 (19:30)

Eytan reports on the meeting with the Egyptians [see No. 99] and explains the difficulty of dealing with them: they base all their arguments on the 4 November Security Council resolution and on the 13 November Memorandum. Israel's only chance for success lies in tiring the Egyptians and continuing to appeal to them. Bunche favours them because they have accepted his draft proposal unreservedly.

102. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 5 February 1949 (22:15)

Yadin reports on that day's military talks, in which the following points were discussed: 1) Auja: the Egyptians, with Riley's support, continued to demand that Auja be turned into a neutral area under U.N. control; 2) Riley proposed dividing the Negev into two sections, the division to be based on an imaginary line following the Faluja — Beersheba — Asluj road. Only defensive forces would be allowed in the western part. In the eastern part, Israel would maintain military forces under the cease-fire agreement, including supervision by U.N. observers, until an armistice was signed with Jordan. The Egyptians asked for time to consider this proposal; 3) Riley interpreted the 13 November Memorandum in Israel's favour, i.e., Israeli forces will be based on the Jewish settlements but will not be confined to them, and will be allowed to establish outposts.

105. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 6 February 1949 (19:35)

Yadin reports on that day's military talks. With regard to the area of the Gaza Strip, Israel suggested that its line consist of 7 outposts, about 2 — 3 kilometres east of the 13 November line, each to be held by one platoon. The Egyptians will establish a similar number of outposts along their line.

The Egyptians opposed this proposal. They demand to be allowed

to maintain a defensive line around the Gaza Strip, up to the 13 November line, while Israel would be allowed to maintain troops in the Jewish settlements only. They fear that Israeli outposts along the Strip will threaten the Gaza — Rafah road. The Israeli delegation therefore suggested doubling the number of the Egyptian outposts in the Strip, and the addition of one battalion to the defence forces stationed in the area. The Egyptians rejected this proposal as well, insisting that no Israeli line be established west of the Jewish settlements in the Negev. No agreement was reached.

As to the line separating defensive from the main forces in the Negev, the Egyptians agreed to draw it from Faluja to Beersheba and even as far as Ein Husub, but opposed its continuation from there southward to the Gulf of Aqaba. They claim that as there are no Jewish settlements in that area, Israel has no right to maintain forces there under the 4 November resolution. No decision was made on this matter either. It therefore seems that the question of the area south of Beersheba and that of the Gaza Strip lines will prove no less a stumbling block to the talks than Auja.

112. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori. 8 February 1949 (15:00)

Eytan reports on a talk with Bunche in which the latter summed up the controversial points remaining between Israel and Egypt: 1) Israel refuses to withdraw from two Gaza sector outposts west of 13 November line (the cemetery near Rafah and H.P. 79); 2) Israel will withdraw from Beit Hanun, also west of the 13 November line, only if there is an Egyptian commitment to prevent civilians from entering the evacuated area; 3) should Israel accept Bunche's compromise proposal, the Egyptians are prepared to make two additional concessions with regard to Auja: to commit themselves not to maintain defensive forces between Abu Agheila and Quseima and the border, and to permit Israeli use of roads traversing the neutral area, for purposes of southbound military movement; 4) Egypt does not agree to the maintenance of Israeli offensive forces east of the Asluj — Um Rashrash line.

113. Y. Yadin [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and Y. Dori. 8 February 1949 (21:15)

Yadin reports on the fourth military meeting, held that day: the Egyptians agreed to Israel's proposal to mark the Faluja — Beersheba — Bir Asluj line on the map as the demarcation line. From Asluj to Aqaba, however, Israeli forces will be confined to the eastern half of the southern Negev without defining this as a line. The Egyptians unexpectedly raised the Beersheba question, demanding that no Israeli troops be stationed in the town itself. Israel objected, and no agreement has yet been reached on this point.

117. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 9 February 1949 (17:30)

Sharett understands and to some extent agrees with Eytan's considerations in his last letter [No. 111]. However, the government is not responsible for the difficulty in reaching a decision regarding Auja. Eytan is mistaken if he thinks that military considerations outweighed political ones in Sharett's consultations with Ben-Gurion. In Sharett's opinion, there are also political considerations against Bunche's proposal for Auja. As to Ben-Gurion, his stand on Auja has changed [see note 2, p. 137 below], but he is well aware of the need to reach agreement. Ben-Gurion tends to underestimate the importance of the Security Council; on this Sharett disagrees with him. However, in view of the importance of the agreement, Ben-Gurion is once again close to Sharett's conclusion, and the matter may be decided that very day. Meanwhile, Eytan should strictly follow the previous instructions.

118. E. Sasson (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 9 February 1949

Sasson reports on his last two talks with Omar Lutfi and Abd al-Mun'im. Yadin participated in one, lecturing on the progress of official and non-official talks in Rhodes. His presentation was skilful, his manner open and friendly. The Egyptians thanked him for

his "interesting, clear and lucid" lecture, and promised to do everything possible in order to ensure success of the talks.

The Egyptians emphasized their desire for a political peace, not merely a military armistice. They pointed out that success of the Rhodes talks would ensure the success of negotiations with Lebanon and Syria, and stated that the destinies of Egypt must no longer be linked to those of Jordan. They doubt that Nuri al-Said will succeed in his efforts "to bring about cooperation between Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt," particularly if the Rhodes talks are concluded successfully. Yet they are concerned lest failure of the Rhodes talks might undermine Egyptian trust of Israel, and will raise, once again, the question of "Arab unity", which still has supporters among members of the court and of the government, as well as among the British and Americans. The two promised Sasson their cooperation in preparing peace talks, once the military talks were concluded. They also promised to see to it that Syria and Lebanon would follow in Egypt's footsteps with regard to "the question of political peace."

120. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 9 February 1949 (24:00)

Sharett reports on the government decision on Auja, adopted that day. The decision was passed by a majority of 9 to 1, with 1 abstention and 2 absent. The government decided to instruct the delegation to accept Bunche's Auja proposal if the following conditions were met:

1) The size of the demilitarized zone should be as small as possible. Israeli control of the junction of the Auja — al-Arish road and the Egypt — Palestine border [see note 2, p. 138 below].

2) Some territory under Egyptian control in the coastal strip should also be demilitarized so as to balance the demilitarization in the Auja area.

3) No military forces should be stationed in the Auja demilitarized zone. The seat of the Mixed Armistice Commission will be at Auja and no U.N. control will be set up in the area.

The decision specifies that, should the delegation fail to achieve fulfilment of these conditions, but a fair agreement on other clauses

of the agreement will be possible, the delegation is empowered to agree to Bunche's Auja compromise proposal as it stands.

Sharett adds that these conditions are not absolute, but every effort must be made to achieve them. Should the delegation be compelled to accept Bunche's proposal as it stands, it must demand that the Egyptians make the concessions they agreed upon [see No. *112*]. For tactical reasons, Sharett suggests not divulging Israeli willingness to compromise on Auja until the last moment. The first step should be agreement on the other clauses.

121. E. Sasson [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 10 February 1949 (10:20)

Sasson reports on his meeting with Lutfi and Abd al-Mun'im, the previous evening. The two stated that they were not authorized to deviate from the Bunche proposal. They must, for internal and pan-Arab reasons, insist firmly on a no man's land at Auja and Rafah, under U.N. control.

Sasson assumes that Egyptian agreement on the question of Beersheba can be expected. He feels the Egyptian promises are sincere and that they will regret the failure of the talks, but are willing to return home empty-handed if necessary.

122. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 10 February 1949 (11:30)

Sharett communicates the contents of a telegram from Eban, reporting on a telegram from Bunche to the President of the Security Council. Bunche reported that the Rhodes talks had failed and suggested that the Council be convened to arbitrate disputed points. The President replied that the Security Council could not act without a full report, and suggested that Bunche continue his efforts to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.

Eban thinks that Bunche intended to get Security Council authorization for imposing his solution on both parties.

124. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 10 February 1949 (18:30)

Eytan doubts whether the government decision [see No. *120*] will be more acceptable to the Egyptians than Yadin's proposal [No. 70], for which the delegation has been battling for some time. From the Egyptian point of view, the government decision is far less favourable than Yadin's plan. [See also No. *128*.]

127. E. Sasson [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 11 February 1949 (11:00)

Sasson disagrees with those members of the delegation who see in Egyptian stubbornness a war of nerves. In his opinion, the Egyptians truly fear an Israeli attack and want to protect themselves in advance. They do not want to maintain large forces on the Israeli border, and want an arrangement which will make this possible. They are convinced that if the talks fail, the Security Council will intervene and support them at least on the Faluja question, which for them is the most pressing problem.

The procrastination in the talks is upsetting Egyptian trust of Israel and might impede the peace talks. Sasson believes that if Israel moves to meet Egyptian demands on Auja and Rafah, the Egyptians will not insist on their demands with regard to Beersheba and U.N. control in Auja.

Sasson feels that for various reasons — political and military, internal and external — the talks should be concluded successfully as soon as possible.

128. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 11 February 1949 (11:00)

Replying to Eytan's comment [No. *124*] on the government's decision relating to Auja [No. *120*], Sharett denies that the decision implies a stiffening of Israel's terms as set out in Yadin's plan. While Yadin proposed that Israel evacuate only the village of Auja, the government agreed to the evacuation of the western strongpoint as well as adjacent positions; the government merely wishes that an

attempt be made to reach a compromise on the size of the demilitarized area.

Sharett admits that the second condition is a hard one, but repeats that it is negotiable.

As for the third condition — no U.N. control in the demilitarized zone — this merely applies to the extended demilitarized zone, a principle already implied in the Yadin plan with regard to Auja village.

Sharett repeats that the purpose of the new conditions is to achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations. If this does not materialize, Eytan is authorized to diverge from the instructions [see No. *120*].

129. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 11 February 1949 (16:40)

Despite Sharett's explanations [see No. *128*], Eytan cannot understand why the Egyptians should accept the government's concessions, when the Bunche proposal is more advantageous to them. Eytan believes the government proposals are artificial and impractical, therefore he wrote Sharett as he did [see No. 126 and note 3 there].

He agrees with the content of Sasson's telegram [No. *127*].

132. Y. Yadin [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 12 February 1949 (18:45)

Yadin reports on his meeting with Ben-Gurion, Sharett and the Chief of Staff. The three opposed his stand against concessions on Auja, as well as his proposal to drag out the Rhodes talks indefinitely.

The delegation is instructed as follows:

1) The maximal concessions which the delegation is authorized to make are confined to the (evacuation of the) Rafah cemetery and (acceptance of Bunche's proposal with regard to) Auja.

2) Pending agreement to make these concessions, the delegation should propose concessions according to the following guidelines:

a) various combinations based on Yadin's Auja proposal [see No. *124*, note 2];

b) neither Israeli nor U.N. forces to be stationed in the Auja triangle. The area to be under control of the Mixed Armistice Commission;

c) the Egyptians will not occupy the Rafah cemetery hill after its evacuation by Israel.

3) Israel will agree to these concessions or to the above-mentioned maximal concessions only if its demands relating to other clauses of the agreement are fully met:

a) complete Israeli control of Beersheba;

b) adoption of Israel's proposals for seven Israeli outposts opposite the Gaza Strip [see No. *105* and No. 123, Appendix III];

c) a satisfactory formula for the eastern sector of the southern Negev.

133. E. Sasson [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 13 February 1949

Sasson reports on further talks with A. Lutfi and Abd al-Mun'im. The latter informed him that following Yadin's visit to Israel, which was interpreted as an indication that the talks had failed, the Egyptian delegation informed Bunche that it wished to return to Egypt at the earliest opportunity, and to send a report on the talks to the Security Council. Muni'm reported to his government, suggesting that it bring this information to the attention of its representatives in Washington and Lake Success. Sasson feels that Muni'm's statement represents a sincere attempt to explain the state of affairs and was not meant as a "threat" to Israel.

In the course of the meeting, Lutfi tried to convince Sasson that the gap between the parties was not so great, and that Israel was not doing enough to prevent Egyptian dissatisfaction.

Sasson promised his help in bridging the gap, on condition that Egypt dropped its demand with regard to Beersheba and accepted Israel's objection to U.N. territorial control.

It was decided that the delegations should meet without U.N. presence.

134. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 14 February 1949 (12:00)

Sharett criticises an amended version for Article VIII, par. 5 of the draft armistice agreement as suggested by Bunche [see No. 125, Appendix I]. It relates to a matter which is definitely *ultra vires*, and has no connection with the Israeli — Egyptian negotiations. Sharett asserts that with regard to this paragraph, Bunche ceased to act as chairman and was once again acting as the U.N. Mediator or representative of the Security Council. The intention of the Rhodes negotiations is to adjust relations between Israel and Egypt, not to impose U.N. demands on Israel.

143. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 20 February 1949 (02:05)

Eytan asks what will happen to Faluja's civilian population of about 3500. He is sending Sharett the text of a letter from Bunche relating to that question. [The letter was eventually appended to the armistice agreement — see Appendix F, pp. 702-3.] Eytan requests approval for the text of the letter [see note 1, p. 144 below].

148. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 22 February 1949 (15:00)

Eytan proposes a text for an Israeli declaration to be issued if the Egyptians return from Cairo without authorization to sign the agreement: Israel will express its regret for the negative reply, and will declare its willingness to sign the agreement as it stands at any time, in Rhodes, at Lake Success or any other place. Once this declaration is delivered, the delegation will return to Israel without engaging in further discussion.

149. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 22 February 1949 (15:10)

Eytan reports on Bunche's expected moves if the Egyptians do not approve the treaty: Bunche will adjourn the conference to afford

the Egyptians an opportunity for second thoughts, he will report to the Security Council, and pressure will probably be put on the Egyptians to change their mind. U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie has already done so in the course of several meetings with the Egyptian representative at the U.N., Mahmud Fawzi. Fawzi informed his government of Lie's opinion, but Eytan doubts whether he supports Egyptian concessions with regard to Beersheba.

150. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 22 February 1949 (21:00)

Sharett proposes amendments in the second part of Eytan's proposal for an Israeli declaration, should the talks fail [see No. *148*]. He suggests that the delegation declare that it will present a full report to its government, which will then decide, in the light of circumstances, what position to take.

Sharett reports intensive efforts by Eban and Elath to ensure approval of the agreement. Eban warded off Ross's pressure for Israeli concessions regarding Beersheba. He also sent a circular presenting Israel's position on this issue to members of the Security Council [see No. 146, note 1].

Sharett met with J. McDonald, who informed him on the following day that the United States had exerted pressure on Cairo to approve the agreement.

151. S. Rosenne [Tel Aviv] to J. Robinson (New York). 22 February 1949

In continuation of his previous letter [see No. 111, note 6], Rosenne reports that a noticeable change has occurred during the last ten days, consequent on the arrival of Sasson, who succeeded in breaking the ice and in arranging private talks with the Egyptians, without U.N. participation.

In these talks the parties discussed the details of Bunche's proposals and formulated a draft agreement, which was submitted to the conference's plenary session for approval.

Rosenne finds the legal form of the agreement disappointing, but explains that compromise was reached at the expense of aesthetic form. He notes his achievement in convincing Stavropoulos that it is possible to set a time limit on the agreement without flying in the face of Security Council resolutions.

He also discussed with Bunche the future of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, in the light of the armistice agreement. He accepts Bunche's position that only the Security Council may abolish the organization, and suggests that the Council be requested to do this in the near future.

152. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 23 February 1949 (18:45)

Sharett congratulates the delegation on the signing of the armistice agreement with Egypt. He is confident that this will open a new period in the process of Israel's consolidation as a state, in the development of its foreign relations with its neighbours and in the life of the entire Middle East.

154. E. Sasson (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 24 February 1949

Sasson reports on the main points raised in his recent talks with the Egyptian political advisers in Rhodes:

1. *Armistice:* The Egyptians reiterated their view that the armistice was merely a first step. They ascribe critical importance to the behaviour of the Israeli representatives in the Armistice Commission and will judge Israel's future intentions on the basis of their flexibility and readiness to compromise.

2. *Negotiations with the Iraqis:* The Egyptians advised Israel to conduct separate negotiations with Iraq and warned against letting the Jordanians act as representatives of Iraq.

3. *Future of the Arab part of Palestine:*

a) The Egyptians want the negotiations between Jordan and Israel to be confined to the military sphere. They admitted that circumstances might oblige them to agree to Jordanian annexation of the

Arab part of Palestine, but it seems that the Egyptians prefer the establishment of an independent Arab state, and in any case wish to postpone the final solution. The Egyptian advisers suggested that Israel present them with a proposal for the solution of the Palestine problem. If it meets with their approval, they will use it as the basis for their Palestine policy.

b) The Egyptians raised several problems relating to the establishment of an independent Arab state. First, the question of funding — in their opinion no Arab state can set the Palestinian Arab State on its feet. Possible sources of revenue are Israeli reparations for abandoned property and an American or international loan to be attained through the good offices of Israel.

The second problem is, according to the Egyptians, who will establish the new Arab state. The Egyptian advisers suggest a "liberation Committee", which will comprise a number of Palestinian Arabs unaffiliated with either the Husseinis or King Abdallah. The Committee will recognize the State of Israel and strive for the independence of Arab Palestine. It will be located in the United States and from there will conduct a propaganda campaign directed at the U.N. and the Arab states. The Committee will explain the Palestinian Arabs' right to independence on the basis of the partition resolution and will oppose annexation by Jordan. It will maintain relations with both Israel and Egypt.

4. *The coastal sector between Gaza and Rafah:* Sasson's impression is that the Egyptians have no definitive opinion about the future of this area; they would apparently prefer to leave it, but do not want to hand it over to either Jordan or to Israel. Sasson proposed demilitarization of the Strip and the establishment of internal Arab autonomy there, with Israeli and Egyptian guarantees for its security. The Egyptians seemed inclined to discuss the proposal but asked for further details.

5. *The Egyptian attitude to the Conciliation Commission:* In their talks with the members of the Conciliation Commission, the Egyptians demanded that the fate of Arab Palestine be determined through a free plebiscite; they demanded the return of the refugees and the payment of reparations for abandoned property; and they opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem. Sasson thinks that in their representations to the Commission the Egyptians will demand that

Jerusalem be placed under Arab rule, but that in actual fact they will agree to an arrangement whereby the old city will remain Arab and the new city be divided between Israel and the Arabs. In Sasson's opinion, Israel will find the Egyptians amenable to its proposals regarding Jerusalem. The Egyptians want to extricate themselves from the Palestine affair in a dignified manner and will be prepared to consider any reasonable Israeli proposal.

6. *Future trade relations:* The Egyptians asked for a list of raw materials that Israel might wish to purchase from Egypt.

7. *Egypt's internal situation:* The Egyptians said that it was their intention to return to peacetime conditions. In about half a year, Egypt would hold general elections and during this time the nature of Israeli — Egyptian relations would be determined. The King, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of War supported the armistice with Israel and it was important that during the coming months the Egyptian people should be convinced that their leaders had chosen the right path. They stated that much depended on Israel's conduct during this period.

8. *The Inter-Arab front:* The Egyptians expressed the opinion that the policies of Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia with regard to Palestine and the Middle East would be similar to those of Egypt.

9. *Contact:* The Egyptian Foreign Minister instructed the Egyptian consul in Paris to maintain contact with Sasson. Sasson, for his part, arranged with Col. Sherine for possible future contacts.

Finally, Sasson points to the congenial atmosphere created in Rhodes during the last few days as an indication that an important foundation has been established for the further development of relations with Egypt.

155. E. Sasson [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 25 February 1949 (12:00)

Sasson sees the agreement with Egypt as an important step towards the final goal, as well as a factor increasing Israel's responsibility and obligating it to further enormous efforts.

He believes that now, more than ever, Israel needs "a basic Arab policy, not a temporary policy or a policy of being dragged along by events."

Both Ben-Gurion and Sharett must commit themselves to peace just as in the past they have committed themselves to defence.

158. M. Makleff to Y. Dori. 14 January 1949 (18:00)

Makleff reports on a meeting that day between Israeli representatives and the Lebanese Chief of Staff. Taufiq Salim. Also present were several U.N. observers from Tiberias and Lebanon. The meeting was called to discuss Lebanon's request that Israeli forces be withdrawn from its territory [see No. 2, note 3], and the opening of negotiations for an armistice, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948.

Colonel Salem presented his government's credentials and requested that Makleff bring similar credentials. In view of Makleff's declaration that Israel would evacuate Israeli-occupied villages in Lebanon if that country agreed to armistice talks, Salem asked from which villages Israel intended to withdraw. Makleff declared that Israel would withdraw from the villages mentioned in the agreement appended to the letter [see Appendix, Main Volume, pp. 282-3]. It was agreed that after evacuation, only civilian services and police would be stationed in the evacuated area, but no military forces.

Salem suggested and Makleff agreed that all military activity along the border be halted for the duration of the talks. Salem declared that Lebanon would endeavour to prevent civilian infiltration of Israeli territory.

Makleff inquired about the status of foreign troops stationed in Lebanon. Salem declared that all forces were under full Lebanese control.

Salem said that the international border should constitute the demarcation line between the forces. Lebanon would withdraw from Naqura only. Makleff replied that without peace Israel would not return to the international border, as the territory occupied by it was vital to the area's defence. Makleff inquired whether the Lebanese government would agree to broadening the scope of the negotiations to include peace talks, and whether it wished to discuss an armistice line or a permanent peace border. His impression is that

the Lebanese are ready for a conclusive agreement, but may hesitate to say so at this early stage.

161. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 2 March 1949 (19:30)

Shiloah reports on Bunche's reaction to Israel's alleged intention to hold on to some Lebanese territory and to demand permanent frontier modifications in that area [cf. No. *162*]. Bunche wishes to inform Sharett that he understands the Israeli demand for withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, but cannot support the demand for frontier modifications. He recalled his last meeting with Ben-Gurion, in which the latter had stated explicitly that Israel would evacuate the Lebanese territory when an armistice agreement was signed.

162. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 2 March 1949 (23:00)

Sharett reports on what he describes as an obstacle created by Bunche at the commencement of the Rosh Haniqra talks: at the first meeting, Vigier, representing Bunche, presented an elaborate draft armistice agreement which established the Israel — Lebanon border as the armistice line [see note 1, p. 149 below, and No. 160]. During the meeting, the delegation did not comment on the proposal, but later it "admonished" Vigier for this mistake. The delegation's impression is that Vigier admits his mistake and will try to extricate himself from it.

In consultation that morning with the delegation, Sharett formulated Israel's position. He stated that Israel saw the northern border as an indivisible whole, although there are two adjacent countries. Israel would agree to recognize the international border as the armistice line only if the same principle applied to the entire northern border. Israel would not withdraw from Lebanon unless the Syrians withdrew from Israeli territory along the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee. Sharett explained that Israel's insistence on comprehensiveness of the agreement in the north is intended to put pressure on Lebanon or to force Syria into negotiations with Israel.

Replying to Shiloah's telegram of the same day [No. *161*], Sharett explains that the Israeli argument has been misunderstood. If the Syrians agree to withdraw behind the international border, Israel will agree to evacuate all Lebanese territory, with slight divergencies dictated by topographical considerations. These divergencies relate only to the armistice line, not to the international border.

163. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 3 March 1949 (10:45)

Sharett asks Shiloah to explain to Bunche that a certain complication of the negotiations with Lebanon — by a linkage of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory to Syrian withdrawal from Palestine — is preferable to separation of the two agreements and leaving Israel free to act against Syria. [Cf. No. *162*].

164. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to J. Robinson (New York). 6 March 1949

Rosenne reports on negotiations with Lebanon. The talks are being held in no man's land at Rosh Haniqra, in a friendly atmosphere. At the first joint meeting Bunche's draft agreement was presented [see No. 160]. Rosenne criticizes the delegation's instruction to link Israeli agreement to recognize the international border as the Israeli — Lebanese armistice line with Syrian agreement to apply the same principle to the armistice line between Syria and Israel. Rosenne maintains that in practice it will be difficult to use Israel's advantage *vis-à-vis* Lebanon in order to compel Syria to withdraw from Israeli territory.

In the course of the negotiations, Lebanon offered to guarantee that no third party would use its territory to launch an attack against Israel. Rosenne emphasizes the demonstrative importance of this proposal, the like of which Israel failed to achieve in the negotiations with Egypt.

Rosenne assumes that the Lebanese will agree to withdraw from the border soldiers who were conscripted outside Lebanon, and that

an appropriate arrangement will be incorporated in the paragraph dealing with reduction of forces.

Rosenne hopes that the relaxed mood of the talks will help to make good the damage caused by Bunche's proposal, adding that direct talks provide the only possibility of surmounting the differences between the parties.

168. Y. Yadin [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan. 11 March 1949

Yadin criticizes the Foreign Ministry's representatives in the delegation for their lack of proper understanding of the military problems of the northern border. He hopes that Eytan will support postponing the signing of an agreement with Lebanon until agreement is reached with Syria. Yadin discussed this point with Sharett, who did not commit himself and only said that for the time being he supported Yadin's stand. Yadin instructed Makleff to insist on Israel's demands and to reject the Lebanese demand for demilitarization of the Israeli side of the line at Rosh Haniqra.

Yadin requests that the delegation be instructed to handle the negotiations with patience, and to impress upon its members the great importance of military as compared with political problems in the talks with Lebanon; in the talks with Egypt, the opposite was true.

169. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Paris). 13 March 1949

Rosenne summarizes the recent talks at Rosh Haniqra and emphasizes the procedural differences between the talks with Lebanon and those with Egypt. In contrast to the almost total lack of direct contact between the parties which characterized the talks with Egypt, the talks with Lebanon are direct, while the role of the U.N. representative is confined to that of a chairman. Though Vigier is biased in favour of the Lebanese, his predilection has no fundamental influence on the course of the discussions. The fact that the talks are being conducted on the border and not in a luxurious hotel is conducive to the creation of a warm and intimate atmosphere.

Rosenne notes the acquaintance of the Lebanese delegation with the situation in Israel, and praises the delegation's legal adviser.

On the basis of the talks in Rhodes and Rosh Haniqra, Rosenne concludes that the mediation method will not lead to peace between the parties. Only direct negotiations will lead to a successful conclusion of the talks. This conclusion should be borne in mind at the forthcoming peace talks on the final settlement of the Palestine question.

170. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 16 March 1949

Rosenne sums up the preceding day's talks at Rosh Haniqra. He encloses Israel's proposal for a new formulation of Article V of the armistice agreement with Lebanon [see Appendix, Main Volume, pp. 313-14], whose purpose is to guarantee postponement of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon pending the signing of an armistice agreement with Syria.

Riley rejected Israel's position on the grounds that no mention of a third party should be included in the agreement. He nevertheless agreed to transmit the text of the article to the Lebanese. Vigier, on the other hand, strongly opposed the proposal, accusing Israel of going back on its promise to proceed with the preparation of a draft agreement, though postponing the signing until an agreement is reached with Syria. He rejected Israel's argument that if agreement was reached on a draft, Israel would be pressed by the U.N. or individual states to sign it immediately, without waiting for agreement with Syria.

Vigier threatened to adjourn the conference if Israel persisted in its stand, but Riley proposed a meeting between the parties without U.N. mediation. At this meeting, which was conducted in Arabic, the Lebanese military representative proved unyielding, while their legal adviser tried to ease the tension and agreed to convey the Israeli position to his government (in return for an undertaking by the Israeli delegation to inform its government that Lebanon would not sign an armistice agreement that permitted Israeli soldiers to remain on Lebanese soil).

The delegations agreed to meet again on 23 March.

Later on, a private meeting was held between Hamada and Pellman [see note 5, pp. 151-2 below]. Pellman agreed to Hamada's proposal that the agreement be finalized before the meeting of the Arab states on 21 March.

Rosenne's impression is that the Lebanese government is anxious to reach an agreement and that despite its declarations that it will refuse to permit Israeli soldiers on Lebanese soil, it will compromise on the disputed point.

171. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 16 March 1949 (17:30)

Shiloah reports on a talk with Bunche about Lebanon. Bunche refused to justify Israel's insistence that the signing of an agreement be linked with an agreement with Syria. He said that if Israel persisted in its stand, he would have to hold it responsible for failure of the talks in his report to the Security Council. He recalled the Prime Minister's promise that Israel would evacuate the Lebanese villages once an armistice was achieved, and pressed Israel to reconsider its position. He stressed that if Israel signed an agreement with Lebanon, its position would be enhanced in future Security Council discussions.

173. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Makleff. 18 March 1949

Eytan forwards instructions, decided on at a meeting held the previous evening under the Prime Minister's chairmanship:

1) The Israeli delegation will meet with the Lebanese delegation at the earliest possible opportunity in order to sign an armistice agreement.

2) The Israeli delegation will agree to evacuate Israeli forces from all Lebanese villages. Evacuation will begin with the signing of the agreement or at whatever time that will be decided upon.

3) The delegation will sign the agreement only if it includes a paragraph concerning the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese territory. If possible, the withdrawal of Syrian forces should be completed concurrently with that of the Israeli forces.

4) The delegation will endeavour to ensure Israeli civilian traffic on the Metulla — Misgav Am road, but will not permit a rupture over this issue.
5) With the signing, the Lebanese army will evacuate all Israeli territory which it occupies (for example, Rosh Haniqra).

Eytan notified Vigier of Israel's willingness to meet with the Lebanese delegation on 19 or 20 March.

174. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 18 March 1949 (17:00)

Shiloah reports on a talk with Bunche in which he informed the latter of Israel's willingness to sign an agreement with Lebanon. Bunche expects an affirmative reply from the Syrians on their agreement to begin talks with Israel. He hinted that he would support Israel's demand for evacuation of the Syrian army from its territory.

176. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 19 March 1949 (00:30)

Shiloah reports that Bunche has been informed by Vigier that Israel had put forward new conditions for signing an agreement with Lebanon: the evacuation of Rosh Haniqra, Lebanese agreement to Israeli use of the Metulla — Misgav Am road and slight border adjustments in the vicinity of Malikiya. Vigier declared that these conditions frustrated all his efforts to bring about an agreement.

Shiloah expresses regret at the failure to notify him of these conditions before he informed Bunche of Israel's willingness to sign the agreement. He requests further details.

177. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York), E. Sasson (Paris), R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 21 March 1949

Rosenne reports on the latest development. The meeting of the previous day was held in a tense atmosphere resulting from the change in Israel's position [see No. *173* and No. *176*]. The U.N.

representatives were furious and declared that in view of Israel's new terms it was pointless to continue the talks. At an unofficial meeting, the Lebanese refused to discuss border adjustments, but thanks to Riley's intervention they agreed to accept Israel's demand for use of the Metulla — Misgav Am road through a confidential exchange of letters between Riley and the Lebanese delegation. Lebanon undertook to allow Israel use of the Metulla — Misgav Am road, under the supervision of the Armistice Commission, for a period of thirty days following the signing of the agreement. Riley agreed to try and prolong the arrangement until construction of an alternate road was completed.

At the official joint meeting which followed, the subject was included in the record [see note 6, p. 155 below]. At the same meeting, Israel demanded withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. The Lebanese delegation objected to the inclusion of this term in the official agreement, and on this point too, the Israeli delegation was obliged to agree to an arrangement between Riley and the Lebanese delegation. Riley made two proposals: either Lebanon should agree with him on evacuation of the Syrian army from its territory or it should agree to move the Syrian units back to the Tripoli — Haleb (Allepo) line. After a heated debate, the Lebanese Chief of Staff agreed to the second proposal and an allusion to it was included in the official record.

Rosenne admits that this is not an ideal arrangement. He explains that during the meeting, the delegation received a further instruction from the Prime Minister to conclude the agreement that same day, at all costs [see note 7, p. 155 below], and it therefore decided to agree to the proffered arrangement. The Chief of Staff approved it.

The conference then split into two sub-committees — one to discuss military matters and the other to formulate the agreement. Within a matter of hours the agreement was ready for signing.

The Israeli delegation demanded that the agreement be signed, or at least initialled, that same day. The Lebanese wanted to delay signing pending approval by their Foreign Minister, but eventually agreed to intial the agreement immediately.

Rosenne is pleased with the legal wording of the agreement and praises the work of the Lebanese legal adviser. He notes some legal aspects of the agreement as compared with the agreement with

Egypt. Thus, he emphasizes the difference in wording between Article IV of the agreement with Lebanon and Article V of that with Egypt. He concludes that the Israeli — Lebanese armistice line, which runs along the international border, should be considered as a political border for all intents and purposes, unlike the armistice line with Egypt.

179. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett (New York) and Others. 24 March 1949

Rosenne reports on a meeting with M. Hamada, Acting Secretary-General of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and member of the Lebanese delegation. The meeting took place after conclusion of the armistice talks with Lebanon. Y. Pellman was also present. Hamada told the Israelis that he had informed the Syrians that the Israeli delegation to the talks with Lebanon was composed of serious and moderate people, and advised them to send a similar delegation to the talks with Israel. Rosenne replied in the affirmative to inquiry about the sincerity of Makleff's words at the conclusion of the talks with Lebanon [see No. 178]. He pointed out that the Israeli government aspired to normal relations with Lebanon and hoped that Lebanon would not persist in its objection to the inclusion of Israel in international organizations.

Hamada declared that as long as Israel's stand on the refugee problem remained inflexible, it was difficult to discuss a general improvement in relations. He agreed to discuss these subjects unofficially with Pellman and Rosenne.

On the same day, Rosenne and Pellman discussed the Syrian question with Vigier and Riley. Rosenne doubts that the Mediator will support Israel's demand for Syrian withdrawal to the international border. The U.N. representatives emphasized that the early stages of talks with Syria would be difficult and slow, and speedy results should not be expected. Vigier said he would rather not chair this conference and would try and persuade Bunche to take on that function.

Riley thinks he will be able to prolong the arrangement regarding the road to Misgav Am for another few months [see No. *177*, note 5].

180. Meeting: E. Sasson — A. al-Tall (Jerusalem, 11 December 1948)

Sasson reports on the meeting with Col. A. al-Tall. The meeting was called by Tall, who brought the King's reply to Sasson's dispatch [untraced]. The meeting lasted about 25 minutes, with the participants standing in a section of no man's land. M. Dayan was present.

Tall reported that the King was willing to start open peace talks, but could do so only in ten days time. He had discussed the subject with other Arab leaders and hoped his efforts would be successful. If not, he would begin the talks on his own. The King enquired as to whether Israel seriously intended to engage in separate talks with him.

Tall informed Sasson that the King wished to discuss the following subjects: Jaffa, Ramle, Lydda, Beisan and Jerusalem, as well as the Negev and the southern part of Palestine. To Sasson's comment that the King was entitled to discuss with Israel all matters that interested him, Tall replied that he was relaying the King's message verbatim and that he was not acquainted with the King's claims on each and every subject.

In reply to Sasson's comment that he understood the King's considerations in the light of conditions prevailing in the Arab world, Tall said that the King had told him that Sasson would understand and not make his situation unnecessarily difficult.

Tall undertook to ask the King if Jordan would agree to sign a general armistice with Israel. He reported that to the best of his knowledge the Iraqi army also wanted an armistice and that the King had told him that the Iraqis knew about and approved of his contacts with Israel. He requested that Israel refrain from attacking the Iraqis during the next ten days.

Tall promised to deliver the King's reply regarding both the armistice and the peace negotiations by 13 December [see No. *181*].

Tall stated that the King was going to implement the resolutions of the Jericho Conference [see editorial note, p. 156 below] and wanted to know Sasson's opinion. Sasson said he could answer such a serious question only after learning all the details and understanding what means the King intended to use in implementing these resolutions.

Sasson asked Tall to inform the King that he was in contact with people from the neighbouring states [see note 5, p. 155 below] and that they too had demands relating to matters which the King might consider to be within his sphere of interest. He therefore wished to start talks with Jordan before concluding negotiations with the others. Tall replied that the King was aware of these talks and wanted Sasson to go carefully in order not to complicate matters.

181. Report on telephone conversation: E. Sasson — A. al-Tall (Jerusalem, 13 December 1948)

Tall transmitted the King's reaction to his talk with Sasson on 11 December [see No. *180*]. The King had agreed to the two Israeli conditions — a general armistice and peace talks, and although he was not yet able to fix a date, he had promised to give a final answer within a week. He required this interlude in order to discuss the matter with the Iraqi regent and to inquire with the Jordanian Prime Minister whether he would consent to undertake the task. Should he refuse, the King would demand his resignation in order to make way for a more courageous man.

Sasson replied as follows to the King's question as to his opinion about the steps taken by Jordan to implement the resolutions of the Jericho Conference [see editorial note, p. 156 below]: 1) If the King was determined to put the resolutions into effect, he should do so as soon as possible in order to present his rivals with a *fait accompli*; 2) Sasson advised the King not to discuss the Israeli aspect with the Palestinian Arabs and to present his moves as an act of deliverance which would guarantee them peace and tranquility; 3) Sasson asked the King not to take a final stand on the Jerusalem question, to discuss its fate with Israel and to arrive at a solution satisfactory to both parties. In this connection, Tall asked whether the Israelis would agree to divide the city between Israel and Jordan. Sasson refused to discuss the suggestion pending the start of negotiations; 4) Sasson advised the King to agree to a general armistice before undertaking the implementation of the Jericho resolutions. Such an agreement would enable him to withdraw his forces from the Palestinian front and to use them, if the need arises, on other fronts, such

as those with Egypt and Syria. Sasson proposed that the armistice be kept secret for the time being if conditions in the Arab world precluded its official announcement. To Tall's question as to Sasson's opinion on the likelihood of a Syrian or Egyptian attack on Jordan, Sasson replied that Jordan must be prepared for such an eventuality; 5) Sasson advised the King to do his utmost to remove the Iraqi forces from Palestine and to replace them with Jordanian police. If the King did this, Israel would presumably agree not to invade the Triangle pending conclusion of the peace talks. Sasson stated that if the Iraqi forces remained in their positions, Israel might be obliged to dislodge them by force. At this point, Tall repeated the King's request that Israel avoid any confrontation with the Iraqis within the next few days, and repeated the King's promise to discuss the matter with the Iraqi regent. To Sasson's inquiry about the possible reaction of Jordan to renewed hostilities between Israel and Egypt, Tall replied that Jordan would remain strictly neutral; 6) Sasson advised the King not to put his trust in foreign mediation rather than in direct negotiations with Israel.

In conclusion, Sasson declared that if the King approved all six points, Israel would seek the sympathy of the enlightened world for the King's moves to implement the resolutions of the Jericho Conference.

Tall noted that the King was interested primarily in the sympathy of the United States. He also requested that Israel adopt a more neutral line in its Arabic broadcasts. He repeated his request to Sasson not to go too far in his contacts with the other Arab states.

Sasson explains that he advised the King to speed up the implementation of the resolutions of the Jericho Conference because he wanted to encourage him in view of the possibility of a rift between him and the Arab League, and to impress upon his mind that he could depend on Israel's friendship.

182. R. Shiloah [Tel Aviv] to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 26 December 1948

Shiloah reports on another meeting with King Abdallah's representatives, which took place on 25 December in the no man's land in

Jerusalem; it was attended by the King's physician Dr. Shaukat al-Saty, A. al-Tall, R. Shiloah and M. Dayan.

Dr. Shawkat said that the King ardently desired to achieve a lasting peace. It was to that end that he had agreed to hold the talks with the Israeli representatives and he fervently hoped that the truce in Jerusalem would last. Shiloah replied that Israel, too, was seeking a lasting peace, but did not believe a mere truce could lead to peace. In order to have peace, it was necessary to undertake armistice talks, and his government had authorized him to start such talks. Shaukat replied that he was authorized to begin talks, but because of the King's delicate position, he wanted the discussions to be kept secret. Shiloah said that Israel appreciated the King's difficulty and had no intention of aggravating his position by uncalculated publication, but such secrecy could only be temporary. Shaukat agreed but asked that the time and mode of publication be weighed carefully.

Shaukat spoke at length about the tension that marked the relations between King Abdallah and the other Arab states, which had led the King to deploy his forces so as to be prepared for a possible conflict with Syria and perhaps even with Egypt. At this point Shiloah repeated a message which the Israelis had conveyed to Tall a few hours before, relating to an alleged Egyptian intention of launching air attacks against the Arab Legion and other Arab army concentrations and putting the blame on Israel.

Shaukat had been instructed by the King to inquire whether Israel would agree to discuss the return of Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle to the Arabs, and especially if it would allow a number of Arab refugees to return to these towns. He did not ask for an immediate answer, but said the King wished the government of Israel to examine the proposal favourably. Shiloah replied that it was impossible to isolate a single problem from all the others and that all outstanding questions would have to be discussed in the course of the negotiations. He added that despite Israel's desire to help King Abdallah in view of his delicate position, Israel did not consider itself obliged to make any sort of gesture towards the Arabs; it had not started the war nor was it the vanquished party. Shiloah said that Israel would agree to discuss all proposals in a serious manner, and promised to transmit the King's message to his government.

Shaukat agreed that the discussions should be continued under

more suitable conditions, and Tall suggested that they be held alternately in the Jewish area of Jerusalem and in Shune, Jordan.

Finally, Shiloah posed two questions:

1) Is there any basis for the rumours of a disagreement between the King and his Prime Minister and does the Prime Minister know of the contacts with Israel? Shaukat replied that the Prime Minister was aware of the talks, but added that the matter was irrelevant because in Jordan the King made the decisions.

2) Do the British know about the talks, and are they being consulted? Shaukat promised an answer at an early opportunity.

It was agreed that this meeting should be considered as the beginning of armistice talks.

183. Meeting: R. Shiloah, M. Dayan — A. al-Tall. (Jerusalem, 30 December 1948. Document dated 31 December 1948.)

The meeting, which took place in a small room in the Old City wall, lasted over two hours. Shiloah opened with a proposal for the exchange of credentials by the two governments. Tall replied that at this stage he could bring credentials from the King only, but not from the government. It was agreed to present credentials at the next meeting. Instead of a full record, the two parties agreed to prepare a summary of the talks, to be signed by both sides.

Tall asked if Israel intended to conduct the talks on the basis of the U.N. partition resolution or of the Bernadotte proposals. The King wanted to base the talks on a combination of the two. Shiloah replied that Israel was prepared to negotiate on the basis of the existing military situation. Dayan sought to clarify whether Tall intended to extend the talks to areas in which Israeli and Jordanian forces did not confront each other. Tall replied that the King's intention was to discuss the Palestine question *in toto*. A comprehensive agreement was necessary because the other Arab states would eventually evacuate the Arab parts of Palestine.

Shiloah made it clear that at this stage, Israel was prepared to discuss only problems outstanding between it and Jordan. In order to discuss the general problem, Israel must know whether the King was authorized to represent the other Arab states. Tall replied that

the King thought he would have this authority by the time the Conciliation Commission reached Israel.

Dayan stated that territories evacuated by the Egyptians would be taken over by Israel, but Tall said that in the King's opinion such territories must remain in Arab hands.

Tall said that the Negev should be divided between Israel and Jordan.

It was agreed to separate the problems between Israel and Jordan from those between Israel and the other Arab states.

Shiloah listed the problems belonging to the first category:

1) The border between Israel and Jordan in the area between Elath and the Dead Sea: Israel proposed the Palestine — Transjordan border as a permanent border.

2) Renewal of work at the potash works at the southern end of the Dead Sea.

3) The fate of the property belonging to the Palestine Potash Company at the northern end of the Dead Sea, and of Kibbutz Beit Ha'arava.

4) Jerusalem: Tall announced that the King was considering a solution involving division of the city between Israel and Jordan. Jordan was ready to allow Israel access to the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, but objected to territorial continuity between the University and Jewish Jerusalem. As a gesture to world public opinion, the parties would agree that a specified area separating the two parts of the city be placed under international control.

5) The railway to Jerusalem.

6) Latrun.

7) The border at the Arab Triangle: Shiloah declared that the present military line was not acceptable to Israel as a permanent border.

8) The Naharayim hydroelectric power station.

9) The fate of the Arab-held part of Palestine. Shiloah said that Israel did not take for granted the annexation of this area to Jordan; the U.N. General Assembly had adopted no resolution to that effect at its last session.

10) Prisoners and compensation.

11) Political and economic relations.

Tall, for his part, presented the following problems:

1) He declared that the Jordanian-Israeli demarcation line would include the sector held by the Iraqis. He replied in the affirmative to Shiloah's question as to whether he was authorized to speak for the Iraqis, adding that following Tall's last talk with Sasson [see No. *181*], the King had initiated moves to evacuate the Iraqi army from the Triangle and hoped to achieve this objective. Likewise, the King had persuaded the Iraqi regent not to attack the Jews. Dayan requested credentials from the Iraqi government; Tall did not commit himself but promised to consult with the King.

2) Jerusalem.

3) Lydda and Ramle: The King wanted these towns included in the territory under his control.

4) Jaffa: To remain an Arab city within Israel, with an arrangement of free passage for the Arabs.

In reply to Dayan's question about Jordan's willingness to rehabilitate the Arab refugees on its territory, Tall said that in principle the Jordanian attitude was that the refugees had the right to determine for themselves where they wanted to live; those who did not wish to return to their homes were entitled to compensation for their property. Nevertheless, the King was prepared to consider a plan for absorbing them where they were.

In reply to Shiloah's question about the desirable solution for the Negev, Tall replied that the King was prepared to leave parts of the Negev in Israel's hands on two conditions: Arab use of the Beersheba — Gaza road, and the inclusion of the Gaza Strip within Jordanian territory.

Tall had no definite answer as to whether the British knew of the talks with Israel, but declared that the British attitude would not be a hindrance to the King.

Shiloah and Dayan proposed extending the cease-fire agreement in Jerusalem [see Main Volume, Appendix D, p.686] to north of the city as far as the Iraqi line, and south as far as Hebron or further, excluding the area held by the Egyptians. Tall claimed that the exclusion of the Egyptians from the armistice agreement would create great difficulties for the King, who was responsible for the Egyptian troops in this area no less than for the Arab Legion. Since the Israeli representatives had definite instructions on this subject,

Tall wanted to raise the matter with the King. He asked that no attack be launched against the Iraqis. The Israeli representatives stated that the general cease-fire applied to the Iraqis, and Israel was not prepared to include them in the special cease-fire agreement.

184. R. Shiloah to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 6 January 1949

A report of the third meeting between Tall, Shiloah and Dayan. The meeting was held on 5 January on the Israeli side of the Mandelbaum Gate (Jerusalem), and lasted about two hours and a half.

The Israeli representatives presented credentials signed by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The document authorized them to "negotiate and conclude an agreement" with King Abdallah "for the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peaceful relations between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Transjordan."

Tall, for his part, brought a letter from the King authorizing him to negotiate with the Israelis "on the basis of a discussion of the general problem." The Israelis demanded official credentials similar to the document which they had presented. Tall promised to comply at the next meeting.

Tall approved the wording of the previous meeting's record, and it was agreed that at the next meeting both parties would sign the record.

Tall opened with an announcement from the King: The King does not view the talks as armistice talks following a war because he views the events of the past months not as a war but merely as a "regrettable conflict." He sees the present talks as a direct continuation of the contacts made with the Israelis prior to the fighting and of those held recently in Paris [see notes 4, 5 p. 157 above]. Shiloah replied that Israel was not ignoring past contacts with the King; on the other hand, it could not ignore the military and political facts created by the war.

The Israeli representatives requested clarification of the King's intentions when suggesting a solution combining the partition resolution and the Bernadotte proposals. Tall explained that the King

was prepared to satisfy certain Israeli interests in the Negev, such as oil, and that Jordan was willing to agree to the inclusion in Israel of the oil [prospecting] areas, for example the south-western part of the Dead Sea. Israel's representatives pointed out that Israel's interest in the Negev did not necessarily relate to oil, but rather to an outlet to the Red Sea, access to the Dead Sea and land for settlement.

Tall clarified the King's interests in the Negev: the road to Egypt, the Bedouin, and strategic needs. He did not state whether the King had in mind strategic needs of Jordan or of the British; he merely confirmed that the King realized that the interests of both sides must be taken into account. He promised to report further on the King's intentions at the next meeting. On the subject of Jerusalem, Tall explained the King's view that the Old City, Qatamon, the German Colony, and all the southern quarters should be included in the Arab part of the city. The remainder would be under Israeli rule. He suggested that Kibbutz Ramat Rahel and the Jewish Talpiyot quarter (in the southern part of the city) be handed over to Jordan in return for the Israeli-held Arab village of Lifta and the (originally mixed) quarter of Romema in west Jerusalem. The two sections of the city would be divided by a street, including the King David Hotel and the Y.M.C.A., which would be under international control.

Dayan told Tall that his approach was totally divorced from reality. The quarters named by the King were all in Israeli hands and Tall's suggestion amounted to an exchange of areas under Israeli control for other areas which were also under Israeli control. To this, Tall replied that the property and lands in Lifta and the other places belonged to Arabs.

Dayan suggested an exchange of southern parts of the city for Sheikh Jarrah (in the north) and its environs, so as to provide Israel with territorial continuity to Mount Scopus. Tall objected because such an exchange would cut Arab Jerusalem off from Ramallah. The Arabs would agree only to the opening of a road between Jewish Jerusalem and Mount Scopus. Dayan replied that in return for a road, Israel would consent only to discuss a road connecting Arab Jerusalem with Bethlehem, but not the handing over of quarters in the southern part of the city to the Arabs.

The Israeli representatives emphasized that the Jordanian proposal regarding an international zone in Jerusalem would not satisfy

world opinion, which was interested in the holy places and not in the King David Hotel or the Y.M.C.A. They therefore suggested international control over the Old City. As to the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, Tall said that Jordan would agree to hand it over to Israel and allow Israel access to the quarter.

Finally, Tall stated that the British knew about and approved of the talks with the Israelis, and that they desired a peaceful solution.

186. E. Sasson (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 1 February 1949

Sasson reports on a two and a half hours meeting with King Abdallah, held on 30 January at the winter palace in Shune. The meeting was also attended by M. Dayan, Dr. Shaukat al-Saty and A. al-Tall.

The King stated that the Arab states, including Yemen and Saudi Arabia, had agreed to armistice negotiations with Israel. Jordan preferred separate negotiations to joint talks with all the Arab states.

For the moment, the King welcomed any attempt by Dayan and Tall to reach understanding on all principal points before setting out for Rhodes, as well as all direct informal contact between the members of the two delegations in Rhodes.

The King had no clear answer about the participation of Iraqi representatives in the negotiations. He declared, however, that in any case Jordan will assume responsibility for the Iraqi army in Palestine. The King requested Israel not to press him for an Iraqi withdrawal from Palestine, and promised to take care of the matter once a peace agreement was signed with Israel. He would probably be able to arrange for the evacuation of the Iraqi forward positions and their manning by Jordanian police. The Israeli representatives made it clear that in Rhodes they would demand the evacuation of the Iraqis as well as the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

The King then said he wished to start peace negotiations immediately following the signing of an armistice agreement. He preferred direct talks to U.N. mediation, Jerusalem to Rhodes, and open talks to secret ones. He had already attained the agreement of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iraq, and almost certainly of Lebanon as well. Syria and Egypt were pretending to oppose the idea, but the

King felt that they would have to agree eventually and to admit Jordan's right to annex the Arab part of Palestine.

The King had received Britain's agreement to negotiations with Israel. The British advised him to stand firm on a number of vital points, but for the moment he could not disclose what these were [see No. *191*]. In any case, these points would not wreck the negotiations.

The King welcomed Britain's recognition of Israel and spoke at length about British "good intentions" regarding her.

The Israeli representatives presented Ben-Gurion's demand for free movement in the Negev as far as the Gulf of Aqaba, and made it clear that Israel had no intention of relinquishing its rights over this territory.

The King, who expressed his esteem for Ben-Gurion's personality, asked the Israelis to tell him that it was still too early to discuss the Negev question; it would be settled at a later date. The King spoke at length about the advantages which would accrue to Israel from cooperation with Jordan. The King enquired about the progress of the talks with Egypt and expressed his hope that Israel would not allow the Egyptians to remain in Gaza. When he was told that Egyptian police forces might remain in Gaza pending a final settlement, he said that such an arrangement should be avoided. He stated that the Egyptians had no business to be in Gaza any more than the Syrians had in Upper Galilee, and that Egyptian withdrawal from Gaza would put an end both to the Egyptian occupation and to the "Mufti government" [see note 4, p. 158 below]. He declared that he would insist on a Jordanian outlet to the sea via Gaza and expressed his hope that Israel would be agreeable on this matter. The Israeli representatives replied that Ben-Gurion was taking into account the question of a Jordanian outlet to the sea and that a solution would probably be found via Gaza.

Finally, the King instructed Tall to honour the undertaking to release the Israeli prisoners of war [see No. *188* and note 1 there].

187. W. Eytan [Rhodes] to M. Sharett, D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Dori. 9 February 1949 (14:45)

Bunche informed Eytan of Jordan's wish to hold the armistice talks in Jerusalem, pointing out that if this suggestion was adopted, he could not serve as chairman, for fear of complications with the Conciliation Commission and the Truce Commission [see note 2, p. 158 below]. Eytan replied that Israel would prefer to hold the talks in Rhodes, and he proposes that Dayan say so expressly to Tall. Sasson thinks the King will agree if Israel insists.

188. M. Dayan [Jerusalem] to Y. Dori and M. Sharett. 11 February 1949 (09:00)

Dayan reports on the conclusion of negotiations with Tall regarding prisoners of war. About 100 Israeli prisoners will reach Jerusalem on 13 February and the rest will be released later, in similar groups. Israel will release local Arab prisoners according to a list to be provided by Tall.

Tall said that he would not participate in the talks in Rhodes; his intention was rather to accede to the Conciliation Commission's request to continue his talks with Dayan in Jerusalem, with the Commission's participation. The Commission members had told him that Israel had agreed to the Commission's participation in the talks and to a separation of the Jerusalem question from the general problem.

Tall also reported that the Iraqis had agreed in principle to hand over the territory held by them to Jordan, and to empower Jordan to represent them in Rhodes. He said that the Jordanian delegation to Rhodes would include four or five officers and two civilian advisers. They would deal only with the armistice lines, and because of their distance from the King, "they will not be independent."

189. M. Dayan [Jerusalem] to Y. Dori and M. Sharett. 12 February 1949 (13:40-15:00)

Tall informed Dayan that he was about to be transferred from the Arab Legion to a civilian post. He inquired whether Sasson could meet with Dr. Shawkat al-Sati the following day.

Dayan told him that Israel refused to hold parallel talks in Rhodes and Jerusalem and suggested that he participate in the comprehensive talks in which all the controversial questions would be discussed.

Dayan reports that the Israeli convoy to Mount Scopus was permitted by the Jordanians to proceed only after numerous delays and that in general the Jordanians have been showing considerable inflexibility in arranging simple matters during the past few days. He ascribes the source of the difficulties to the British command (of the Arab Legion), but hopes to clear up the problems with them.

Dayan also reports that the Conciliation Commission is vexed by Sharett's refusal to make concessions to the Arabs in anticipation of the peace agreement. The Commission members are trying to incite foreign reporters and the consuls in Jerusalem against Israel.

190. Y. Shimoni (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 14 February 1949

Shimoni reports on his meeting with King Abdallah's representatives on 13 February. Present at the meeting were Tall, Dr. Shaukat al-Saty and Moshe Dayan. Dr. Saty read a letter from the King which included instructions for conducting the talks and the principal points of Jordan's position. In this letter the King expresses his hope of concluding a lasting armistice, on terms which will enable both parties to achieve a solid peace in Palestine; the two armies will remain in their present positions except for certain locations in Jerusalem; Jordan wants Lydda and Ramle to be ceded to it and their inhabitants reinstalled in their homes; the towns will remain under Jordanian control; Jordan will be responsible for the Iraqi front; Gaza and the Negev will be under Jordanian control; the exact borders will be determined in future; discussion of Jordanian inter-

ests in Haifa and Israeli interests in Wadi Araba will be postponed until the peace talks; Jordan will guarantee access to the Dead Sea potash works and to the Naharayim power station; Jordan opposes international rule in Jerusalem and prefers division of the city between Arabs and Jews.

The Israeli representatives pointed out a certain contradiction in the King's position — between his statement that the armies would remain in their present positions and his proposal that the refugees from Lydda and Ramle be allowed to return to their homes and that the two towns be placed under Jordanian rule. They made it clear that Israel would agree to the return of a certain number of refugees to Lydda and Ramle as part of a broader economic and social plan, but would not withdraw from these towns.

Dayan asked the Jordanian representatives for a clear statement as to where the Jordanian lines in the Negev actually lay, according to their claim. Tall promised to bring precisely marked maps to the first session of the armistice talks.

Dayan inquired whether the Jordanians were aware that the Conciliation Commission's participation in the armistice talks was doubtful because of its opposition to the principle agreed upon by the two parties — to divide Jerusalem between Jews and Arabs. Tall agreed that the Commission could participate in the talks only if it accepted principles already agreed upon by the two sides; in his opinion, however, the Commission would agree to everything on which the two parties were agreed. Dayan asked if the Jordanians had any suggestions for changes in the line in Jerusalem; Tall replied that there were as yet no specific suggestions.

The Israeli representatives inquired about the meaning of Jordan's willingness to take responsibility for the Iraqi front: did it mean that Iraqi officers with appropriate authorization from their government would participate in the armistice talks, or that the Jordanian representatives would be given official authorization by the Iraqi government? The Jordanian representatives assumed that the King would choose the second possibility. The Israelis also inquired whether taking responsibility for the Iraqi front could be taken as an indication that the Iraqis would evacuate the territory held by them and hand it over to the Arab Legion or that the Iraqi forces would be placed under Jordanian command. Tall replied that

the latter explanation was correct, although he had no official authorization to say so, and that in any case he saw the Iraqi army in Palestine as part of the Jordanian forces.

No clear answer was forthcoming to the Israeli question about the King's exact intention with regard to the Negev. However, his representatives made it clear that the King wanted agreement in principle that Israel was prepared to discuss this question.

The Israeli representatives emphasized that if the King had in mind an agreement allowing Jordan use of Gaza port, the government of Israel would agree, but it would probably oppose any arrangement involving territorial concessions to Jordan, such as a corridor between Jordan and Gaza. The Israeli representatives maintained that the questions of Gaza and the Negev, except for the demarcation of the line in the vicinity of Aqaba, must be settled in the course of the peace talks, and they advised the Jordanians not to raise the Gaza question in the course of the armistice negotiations. They noted the possibility of Gaza remaining in Egyptian hands for the duration of the armistice.

The Israeli representatives inquired when work at the potash works and the Naharayim power station could be resumed. Dr. Sati recorded the question for clarification but added his "personal opinion" that discussion of this point would be possible when the King saw a friendly gesture on Israel's part with regard to Lydda and Ramle.

191. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan and E. Sasson (Rhodes). 15 February 1949 (11:40)

Sharett reports on Dayan and Shimoni's meeting with Dr. Shaukat al Saty [see No. *190*] and represents Israel's policy considerations for the near future in view of King Abdallah's demand implying the permanent exclusion of the southern Negev from Israel.

Sharett holds that the only way to "frustrate this plot" is by establishing tangible Israeli control of the southern Negev, and he alludes to a military operation which is being planned with a view to occupying that area [see editorial note, p. 165 below]. The best timing for such a campaign is the period between the signing of the

agreement with Egypt and the commencement of official negotiations with Jordan. Sharett therefore recommends that the agreement with Egypt be concluded as soon as possible, to be followed immediately by negotiations with Lebanon and Syria, while negotiations with Jordan should be postponed to a later stage. He proposes "dragging out" the direct negotiations which the Israeli and Jordanian representatives have been conducting lately [see Nos. *183, 184, 190*], and instructs the Israeli representatives in Rhodes to induce Bunche to give priority to the negotiations with Lebanon and postpone the beginning of talks with Jordan.

192. W. Eytan (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 15 February 1949 (17:30)

In reply to Sharett's telegram [No. *191*] Eytan writes that the best way to postpone negotiations with the Jordanians is to begin talks with them in Jerusalem immediately, in the hope that they themselves will inform Bunche of their desire to postpone the commencement of negotiations in Rhodes. Eytan explains that there are difficulties in starting the talks with Sryia and Lebanon, since neither has yet responded formally to Bunche's invitation to begin armistice negotiations, while Jordan has already done so.

He suggests that Tuvia Arazi inform Riyad al-Sulh, through the Lebanese legation in Paris, that Israel will evacuate the Lebanese villages it holds if Lebanon agrees to the immediate commencement of armistice negotiations. With regard to Syria, the situation is more difficult.

Eytan promises to press Bunche to postpone negotiations with Jordan and to advance the talks with Lebanon, but he doubts that he will have any success.

193. E. Sasson [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 15 February 1949 (21:30)

Sasson proposes notifying Tall in no uncertain terms that Israel will not begin talks with Jordan, either in Jerusalem or Rhodes, as long as the Jordanians insist on their claims in the southern Negev and do not accept Israel's position [see Nos. *190, 191*]. Sasson holds

that even if the matter is brought to the Security Council, the Council cannot force Israel to waive its right to the Negev, which was confirmed by the U.N. General Assembly.

He thinks that in the conflict with King Abdallah, Israel will enjoy the tacit support of the Arab world.

194. W. Eytan (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 16 February 1949 (10:30)

Basing himself on the experience gained in the course of the talks with Egypt, Eytan proposes the formulation of a series of demands, even excessive ones, in anticipation of the negotiations with Jordan:

1) The Jordanians will withdraw from Kafr Qasim, Qalqiliya, Tulkarm and Baqa to east of Biddya, Azzun, Anabta and Ya'bad; and from Wadi Ara, Lajjun and the Gilboa mountains to south of Jenin. Kafr Qasim, Qalqiliya, Tulkarm, Baqa and Jenin will be incorporated in the State of Israel.
2) All Jordanian forces will be withdrawn from Latrun to Ramallah.
3) Israeli vehicles will have free passage via Jerusalem, Amman and Ma'an as far as Aqaba in Jordan. Aqaba will be a free port.
4) Israeli vehicles will have free passage to Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives and the northern end of the Dead Sea. Israeli boats will be allowed to navigate freely in the Dead Sea.
5) Beersheba will be included in the State of Israel.
6) Wadi Hassi will be included in the State of Israel.
7) Jordanian forces will be evacuated from Ein el-Weiba, el-Gamr, Gharandal, Um Rashrash and all other places held by the Jordanians on the Israeli side of Wadi Araba.
8) Jordan will declare that it will not invoke the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance against Israel [see note 1, p. 160].
9) Jordan will declare that its treaty with Great Britain does not grant the British any rights west of the Jordan.

Eytan emphasizes that the demands constitute a reasonable starting-point for negotiations.

195. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to W. Eytan (Rhodes). 19 February 1949 (11:10)

In response to Dayan's query as to why the Jordanians were anxious to go to Rhodes, although they had previously expressed a desire to hold preliminary talks with Israel, Tall informed him of King Abdallah's request to meet once more with Sasson and Dayan in order to reach an agreement before the start of official negotiations. Tall made the meeting conditional upon Sasson's participation, even if it involved a certain delay pending Sasson's return from Rhodes. Sharett suggests taking advantage of this proposal in order to implement the plan for conquest of the southern Negev [see No. *191* and note 5 there]; he wants Sasson to return to Israel immediately.

197. Instructions to the Israeli Delegation to the Armistice Negotiations with Jordan (Draft). 28 February 1949

1. THE OPPOSITE PARTY

The delegation will declare that it is authorized to negotiate with the Jordanian delegation on questions outstanding between Israel and Jordan only, and not on matters relating to the Iraqi army and territories under its control. If the Jordanian delegation presents official credentials on behalf of the Iraqi government, the Israeli delegation will inform it that it must report to its government and ask for instructions.

2. THE ARMISTICE LINES

a) *Wadi Ara:* The delegation will demand that the present front line be moved to south-east of Wadi Ara so that the entire Hadera—Afula road will be under Israeli control [see notes 1 and 2, p. 162].

b) *Sharon front:* The delegation will demand that the line be moved eastward, so that the villages of Qalansuwa and Tira are included in Israeli territory. The delegation is empowered to decide whether to demand the evacuation of the village of Qalqiliya at this stage [see note 3, p. 162 below].

c) *Latrun:* The delegation will demand the evacuation of the Latrun salient and the demarcation of the armistice line north-east of Latrun in accordance with military considerations.

The delegation will explain these demands on grounds of military considerations, transportation requirements and the importance of stable armistice lines. The delegation will not claim territorial sovereignty over those areas and will not found its claims on the 29 November partition resolution even where such an argument would enhance its claims.

d) *Wadi Araba and Elath:* The delegation will demand that the armistice line be established along the Palestine — Transjordan border, from the southern tip of the Dead Sea to the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba. Some minor border modifications are possible, but the delegation must insist on the evacuation of Ein el-Weiba and of other outposts at present held by the Arab Legion west of the border. Under no circumstances will the delegation waive Israel's claim to freedom of access to Elath, and it will threaten to take the matter to the Security Council if the Jordanians insist on an armistice line which cuts across the southern part of the Negev.

3. JERUSALEM

a) *Mount Scopus:* The delegation will demand absolute freedom of movement between the Israeli-held part of Jerusalem and the Israeli institutions on Mount Scopus. In return it will propose freedom of movement between the Arab part of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The delegation itself will decide whether at this point to present a demand for territorial continuity between the Mount Scopus area and Jewish Jerusalem in exchange for similar continuity for the Jordanians in the southern part of the city.

b) *Mount of Olives:* The delegation will demand free passage to the Mount of Olives for Jewish funerals.

c) *Wailing Wall:* The delegation will demand free access to the Wailing Wall for Jewish worshippers and visitors.

d) *Railway:* The delegation will demand that the armistice line be marked so as to include the entire track within Israeli territory.

4. CONCESSIONS

a) *Electric Corporation:* The delegation will demand free access to

Naharayim and the possibility of operating the power station. The delegation will demand evacuation of Jordanian forces from the entire area in order to ensure the possibility, at least, of reactivating the plant.

b) *Potash Company:* The delegation will demand renewal of the water supply for the potash works at the southern end of the Dead Sea, free passage for the company's vessels in the Dead Sea and the right to transport potash in convoys of Israeli vehicles from the northern end of the Dead Sea to Jerusalem. The delegation will also demand permission to make several inspection tours to the potash works at the northern end of the Dead Sea with a view to future reactivation.

5. JORDANIAN — BRITISH RELATIONS

The delegation will demand a Jordanian commitment not to invoke the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty against Israel as long as the armistice is in effect; it will also ask for a declaration that the treaty does not grant Britain any rights whatsoever west of the Jordan.

6. JORDAN'S STATUS WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER

The delegation will demand that the agreement state explicitly that it does not grant the Jordanian government any sovereign rights over territories west of the Jordan, and does not constitute an admission on the part of Israel regarding the validity of such rights.

7. RECOMPENSE

The delegation will not commit itself to any Israeli recompense, either by concession of territories held by Israel or by an agreement to the repatriation of refugees, without receiving specific instructions to that effect.

198. R. Shiloah (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 3 March 1949

Shiloah reports on the state of the Rhodes negotiations. The Israeli delegation met several times with Bunche [see note 1, p. 162] and discussed procedural questions, the agenda, etc. The Jordanian delegation has not yet laid its cards on the table and is acting very

cautiously. They transmitted Bunche's draft agenda to their government and are waiting for its approval. The Israeli delegation accepted Bunche's proposal, but asked for the addition of a special paragraph relating to the checking of credentials [see note 3, p. 162 below]. It demanded exact specification by the Jordanians as to which territory they are authorized to discuss. Should they insist on including the Triangle, the Israeli delegation will demand a letter of authorization from the Iraqi government.

With regard to Latrun, the delegation will act on Sharett's instructions [see note 6, p. 162 below], although Shiloah and Dayan would prefer to separate the issue of unrestricted movement on the Latrun road from the demand for the evacuation of Latrun. In the delegation's opinion, Israel erred some months ago when it rejected Tall's proposal for a resumption of traffic on the Latrun road [see note 7, p. 162 above] because it was not accompanied by consent to withdraw from the Latrun Salient. Shiloah holds that Israel would probably be in a better position to demand the evacuation of Latrun if it were already using the Latrun road. Shiloah and Dayan therefore think that the demand for free movement on the Latrun road should be presented at the outset as a condition for the signing of the cease-fire agreement. The demand for the evacuation of Latrun itself should come later in the talks, as a natural sequel to that right. Since their stand is not in line with Sharett's instructions, Shiloah asks for Sharett's consent to the proposed changes. [For Sharett's reply see No. *200*.]

Shiloah and Bunche discussed the problem of Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping [see note 12, p. 163 below]. Bunche promised to settle the matter with the Egyptians.

199. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 3 March 1949 (23:15)

Bunche informed Shiloah that the Jordanians had approved the agenda and the draft of the cease-fire agreement proposed by him [see No. *198* and notes 3, 10 there]. The Jordanians had informed Bunche in writing that their delegation had been authorized to negotiate and sign an armistice agreement on behalf of the Iraqi army as well. Bunche will request confirmation by the Iraqi govern-

ment [see note 3, p. 163 below], and Shiloah requests Sharett's instructions as to whether he will make do with such confirmation or insist on the participation of an Iraqi delegation [see No. *200*].

200. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 4 March 1949 (13:05)

In reply to Shiloah's question [see No. *198*], Sharett cables that the opening of the Latrun road is not to be presented as a condition for the cease-fire agreement. Israel will not use the road as long as the Arab Legion occupies Latrun; therefore, there is no sense in presenting a demand which, if accepted by the Jordanians, they will consider as a concession on their part, while Israel will not have gained any real advantage from it.

Sharett instructs the delegation not to sign the cease-fire agreement pending clarification of Jordan's authority to deal with the Iraqi front and pending developments with regard to actual control in Wadi Araba and Elath. In view of the plans [of an advance to Elath], Israel is interested in delaying the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement [see editorial note, p. 165 below].

The Iraqi letter of authorization must state explicitly that the Jordanian government is empowered to negotiate and sign a binding agreement on their behalf; a vague announcement authorizing the Jordanian government is not sufficient.

202. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 4 March 1949 (17:15)

Shiloah reports a hitch at the first official meeting. Before the meeting, it had been agreed with Bunche that he would first introduce the heads of the delegations to one another, and then the other members. However, when the Israeli delegation entered the room, the Jordanian delegation was already seated, and its head ignored Bunche's attempt to introduce him to the head of the Israeli delegation.

Shiloah did not react immediately, but later informed Bunche that if the Jordanians persisted in such behaviour, he would be unable to continue the talks [see notes 2, 3, p. 164].

203. E. Sasson (Paris) to M. Sharett. 7 March 1949

Sasson transmits the text of the telegram that he had sent to King Abdallah upon receiving Shiloah's report on the composition of the Jordanian delegation and its powers [see note 1, p. 164 below].

Sasson informs the King of Shiloah's criticism of the Jordanian delegation, i.e., that its members lack real authority and see themselves merely as a link between Amman and Rhodes. He tells the King that if the Jordanian government really wants an agreement, it must appoint top-level people to the delegation and invest them with appropriate powers.

204. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 9 March 1949 (10:00)

Sharett reports to Shiloah on King Abdallah's message regarding the possibility of a military clash between Israeli and Jordanian forces in the Wadi Araba area, and his request to halt the Israeli advance in this area until an agreement is reached by negotiation [see editorial note, p. 165 above].

Sharett's instruction was to reply to the King that there was no ground for concern, since Israeli forces had not crossed the Jordanian border and had no intention of doing so. If the King ordered his troops to stay within Jordanian territory, there need be no fear of a military clash.

205. R. Shiloah (Rhodes) to M. Sharett. 9 March 1949

Shiloah reports on talks between the Israeli delegation and Bunche. The Jordanians apparently want an armistice based on the existing lines and will avoid discussion of far-reaching rectifications. Discussion of the proposal for the signing of a cease-fire agreement has been postponed pending receipt of the Iraqi government's reply to Bunche's message [see No. *199*]. The delegation discussed the armistice lines on the Arab Legion front with Bunche, beginning with the Budrus — Jerusalem sector. The Israeli delegation agreed

to accept the fighting line as a starting point and, for the present, demanded two changes: the evacuation of Jordanian outpost 318 opposite Shilta and the delivery of Latrun and its environs to the Israeli army. The delegation rejected Bunche's proposal of U.N. supervision in the Latrun area and refrained from commenting on his query as to whether Israel would be satisfied with the stationing of Israeli police in the evacuated Arab Legion outposts.

206. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett and Y. Yadin. 9 March 1949 (19:45)

Shiloah reports on an unofficial meeting on the same day with the Jordanian delegation [see note 1, p. 166 below]. The Israeli delegation presented its essential terms for an armistice agreement: the evacuation of Latrun and of strongpoint 318, access to Mount Scopus and reopening of the railway to Jerusalem. It also demanded access to the holy places, including the Mount of Olives.

The Jordanians demanded the evacuation of Nabi Dawud, Deir Abu Tur, Talpiyot and Ramat Rahel up to a line west of the railway, and U.N. supervision and management of the railway. They also raised the question of the Israeli outposts near Beit Nuba, which had allegedly been captured after the cease-fire had gone into effect.

The Jordanians explained that they would not object to the operation of the railway, on condition that it would be under U.N. supervision pending the final solution of the Palestine problem. Their intention was to prevent the use of the railway for military purposes and to safeguard Arab rights, as the railway was the property of all inhabitants of Palestine, not only the Jews.

The Israeli delegation argued that temporary arrangements in the framework of the armistice agreement should not be mixed up with the solution of political problems, which were a matter for the peace negotiations. A further meeting was set for the following day.

207. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett. 9 March 1949 (21:15)

Shiloah reports on a complaint submitted to Bunche by Col. Jundi regarding a truce violation in the Wadi Araba region. The

Jordanians, fearing a military clash which might disrupt the talks, propose the immediate signing of a cease-fire agreement for the whole Arab Legion front south of Budrus. Shiloah told them that Israel would sign, provided Jordan accepted the international border as the armistice line in the Wadi Araba as far south as the Gulf of Aqaba. He also expressed his willingness to give priority to the negotiations regarding this line over the talks on Jerusalem. A meeting was arranged for the following day to discuss the Wadi Araba problems.

208. E. Sasson [Paris] to M. Sharett. 10 March 1949

Sasson conveys the text of a telegram he sent to King Abdallah relating to the Israeli advance in the Negev. He assured the King that Israel had no intention of attacking the Arab Legion or of crossing the border or of clashing with the British forces in Jordan. If the Jordanians refrained from provoking the Israeli forces, relations between Israel and the King would not be impaired.

Sasson told the King that Israel was determined to oppose any British attempt to wrest the Negev from Israel and asked him to persuade the British of the futility of such efforts. An agreement with Jordan was dependent on Jordanian and British recognition of Israeli rights in the Negev and any delay of this recognition would only prolong the dispute.

Sasson asks Sharett to show forbearance towards the King — to explain the situation to him as a friend interested in his welfare rather than as a statesman insisting on his rights. He is confident that if Israel continues to treat the King as it has done in the past, it will achieve its goals in the agreement with Jordan.

209. Y. Nevo [Jerusalem] to Y. Dori and M. Sharett. 10 March 1949 (12:00)

At his meeting with Tall that morning, Nevo reaffirmed that Israel had no intention of attacking the Arab Legion in the Negev, but would not waive its right to unrestricted movement within its

borders. Nevo feels that Jordan does not aspire to further expansion in the Negev, provided the British at Aqaba do not intervene. Tall informed Nevo that the Arab Legion was about to take over the Iraqi positions in the Triangle.

211. King Abdallah [Amman] to M. Sharett. 10 March 1949

The King expresses his regret for the events of the last few days in the Negev, the Wadi Araba and Aqaba [see editorial note, p. 165 above] and notes with concern the effect of those events on efforts to achieve an agreement between the parties. He requests an assurance that Israeli forces will refrain from all contact with Jordanian troops in order to avoid unnecessary clashes [see No. *215*].

212. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett and Y. Yadin. 10 March 1949 (22:00)

Shiloah reports on the afternoon meetings with Bunche and the Jordanian delegation. Bunche demanded that Israel sign the cease-fire agreement immediately. Replying to Shiloah's proposal that the Araba lines be specifically defined in the agreement, Bunche argued that this was a matter for the armistice talks. The Jordanians demanded that U.N. observers be instructed to check the lines and that the agreement be signed immediately. Following a tense debate, Shiloah promised to get his government's reply without delay.

Shiloah presents Sharett and Yadin with the choices facing Israel: either to sign a cease-fire agreement similar to that signed with Egypt [see No. 48], applying to the entire Arab Legion front, or to affix an appendix to the agreement, stating that both sides would undertake to avoid all military movement and activity intended to strengthen their respective positions, pending clarification of the two parties' positions in the area south of the Dead Sea [see note 3, p. 168 below].

Shiloah reports that Bunche has already sent observers to the Negev and has appealed officially to the delegations to submit to their respective governments a demand for an immediate halt to all military reconnaissance, reinforcements and movements in the

Negev [see note 4, p. 168 below]. In the course of that day's talks, Bunche was very tense and inclined to blame Israel for its refusal to sign the cease-fire agreement immediately. He hinted at the possibility of submitting the matter to the Security Council, should Israel persist in its stand.

Shiloah requests authority to sign the agreement, even if the lines are not clearly specified, and conveys the delegation's preference for an agreement without the proposed appendix [see note 5, p. 168 below].

213. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to M. Sharett and Y. Yadin. 11 March 1949 (01:15)

Shiloah replies to four questions of Sharett [see note 2, p. 168 below]: 1) The cease-fire agreement will only apply to the front from Budrus southward. When Iraq hands over the areas under its control to Jordan, Israel will discuss the cease-fire on that front. 2) The parties have already discussed Sharett's proposal of an oral declaration; both decided to content themselves with oral clarification, and not to add declarations by the parties to the agreement. 3) Shiloah assumes that if Israel redeploys its forces in the southern Negev, the Jordanians will accuse it of breaking the agreement, but he cannot foresee Bunche's attitude. 4) The observers will reach the southern tip of the Negev.

215. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to King Abdallah (Amman). 11 March 1949

In reply to the King's message [see No. *211*], Sharett assures him that Israeli forces did nowhere cross into Jordanian territory and will not do so in future. Their movements are therefore absolutely legal and imply no aggressive intent against Jordan.

Sharett denies the claim of the Jordanian delegation in Rhodes that Israeli forces attacked Arab Legion outposts. He notes that the only incident which occurred was in the Gharandal area, and the Israeli forces were not responsible for it [see No. 210 and note 4 there].

With regard to the King's mention of Naqeb [see note 5, p. 169 below], Sharett points out that the place is situated on the Israeli-Egyptian border and does not concern Jordan. In the Wadi Araba and Aqaba regions, Israeli forces are careful not to cross the border.

In conclusion, Sharett states that an agreement between Israel and Jordan will only be possible on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty; he hopes to achieve such an agreement at the earliest opportunity.

Sharett informs the King that the British have notified Israel of a complaint received from the Jordanian government alleging agressive acts on Israel's part; Israel has therefore informed Britain of the actual situation and of the content of Sharett's reply to the King [see notes 6, 7, p. 169 below].

218. Y. Shimoni [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion and W. Eytan. 12 March 1949 (20:30)

Shimoni reports on that day's meetings with the Jordanians on the subject of Jerusalem [see No. 216]. Israel proposed ceding to Jordan the Abu Tur quarter, half of Allenby and Alamein camps together with both sides of Bethlehem road, as well as free passage as far as the Damascus Gate of the Old City. In return, Israel demanded the police depot in the northern part of the city and territorial continuity to Mount Scopus via crossroads on the Ramallah road, use and control of the railway, Jordanian withdrawal from Latrun, access to the Wailing Wall and to the Mount of Olives. In the afternoon, the Jordanians presented a counter-proposal [see No. 217]: Israeli withdrawal in southern Jerusalem to west of the railway and to behind Notre Dame, in return for passage to Mount Scopus under either mixed or U.N. supervision and similar freedom of passage at Latrun, where the Jordanians would remain. They also agreed to allow Israel the use of the railway. The Israeli delegation rejected the plan, and Bunche eventually suggested reciprocal withdrawal and the establishment of a zone between the new lines under police supervision.

Shimoni reports that the Israeli delegation tends to support reciprocal withdrawal, provided it does not lead to joint or international

supervision, or to the return of Arab residents to the demilitarized zone [see No. *219*, note 4].

219. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin. 12 March 1949 (20:50)

Dayan notes the shortcomings of the Jordanian delegation: its members have difficulty understanding the topics under discussion, and they are not permitted to deviate from their instructions. Because of this limited independence the Israeli delegation feels that for the time being no advantage can accrue from direct contacts.

Meanwhile, Bunche and Riley seem intent on implementing the U.N. resolutions regarding Jerusalem [see No. 217, note 4]. Dayan proposes that the southern (evacuated) quarters of Jerusalem be repopulated immediately [see note 3, p. 170 below]. He holds that Bunche's proposal for the demilitarization of Jerusalem [see note 4, p. 170 below] should not be opposed in principle; rather, the initiative and planning should be left to the U.N. and its practical proposal be studied when submitted.

221. Y. Shimoni [Rhodes] to D. Ben-Gurion and W. Eytan. 13 March 1949 (12:35)

Shimoni reports that at that morning's meeting of the delegations [see No. 220], Israel did not commit itself with regard to Bunche's proposal to move back the military lines in Jerusalem [see Nos. *218*, *219*, and note 4 there]. The Jordanian delegation refrained from any comment.

Jundi announced that unless Israel agreed to evacuate Talpiyot and adjacent quarters, Jordan would oppose any changes in the existing military lines. In that case, the local transit arrangements formulated in the Dayan — Tall agreement would remain in force [see Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686].

It was agreed that Bunche and his aides should work out a detailed plan for reciprocal withdrawal in Jerusalem [see No. 228 and note 1 there].

222. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin. 13 March 1949 (16:35)

Dayan reports that he found Bunche sulking over U.N. queries about Operation *Uvda* (the Israeli advance to the Gulf of Aqaba — see editorial note, p. 165 below). Bunche thinks that the British will seek political gain from the operation, and is concerned lest he gets personally involved and might be obliged to give up the conduct of the Rhodes talks. He fears that if the matter is raised in the Security Council, the Arabs will claim that he assented to the Israeli advance in the Negev, despite the Rhodes talks and in violation of the truce. He will then have to demand Israeli withdrawal from the southern Negev. A refusal will lead to a deadlock which will force him to resign.

Dayan reassured Bunche that there had been no Israeli advance in the Negev, but rather a deployment of forces which replaced the control of the territory by reconnaissance; in Elath, too, there were no Jordanian forces, so that the advance had not been at the expense of the other side. Bunche replied that any advance was prohibited under the truce, even though he admitted that if no military clash had occurred and no lines had been breached, the truce violation was not so serious.

To Dayan's argument that the Jordanians had signed a cease-fire agreement with Israel on 10 March [see No. 214], Bunche replied that despite the agreement, the British were liable to protest in the U.N. and the Jordanians in Rhodes if they received appropriate instructions from Amman. He said that the Jordanian delegation was already manifesting its displeasure and had asked why Israel could not have advanced to Elath before beginning the talks with Jordan. Dayan replied that if the Jordanians wanted to get the territory held by the Iraqi forces, they must cooperate with Israel, not quarrel with it.

Bunche alluded to the possibility that Dayan discuss the matter with Jundi. Dayan is not inclined to accept this suggestion, since Jundi is not independent, but inquires whether he should not make it clear to Jundi that if Jordan hinders Israel, Israel will not cooperate in the transfer of the Iraqi-held territory to it [see note 4, p. 171 below], or, alternatively, whether Bunche should be relied upon to settle the matter with the British.

224. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 14 March 1949 (12:00)

Dayan reminded Bunche of his demand that the cease-fire agreement should include maps approved by both parties, and inquired about the area south of the Dead Sea. Bunche replied that he had already instructed the U.N. observers to reconnoitre that territory and hoped to receive their report on the Israeli and Jordanian lines from Jerusalem to Aqaba within two days. The observers had been instructed to obtain the signatures of the local commanders as confirmation of the correctness of the maps. Upon receipt of the report, he would read its contents to the delegations. Silence would be taken as confirmation. If the report was questioned, he would send the observers to examine the situation in the disputed sectors. In Bunche's opinion, the combination of a cease-fire agreement with a report on the lines, read to and approved by the delegations, will serve as a satisfactory document.

In reply to Yadin's telegram [see No. *222* and note 4 there], Dayan reports that Bunche justifies Israel's stand regarding British reinforcements in Aqaba. He said that his activity in that matter was based on Israel's protests.

Bunche did not complete his Jerusalem plan [see Nos. 220, 228] because of his preoccupation with the Aqaba matter. His plan will probably include the following points: 1) reciprocal withdrawal and the replacement of army units by police; 2) supervision of the roads and the common holy places by either mixed units under U.N. supervision or by U.N. personnel; 3) establishment of a committee consisting of Israeli, Jordanian and U.N. representatives which will work out the details of the plan.

225. King Abdallah [Amman] to M. Sharett. 14 March 1949

In reply to Sharett's letter [see No. *215*], the King repeats his call to Israel to avoid all movement and provocation in the Negev. He inquires whether it is true that an Israeli announcement about the advance to the Gulf of Aqaba includes a declaration to the effect that Israel will seize those areas of Palestine which the Iraqis will evacuate.

226. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to King Abdallah (Amman). 15 March 1949

Eytan replies on behalf of Sharett to the King's last letter [see No. *225*]. He informs him that the Negev is absolutely quiet, and no incident has occurred between Israeli and Jordanian forces. Eytan assures the King that there is no truth in the rumours alleging an Israeli invasion of Jordanian territory, or an Israeli intention of doing so. As long as both parties respect each other's sovereignty, there will be no incidents. Eytan once more declares Israel's desire to live in peace and friendship with Jordan.

As to the Iraqi withdrawal from Palestine and the transfer of the territories under their control to Jordan, Eytan informs the King of Israel's statement to the Acting Mediator that it will view such an act as a manifest violation of the truce, and will not recognize it if it is implemented without Israel's agreement [see No. 223]. Eytan states that Israel has no intention of taking over this territory or of threatening its resident Arab population, but hopes that mutual understanding will enable the parties to agree on arrangements which will make a rational solution in the area possible. Since this matter is not directly related to the Rhodes talks, Eytan proposes a meeting between Tall and Dayan to discuss mutually agreeable arrangements in the area to be evacuated by the Iraqi army [see note 4, p. 172 below].

227. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 15 March 1949 (13:25)

Dayan reports on that day's meeting of the delegations [see note 1, p. 172 below]. A map was presented of the territory south of Jerusalem as far as Ein Gedi, prepared by the U.N. observers and signed by the local commanders. The Jordanians claimed that most of the Israeli line in this sector had been occupied during the past few days, and they had marked the Israeli line at a distance of several kilometres from the present line. Dayan is confident that "Bunche-ism" and Israeli insistence will prove effective in straightening out this matter. He recommends the establishment of a supply line between Ein Gedi and the Israeli position at MR 152085 in order to strengthen Israel's claim in that sector.

230. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 15 March 1949 (19:30)

Eytan reports on his letter to King Abdallah [see No. *226* and note 4 there] and asks that Dayan be prepared to return to Israel if required. He inquires about Bunche's reaction to Israel's protest against the replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces [see No. 223 and note 5 there] and whether he tends to prohibit it.

Eytan also conveys the contents of a telegram received from Eban [see note 5, p. 173 below]. Eban holds that an Israeli action against the Iraqi-held territory may have extremely grave repercussions unless the circumstances and timing are most carefully arranged.

232. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 16 March 1949 (20:30)

Shiloah reports on the day's meetings [see note 1, p. 173 below]. The Jordanians demanded that the armistice line in the Hebron area include an Arab reconnaissance area and not a line of outposts. Israel insisted, with Bunche's support, that the outpost lines approved by the observers should serve as the exclusive basis for the armistice lines.

Bunche's proposal relating to Jerusalem was discussed [see No. 228]. The Israeli delegation rejected it. Jundi repeated his suggestions for changes in the Jerusalem arrangements, but the Jordanians eventually agreed with the Israelis that no changes be made in the Dayan — Tall agreement at this point, and that the subject be further dicussed by the two local commanders.

Dayan and Shiloah have concluded that the delegation would not succeed in solving any of the more intricate problems in Rhodes, and that at this stage they should be satisfied with an armistice based on the existing lines from Budrus to Elath, and leave the other problems for discussion at a later stage. Should an agreement be reached with the King with regard to the Iraqi-held territory, it will be possible to include also those lines in the proposed agreement.

234. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 17 March 1949 (14:00)

Shiloah reports on the first meeting which dealt with the reduction of forces [see No. 233]. In principle, it was agreed to discuss the problems under three headings: 1) the Budrus — Jerusalem line and the line from south of Jerusalem to the Dead Sea; 2) the city of Jerusalem; 3) the Negev as far as Elath. There was a sharp argument about the British forces in Aqaba. Assuming that the Palestine — Transjordan border served as the cease-fire line, the Israelis demanded that the British force should be included in the general tally of Jordan's defensive forces. The Jordanians declared that they were not authorized to discuss the British force. Bunche supported the Jordanians. Shiloah proposes that Dayan raise the question with King Abdallah and that Eban do the same with Cadogan. Eban should demand British observance of any reduction of forces agreement which will be signed with the Jordanians. Shiloah requests instructions on this point.

235. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin. 17 March 1949 (18:50)

The reduction of forces was discussed at a meeting of the military sub-committee and an agreement was reached, subject to approval by the Israeli and Jordanian army commands. The agreement established the following points: 1) All forces, except defensive forces, are to be removed to a distance of about ten kilometres on both sides of the cease-fire lines. 2) Defensive forces are defined as in the agreement with Egypt. 3) The front will be divided into four sectors: a) from Budrus to the northern point of the 30 November line (one battalion); b) the 30 November line (two battalions); c) from the 30 November line to the Dead Sea (one battalion); d) the Wadi Araba area as far as Elath. The Jordanians refused to discuss this area for the time being. 4) Only four anti-aircraft guns will be stationed by either party in each of the first three sectors. 5) By Jordanian demand, it was agreed that all types of artillery, except as specified above, would be removed to a distance of fourteen kilometres from the cease-fire lines.

Lt. Col. Loehner raised the question of Latrun and announced

that if the Jordanians did not agree to evacuate the Latrun area, Israel would be forced to augment its forces in the Hartuv region, which was located within the reduction of forces zone. The Jordanians promised to consider the Israeli demand.

Shiloah requests Yadin's opinion regarding the proposed agreement [see No. *238* and note 1 there].

236. M. Dayan (Jerusalem) to W. Eytan. 18 March 1949 (12:30)

Dayan, meeting with Tall, explained Israel's stand with regard to the Iraqi-occupied area. Tall promised to get the King's answer before the next meeting. Dayan undertook to bring a map indicating the location of the Iraqi outposts and the changes demanded by Israel.

Tall expressed doubt as to Jordan's ability to agree to changes in this sector in view of Jordanian public opinion and the expected Iraqi reaction. Dayan said that if so, only two possibilities existed: either the Jordanians did not take over the territory from the Iraqis or they might reach an agreement with Israel, to be implemented by stages so as not to draw attention to the changes in the line. Tall tended to support the second possibility and suggested a "secret agreement." He claimed that Israel had signed a secret agreement with Egypt as well.

Dayan requests that the map of the Iraqi lines and the list of Israel's demands be sent to him immediately. He advises against trying to "ask for the moon".

237. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 18 March 1949 (16:30)

Shiloah reports on his meeting with Riyad Muflih, the King's special envoy and his confidant in the Jordanian delegation. Mufalah explained that because of Iraq's internal situation, its government could not participate in the Rhodes talks, and the only way to solve the problem was to transfer the territory under its army's control to Jordan. Jordan was prepared to make slight alterations as part of the armistice agreement, and more extensive

alterations on the conclusion of peace. He implied that Israeli threats to conquer this area are responsible for the delay in transferring the territory to Jordan. He proposed that Shiloah present him immediately with the changes which Israel demanded in the Iraqi sector, for transmission to the King. If the King approves these changes, that area can also be included in the armistice agreement.

Shiloah asks whether to act on this proposal or to await the results of Dayan's enquiries [see No. *236*]. He proposes action on both fronts simultaneously and wishes to know the minimum demands that Dayan intends to present to Tall.

As to the British forces, Muflih said that Jordan could guarantee that they would not cross the border, but could not give an undertaking relating to the reduction of their forces in the Aqaba area. He is nevertheless confident that when the armistice agreement is signed, most of the British troops will be evacuated. Shiloah's impression is that the Jordanians will accept the old Palestine border as the armistice line.

238. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin.
18 March 1949 (17:15)

Shiloah makes the following comments in reply to Yadin's telegrams [see note 1, p. 175 below]: 1) It is difficult to insist on three battalions for Jerusalem when the Jordanian delegation and the U.N. are opposed even to the two which the Israeli delegation has proposed. Loehner suggested that one battalion be maintained in the Hartuv — Kasla sector, thus safeguarding the Jerusalem corridor. 2) Loehner proposes that Israel be permitted to add twelve armoured cars to the battalion to be stationed in the sector south of the 30 November line. 3) The delegation will act on Yadin's directives regarding the southern Negev, but Shiloah doubts that the Jordanians will be able to guarantee the inclusion of the British in their tally of defensive forces. Shiloah requests clear directives from Yadin as to how to proceed on all these topics [see note 2, p. 175 below].

239. Y. Yadin [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 19 March 1949 (12:00)

Replying to Shiloah's telegram [No. *238*], Yadin instructs him to tell Bunche that restriction of Israeli strength in the Jerusalem sector to two battalions and the removal of artillery to a distance of ten kilometres from the armistice line will necessarily imperil the safety of Jerusalem. To this Israel cannot agree. Yadin proposes expanding the force to include three battalions or reducing the demilitarized area to four kilometres.

240. King Abdallah [Amman] to W. Eytan. 19 March 1949

Replying to Eytan's letter [No. *226*], the King expresses his confidence that quiet in the Negev will be preserved if both sides act in good faith and in a spirit of peace.

As to the Iraqi front, the King reminds Eytan of his meeting with Dayan and Sasson [see No. *186*], in which both supported the handing over of the Iraqi front to the Jordanians. The King invites Eytan to meet with him to discuss the "just demands" of both sides regarding this front.

241. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to King Abdallah (Amman). 20 March 1949

Eytan thanks the King for his friendliness and willingness to compromise, and for his cordial reception of the Israeli representatives at their last meeting [see Nos. *242*, 248]. He will be honoured to accept the King's invitation [see No. *240*] if the latter still considers such a meeting important after Dayan's visit.

Eytan agrees with the King's statement regarding the just demands of both sides and hopes that both sides will respect each other's demands. He hopes that the King will accept Israel's demands with regard to the line from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea, the line of outposts in the Dead Sea — Hebron — Budrus area

as approved by the U.N. observers, and the armistice line on the Iraqi front and Latrun.

Eytan reiterates Israel's desire for peace with the Kingdom of Jordan.

242. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 20 March 1949 (12:40)

Eytan reports that the King, at his meeting with Dayan [see Nos. *241*, 248] agreed to cede Wadi Ara and the hills overlooking the coastal plain, except for Tulkarm and Qalqiliya. This transfer will be implemented in stages, following the signing of the armistice agreement. The King does not wish his government to know about the direct negotiations with Israel and will instruct the Jordanian delegation in Rhodes via Glubb Pasha and the Jordanian Prime Minister.

Shiloah is instructed not to divulge any information about these negotiations to Bunche or the Jordanian delegation and to await Dayan's arrival.

243. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 20 March 1949 (18:00)

In a consultation with the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff and Yadin it was decided to accept the proposals regarding the armistice line in the area of the Iraqi front [see No. *242*]. Dayan will meet with Tall in order to clarify further details. He will notify Tall of Israel's objection to the concentration of the Iraqis in the rear and will demand the speeding up of the transition period for the transfer of territories to Israel. He will also make it clear to Tall that Israel will not sign an armistice agreement unless Jordan agrees to the Elath — Dead Sea line.

Eytan repeats that Shiloah must not inform Bunche of the negotiations with the King.

244. M. Dayan [Jerusalem] to W. Eytan. 20 March 1949 (23:30)

Before his return to Rhodes, Dayan wishes to clarify his stand regarding the British forces in Aqaba [see No. *238* and note 1 there]. In his opinion, there is no point in demanding the inclusion of the British troops in Aqaba in the general tally of the Jordanian defensive forces. He gives the following reasons: 1) Jundi cannot be expected to sign in the name of the British Empire; 2) following the signing of an armistice agreement, the British will not be able to claim that the Jordanians need their presence as a defence against Israel; 3) the British have vital interests in the Middle East, which justify the maintenance of forces and bases in Aqaba, not necessarily against Israel; 4) Israeli insistence on this point is liable to lead to a deadlock, from which Israel alone will suffer; 5) even if there is no reduction of forces in the Elath — Aqaba area, Israel cannot bring enough forces to Elath to balance every additional British vessel or military unit arriving in Aqaba; insistence on this point might be interpreted as an Israeli attempt to restrict the freedom of movement of the British forces in Jordan; 6) the blocking of the land route from Egypt to Jordan is an irksome matter for the Arabs, and they must be given time to habituate to it. Dayan proposes that Israel station a considerable force in Elath and agree to the maintenance of a similar Jordanian force in Aqaba. He argues that Elath, which is a weak point for Israel, should not be linked up with the difficult problem of the British forces.

247. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 23 March 1949 (21:30)

Replying to Eytan's instruction that he should await Dayan's return [see note 1, p. 177 below], Shiloah complains that he is being put in an impossible situation. Bunche knows about the talks with Tall, and the Jordanians are at least surmising that something is afoot. Bunche is pressing for resumption of the talks, and he — Shiloah — cannot continue to ignore his queries. Shiloah asks when Dayan will return, when the talks can be renewed, and which paragraphs he is authorized to discuss. He adds that unless he receives clear answers immediately, he will return to Israel, as it is

not in keeping with his own or the government's dignity that he should make a fool of himself *vis-à-vis* Bunche [see No. *250*].

249. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 24 March 1949 (14:40)

In reply to Shiloah's telegram [see note 1, p. 177 below] Eytan instructs him to stand firm with regard to the line from Sdom to Elath and to extract the maximum possible concessions regarding Naharayim. The maximum is the cession of Naharayim to Israel, the minimum — reactivation of the power station immediately following the signing of the agreement [see No. *256* and note 1 there].

He leaves the question of Latrun to the discretion of Shiloah and Dayan, the latter having received instructions from Yadin. In Eytan's opinion, a total Jordanian withdrawal from Latrun cannot be expected.

With regard to the British forces in Aqaba, Shiloah should not put the onus of solving the problem on the Jordanians. Rather, he should try for the inclusion of a paragraph stating that because of the presence of a third party, Israel is entitled to maintain a larger force.

250. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 24 March 1949 (14:50)

Replying to Shiloah's complaints [see No. *247*], Eytan reassures him that from now on he will receive clear instructions. He instructs him on how to deal with the Iraqi front, but proposes that he await Dayan's arrival. His instructions are: to work for the insertion of two clauses in the armistice agreement — first, that the armistice line should be subject to local adjustments which have been or will be agreed upon by the parties, and that these changes will be as binding as if they had been included in their entirety within the text of the armistice agreement; second, that changes may be inserted in the agreement at any time, subject to the agreement of both parties. The armistice line on the Iraqi front will be the present fighting line.

Eytan instructs Shiloah to continue his pressure on Bunche to oblige the British to leave Aqaba; he emphasizes the political significance of this issue.

251. M. Dayan [Jerusalem] to W. Eytan. 24 March 1949 (16:00)

On second thoughts, Dayan proposes that the agreement with the King [see No. 248, Appendix] be disclosed to Bunche, and that it be shown to him once it is finally approved. Dayan explains that according to the conditions of the agreement, the chairman of the implementation committee will be a member of the U.N. staff, and the matter will in any case become known to Bunche. Moreover, one cannot spring the agreement upon Bunche and then ask him to have his representative implement it.

Dayan requests instructions on how to proceed.

253. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 24 March 1949 (19:00)

In the afternoon meeting that day [see No. 252], the Jordanians agreed that the armistice line from the Dead Sea to Elath should run along the international border, on condition that the agreement state explicitly that this does not prejudice their claims in that area. However, they accepted Shiloah's proposal to make do with the general paragraph in the agreement guaranteeing the right of the parties to insist on their claims in the final settlement.

As for the Hebron area, Israel agreed to present a map of lines in the light of the conclusions of the U.N. observers. The Jordanians accused Israel of violating the cease-fire in the Hebron area by occupying villages and outposts after the agreement had been signed and by expulsion of inhabitants. Shiloah suspects that some of the Jordanian complaints are justified and that Israel must make amends. Shiloah's attempt to convince Bunche on the basis of Yadin's telegram [see note 3, p. 178 below] failed, and Bunche sent another letter to Tel Aviv on the matter [see No. 252 and note 3 there].

The Jordanians refused to separate the discussion of Latrun from

that of the Jerusalem question. Shiloah is concerned that if Israel insists on the evacuation of Latrun, the Jordanians are liable to demand the opening of the Bethlehem road.

In a discussion of the British forces question, Bunche informed Shiloah that at his insistence, the Secretary-General had raised the question with Britain, but has received no answer as yet.

254. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin. 25 March 1949 (20:00)

Dayan and Loehner met with the Jordanians, without intermediaries, and discussed the Hebron — Ein Gedi line and the reduction of forces. They encountered difficulties in reconciling the respective stands of Jordan and Israel with regard to the positioning of the reduced forces. The Jordanians want to maintain two brigades on the Aqaba — Beisan line.

Dayan thinks that Israel will be obliged to curtail its demands, and suggests two battalions instead of three for Jerusalem. Even then there will be five Israeli brigades along the entire line as against two Jordanian brigades [see also No. *255*].

Finally, Jundi stated his preference for preparatory talks, held without intermediaries, preceding the official talks.

255. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin. 26 March 1949 (10:30)

Dayan proposes that Israel reconsider its demands regarding reduction of forces. He assumes that in any case Israel will not maintain more than four brigades opposite the Jordanians, including the sector now held by the Iraqis, and he feels that Israel has no interest in producing an exaggerated impression of its forces.

Should an agreement be signed with the King [see No. 248, Appendix], there will be no point in demanding stronger forces in the south in order to pin down the Jordanians and discourage them from taking over of the Iraqi line. Furthermore, exaggeration and pressure coupled with Jordanian experience of Israeli behaviour might make Israel suspect and move the Jordanians to appeal to the British and Iraqis for help.

The proximity of front and rear in the northern part of the country will enable Israel to increase its forces in time of need, and there is no sense in maintaining augmented forces. The situation is different in the case of Elath, both because of its distance and because of the British factor.

Dayan therefore proposes maintaining four brigades opposite the Jordanians, one of which will hold the Dead Sea — Elath line [see note 2, p. 179 below].

256. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 26 March 1949 (20:00)

Shiloah replies to Eytan's telegram of the same day [see note 1, p. 179 below]: 1) He promises to press Bunche with regard to the interference with Israeli shipping in Egyptian ports. 2) He agrees that at this stage Bunche should not be informed of the agreement with the King; however, he will have to be told at some point in order to ensure his cooperation in the implementation of the agreement. When this stage is reached, the delegation will request approval from Israel. 3) The delegation can of course take a firm stand on the question of Naharayim, but in so doing it will go back on the agreement reached with the Jordanians, i.e., postponement of the discussion of all problems except those of the lines and reduction of forces until the armistice agreement has been signed. The Jordanians will have to get special permission from their government to discuss this question. 4) Shiloah will speak to Riley about the inspection visits of U.N. observers in the villages.

At Sasson's request, Shiloah raised the question of the Jews of Iraq with Bunche [see note 2, p. 179 below]. Bunche can apparently do little in this matter, but he agreed to approach the Iraqi Foreign Minister and asked for further information. He proposed that Israel submit a complaint to the U.N. General Assembly, which might produce some results in view of the Assembly's anti-genocide resolution [see note 3, p. 180 below].

258. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 27 March 1949 (19:40)

Shiloah reports on meetings of the last few days with the Jordanians, at which no U.N. representatives were present. The Jordanians agreed to the Israeli proposal for the Hebron — Ein Gedi line but took exception to the size of the forces which Israel wanted to maintain on the Jordanian front: from Budrus to the 30 November line — one battalion; on the 30 November line — two battalions; from there to Ein Gedi — one battalion; from there to Elath — four battalions.

Mufalah urged Shiloah to reduce the size of the force in the southern sector to two battalions, claiming that the Jordanians would in fact maintain less than two battalions there. Shiloah repeated Israel's argument about the British force in Aqaba [see Nos. *244, 249*] and proposed that the armistice agreement include a clause allowing for a reappraisal of the forces' strength and their reduction by mutual consent after a certain period. Muflih continued to urge a larger reduction, but Shiloah feels that the Jordanians will eventually agree to three battalions in the Ein Gedi — Elath sector. Shiloah requests Yadin's opinion [see note 2, p. 180 below].

Bunche wrote to Shiloah and to Jundi demanding the immediate resumption of the talks, and notified them that his envoy in Baghdad had received a signed authorization from the Iraqi Foreign Minister empowering the Jordanians to conduct negotiations with regard to the Iraqi sector [see No. 257]. Shiloah urges that such negotiations be started immediately; he can hardly keep on evading Bunche, having used up all possible pretexts [see note 4, p. 180 below].

259. Y. Harkabi to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 27 March 1949 (23:10)

Harkabi reports that in principle the Jordanian Prime Minister has consented to the agreement reached with the King, but he requested a further meeting attended by the Prime Ministers and ministers of both sides. At Nevo and Harkabi's meeting with Tall it emerged that the Jordanians want an open agreement, that the transfer of territories to Israel should be implemented immediately after their transfer by the Iraqis to the Arab Legion, and that certain

changes be made in the lines agreed upon. Further discussion of the border line will be postponed until the peace talks, which will begin immediately following the signing of the armistice agreement. The Jordanians fear that unless this procedure is adopted, public opinion will force their government to resign.

Harkabi informed Tall that Israel will agree to his first two conditions, but will oppose any changes in the line agreed upon. Tall replied that the Jordanian Prime Minister might be amenable if Israel offered suitable recompense. Harkabi rejected this demand.

260. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to R. Shiloah (Rhodes). 28 March 1949 (10:30)

In response to Tall's proposals [see No. *259*] the Prime Minister instructed Nevo to inform Tall that the government of Israel was not willing to discuss changes in the line agreed upon. The government was willing to make the agreement public and to implement it immediately. Israel is prepared to hold an additional meeting in Jerusalem.

261. Y. Nevo [Jerusalem] to Y. Yadin and W. Eytan. 28 March 1949 (19:15)

Having consulted his government, Tall replied [see Nos. *259, 260*] that Jordan consented in principle to the line agreed upon with the King, and that the Jordanians proposed holding the additional meeting on 30 March in Shune and not in Jerusalem, in order to facilitate the intervention of the King should problems arise. The Jordanians requested Dayan's presence at the meeting. On their part, Jundi would also attend. Nevo assumes that the Jordanian ministers will try to get [territorial] compensation elsewhere in order to facilitate the acceptance of Israel's conditions.

262. M. Dayan [Rhodes] to Y. Yadin. 29 March 1949 (01:15)

Dayan points out that the delegation should complete the Rhodes talks on the Budrus — Elath line before the next day's meeting in Shune [see Nos. *261,* 267], so that he can present the meeting with a map approved by the parties and by Bunche. He asks Yadin for clear instructions on how to proceed in determining the line in the Ein Gedi — Hebron sector, the only one still in dispute.

263. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 29 March 1949 (14:00)

Shiloah reports that the draft of the armistice agreement and the map of the lines were discussed at a joint meeting held that morning [see note 1, p. 181 below]. In general, the delegation is satisfied with both.

The talks have been adjourned for a few days and the members of both delegations are returning to their respective capitals.

266. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 3 April 1949 (01:00)

On returning to Rhodes, Jundi and Shiloah handed their new instructions [see note 1, p. 181 below] together with a copy of the agreed maps to Bunche, who prepared a draft armistice agreement [see note 2, p. 181 below]. If the Jordanians accept the agreement, it will probably be signed the next day. The Jordanians have some reservations regarding the amendments proposed by the Israeli delegation in the reduction of forces clause [see note 4, p. 182 below].

268. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 3 April 1949 (14:30)

Shiloah reports that the Jordanians have referred to their government the Israeli request for omission of the clause forbidding the establishment of naval bases and the movement of military vessels in territorial waters adjoining the reduction of forces zone [see editorial note, pp. 182-3 above]. An answer is expected within two hours.

With regard to the armoured vehicles, Shiloah anticipates that the Jordanians will accept Israel's stand and that the question of the weapons to be allowed on them will be referred to the Armistice Commission.

Shiloah requests authority to sign the agreement, even if the Jordanians insist on the matter of the naval bases, because of possible reactions in the Arab world should the conditions of the agreement become known before its signing. The reactions might impel the King to go back on the agreement [see note 1, p. 183].

270. R. Shiloah [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 20 March 1949 (18:45)

Bunche informed Shiloah that Syria had agreed to begin talks with Israel. Farid Zein al-Din had informed Bunche that Syria wanted the talks to make rapid progress and, moreover, would like to be among the first to negotiate for peace. Bunche took advantage of this occasion to prepare Zeyn al-Din for the necessity of evacuating the Syrian positions in Palestine. The Syrians prefer to hold the armistice talks on the Palestine — Syrian border rather than in Rhodes.

271. Y. Shimoni [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 30 March 1949 (12:00)

Bunche informed Shimoni that the Syrians had agreed to begin the talks on 1 April, and that they wanted to sign a cease-fire agreement before the beginning of the negotiations. Bunche invited the Israeli delegation to Metulla on 1 April and urgently requested: notification of the delegation's composition; a reply to his invitation to negotiations; and an undertaking to clear the Metulla — Marj Ayun road of mines.

272. S. Rosenne [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 30 March 1949 (17:25)

Rosenne reports on a meeting with Bunche in which Y. Shimoni also participated. They explained to Bunche Israel's position regard-

ing the armistice line with Syria. Bunche refrained from comment, as he wished to discuss the question with the Syrians. He inquired about Israel's response to a possible proposal for Syrian withdrawal and demilitarization of the evacuated area. Shimoni and Rosenne replied that they were opposed to this idea in principle. Bunche said that he himself would not propose demilitarization but that Israel must be prepared for such a proposal on Syria's part. As for the prisoners of war, he recommended that the fate of the persons sentenced for trying to reach Palestine illegally through Syria [see note 1, p. 184 below] should not be linked with the question of the prisoners of war proper; he promised that he himself would deal with that specific problem. Rosenne asks Eytan for full details concerning the cease-fire proposal.

273. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan, R. Shiloah, Y. Yadin and M. Makleff. 31 March 1949

Rosenne reports on a talk with Bunche on 30 March. Bunche said that the new Syrian rulers [see note 2, p. 184 below] wished to negotiate with Israel, but asked for a short postponement. Rosenne reported his government's approval of the proposed location of the meetings. He announced that the delegation which had represented Israel in the talks with Lebanon would also represent it in the talks with Syria. However, he added a reservation to the effect that if no other government recognized the new Syrian regime, Israel might have to postpone the negotiations.

Bunche said he would not pressure Israel to agree to the Syrian demand for the signing of a cease-fire agreement before the beginning of the negotiations, but should the Syrians insist, Israel would have to agree in order to produce a congenial atmosphere for the negotiations.

Rosenne pointed out that Israel's main concern was to bring about a Syrian withdrawal to the international border; he gave the following reasons: 1) the northern border constitutes one unit, both politically and militarily; 2) the Syrians cannot claim, as the Egyptians did in the case of the Gaza Strip, that they are protecting an Arab population; 3) Israel's demand is unrelated to the U.N. parti-

tion resolution; possible claims on western Galilee [which the partition resolution allotted to the Arab state of Palestine] are untenable in view of the armistice agreement wih Lebanon; 4) even if the Syrians evacuate Mishmar ha-Yarden, their presence along the border poses a threat to the security of the Jewish settlements in the area, particularly Ein Gev.

Bunche asked whether Israel would agree to a Syrian withdrawal unaccompanied by an Israeli advance. Rosenne replied in the negative. Bunche advised the Israelis not to expect quick results in the first meetings and to be patient with the Syrians.

276. S. Rosenne [Rhodes] to W. Eytan. 3 April 1949 (20:50)

Rosenne reports on a Syrian cease-fire proposal transmitted to him by Vigier [see No. 275]. The proposal resembles an armistice agreement but is meant to be signed in the name of the army, not of the government. His advice is to refuse to sign and to object to the letter of credentials brought by the Syrians because it is signed by Zaim as Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian armed forces [see No. 277].

278. S. Rosenne [Tel Aviv] to J. Robinson (New York) and E. Sasson (Paris). 6 April 1949

Rosenne reports on the progress of the talks with the Syrians. The introductions, which were stiff and artificial, were followed by the first meeting. Vigier was chosen as chairman and the authority of the Syrian delegation was discussed [see No. 277]. After the meeting, the Israeli representatives discussed the cease-fire question with the U.N. staff. They stated their objection to the signing of the agreement and demanded a Syrian withdrawal to the international border. The Israeli representatives argued that the Syrians were different from the other Arab nations and Israel feared that once a cease-fire agreement was signed, the Syrians would discontinue the armistice negotiations. Vigier stressed the precedents for signing a cease-fire agreement, the like of which were signed with all the other states in the course of the respective talks.

The delegation's instructions were to refuse to sign a cease-fire agreement as long as it could do so without damaging Israel's standing prior to the voting on its admission to the U.N. [see note 5, p. 185 below]. The argument about the powers of the Syrian delegation was intended to gain time pending clarification of Israel's status in the U.N. and of the future of the new government in Syria. Since Vigier and Riley were urging the Israeli representatives to sign the cease-fire — they had even threatened them with an appeal to the Security Council — the delegation proposed that the next meeting discuss a non-aggression declaration, similar to that which appeared in the first article of the armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. The Syrians promised to reply at the next meeting [see No. *283*].

283. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to J. Robinson (New York) and E. Sasson (Paris). 10 April 1949

Rosenne reports that the Syrians did not show up at the second meeting, excusing themselves on grounds of tiredness; however, upon investigation it turned out that they had not come because they were not sure whether Israel had completed the evacuation of the recently occupied territory [see Nos. 280, 282]. After discussion, it was decided to set aside the incident and a meeting was fixed for 12 April.

Vigier and Riley urged the Israeli delegation to sign a cease-fire agreement in order to facilitate the armistice talks. The delegation objected, unless the Syrians agreed to withdraw to the international border. Rosenne adds that in effect this statement was couched in milder terms in order to prevent the Mediator from submitting a censorious report to the Security Council before the voting on the admission of Israel to the U.N. The delegation urged Vigier and Riley to work for an armistice rather than a cease-fire.

When subjected to detailed questioning by the Israelis, Vigier and Riley hinted that the Syrians wanted the armistice line to run along the present fighting line. The Israelis thereupon invited Vigier and Riley to come to Tel Aviv on Sunday, 10 April, when the delegation was due to meet with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the G.H.Q.

The delegation announced that if the Syrians did not evacuate position 223, it would not attend the next meeting.

Rosenne concludes that the negotiations with the Syrians will be difficult and that there is little hope for agreement on the delineation of the armistice line.

285. M. Makleff to Y. Yadin and W. Eytan. 18 April 1949 (15:00)

Makleff reports that at a joint meeting that day the Israeli representatives presented their position in a clear and unequivocal manner. The possibility of direct talks between Israeli representatives and Col. Zaim was discussed.

292. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to J. Robinson (New York) and E. Sasson (Paris). 28 April 1949

Rosenne reports on an official joint meeting on 26 April. Before the meeting, the Israeli representatives met with Vigier and Riley and warned them against the effect which a deadlock in the Syrian talks would have on the Lausanne talks. They stated that Israel would refrain from any contact with the Syrian delegation in Lausanne pending the signing of an armistice agreement. Vigier proposed that the military members of the two delegations should try to delineate the armistice line as a military line, without taking political factors into consideration. Israel's representatives agreed, on condition that the military committee sat continuously and completed its work before the Lausanne talks got under way.

The proposal was accepted at the official meeting and the military talks began immediately. It was decided to delineate the line from north to south. It was agreed that down to Lake Hule the armistice line would run along the international border. The Syrians proposed a narrow demilitarized strip on either side of the border and a wide zone on either side of that strip in which only defensive forces would be allowed. The Israeli representatives agreed to transmit the proposal to their government, but only after receiving the Syrian proposal for the entire front. The Syrians then explained their position

regarding the other sections of the front and it turned out that they were in fact standing by their first proposal — an armistice line along the water line rather than along the international border, except for the area around Ein Gev. Since they showed no inclination to make concessions, the Israeli representatives proposed to adjourn the meeting. The next meeting was set for 29 April [see No. *296*].

296. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to J. Robinson (New York) and the Israeli Delegation in Lausanne. 1 May 1949

Rosenne reports on a meeting with the Syrians on 29 April. Prior to the meeting, the delegation, in consultation with the Foreign Minister, decided to make every effort not to let the negotiations reach a dead end at that meeting. At a preliminary talk with Vigier and Riley, Vigier professed not to have seen Sharett's letter to Bunche [see No. 288]; upon being shown a copy, he declared that he did not want to continue the talks until he received Bunche's reply. The delegation agreed. It was proposed that a meeting be arranged between one of the Israeli leaders and Col. Zaim; Vigier agreed to try and arrange such a meeting.

After a short official meeting, Pellman met with Major Muhammad Nassir of the Syrian delegation. Pellman gained the impression that the Syrians might agree to withdraw to the international border under certain conditions, but that Israel would have to help them save face. The Syrians suggested that the present line be recognized as the armistice line in the armistice agreement, but that they would undertake to withdraw to the border within a specified period of time.

In consultation with Ben-Gurion, it was decided to propose Shiloah and Yadin as Israel's representatives for the meeting with Zaim. Should the Syrians request a meeting with the Foreign Minister or Sasson, the meeting would be postponed for a few days [see No. *298* and note 2 there].

298. Memorandum by S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv). 8 May 1949

Rosenne reports on the talks of 6 May. Before the joint meeting scheduled for that day, the Israeli representatives met with Vigier and Riley, who expressed their disappointment at the failure of the secret meeting between the Israeli and Syrian representatives [see note 2, p. 189 below]. Vigier said that the Foreign Minister should have represented Israel and blamed its representatives for having missed a unique chance to reach a long-term agreement with the Syrians because of their insistence on an armistice line based on the international border rather than on the water line. The Israelis replied that they could not accept the Syrian demand and that Vigier's argument was similar to the accusation levelled against Israel a year before, namely that the war would not have broken out if the Jews had refrained from establishing their state. After further mediation by Vigier, the heads of the delegations met and decided to defer the joint meeting to 10 May, when the Syrians would submit new proposals [see No. 301].

Later on, Makleff and Rosenne met with Riley and asked him why the United States was not giving Israel active support in the matter of the international border. Riley replied that from the military and political viewpoints the water line was far more logical as a border, and therefore the United States found it difficult to put pressure on the Syrians. The Israeli representatives explained that Israel's demand was not based merely on military or political considerations, but also on economic and social reasons related to the use of the water. They urged Riley to formulate a compromise proposal of his own. They said that if Syria agreed to withdraw to the international border, it would be possible to discuss certain concessions on Israel's part. The Israeli government might agree not to advance its troops to the eastern bank of the Jordan and might also consent to the establishment of a demilitarized zone between the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee on the one hand and the international border on the other. Demilitarization would not preclude the use of the demilitarized zone by civilians, including fishing in the Sea of Galilee. As to the Mishmar ha-Yarden sector, Riley's opinion was that Israeli forces would not be allowed to advance into areas evacuated by the Syrians, but that the inhabitants would return to the village

and would be able to set up a police force there, or even a civil guard.

The Israeli representatives did not take a definite stand with regard to Riley's proposal, but demanded the right to maintain a small garrison in Mishmar ha-Yarden as well as in Ein Gev. When Riley asked about the future of the railway junction at Samakh, the Israeli representatives replied that if the Syrians intended to re-open the track, the matter should be discussed in Lausanne or between the Transport Ministries of Syria and Israel.

Riley was impressed by the statement of the Israeli representatives and described it as a "considerable concession." Vigier suggested that they present it in writing, but the Israeli representatives said that it would be better if the U.N. submitted it.

306. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv) and M. Sharett (New York). 15 May 1949

Rosenne reports on a meeting with the Syrians on 13 May, which dealt with certain points of the Mediator's proposal [see No. 301]:
1) When asked whether the proposal guaranteed a withdrawal to the international border, Vigier replied that in principle it did, but that it recognized exceptional situations, to be agreed upon by the parties, in which outposts would be allowed to remain beyond that line.
2) Rosenne asked whether the intention of the proposal was to guarantee normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone, adding that according to reports received by Israel that was indeed Bunche's intention. Vigier replied that according to Bunche's proposal the matter remained open and would have to be settled by agreement between the parties. He pointed out the difficulty involved in formulating a suitable paragraph.
3) As to the establishment of a demilitarized zone in Syrian territory, Vigier said the proposal did not contemplate such a possibility, but neither did it preclude it, should the parties agree to it.
4) The Israeli representatives objected to any explicit prohibition of military activities on Lake Hule and the Sea of Galilee and to arrangements regarding these lakes based on the fact of their being water areas demanding a particular plan; rather, they must be included in the general arrangements applying to the areas of their location after delineation of the lines. Vigier agreed.

At the close of the meeting, the Israeli representatives told Vigier that their government would not agree to Syrian outposts on its territory and would not accept the proposal as a basis for further discussion if it did not aim at the restoration of normal civilian life.

310. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 18 May 1949

Rosenne reports on a confidential talk with Riley on 17 May. Riley informed him that he had learned from unofficial sources that Hussni al-Zaim wanted to solve the Syrian-Israeli problems peacefully and to devote his energies to the development of Syria. Zaim feared a counter-revolution which would lead to a critical review of his activities, including the negotiations with Israel. He therefore wanted Israel to help him out of his quandary without his having to lose face. He had asked Riley to find out Israel's reaction to the following proposal: within the framework of the Lausanne talks, Syria would agree to settle some 300,000 refugees within its borders. The problem of the Israeli-Syrian border would also be settled there. (Riley commented that the Conciliation Commission would probably press the Syrians to withdraw to the international border). In return, Syria would sign an armistice based on the present military lines and with clear instructions regarding the reduction of forces on both sides. The agreement would be valid for three months and would include a paragraph alluding to Israel's insistence on a Syrian withdrawal to the international border.

Rosenne's reaction to the proposal was negative, and he told Riley that Ben-Gurion's reaction would in all probability be the same, for the following reasons: 1) There was no certainty that the Conciliation Commission would succeed in imposing acceptance of the former international border on the Syrians, and failure of the armistice talks was liable to cause difficulties for the Conciliation Commission; 2) Ben-Gurion might ask what right Riley had to approach the Israelis with such a proposal after he had urged them to accept the international border in the case of Lebanon; 3) Israel had no guarantee that the Syrians would observe such a secret commitment, in view of their desire for basic changes in the interna-

tional border; 4) Israel was not used to basing its actions on considerations of prestige, but it was prepared to find a way that would help Zaim find an honourable way out of his quandary.

Rosenne told Riley that Israel was convinced of the justness and logic of its demands regarding the northern border, while the Syrian claim had neither economic nor military logic.

Rosenne said that Israel was in no hurry and that Syria was in far greater need of an agreement. Moreover, Israel did not fear the Security Council's reaction and felt that the time had come to exert heavy U.N. pressure on the Syrians.

Rosenne has already reported on the meeting to Ben-Gurion, whose response to Riley's proposal was negative. He did not, however, want to make a final decision until Sharett's return to Israel.

348. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to M. Makleff. 1 July 1949

Sharett instructs Makleff to accept the Mediator's proposal of 8 June [see No. 329] and his clarifications of 26 June [see No. 343] as a basis for negotiations.

He instructs the delegation to demand the following [see note 3, p. 200 below]:

1) The Israeli police force in Ein Gev and Dardara must be equal in strength to the Syrian military force facing them.

2) The status of the Jewish and Arab villages in the demilitarized zone must be the same as that of the villages in the area formerly held by Iraqi forces and subsequently transferred to Israel.

3) The police force in Ein Gev, Mishmar ha-Yarden and Dardara to be "based on" those places, in order to ensure their right to free movement throughout the area.

350. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York), G. Hirsch (Lausanne) and M. Fischer (Paris). 4 July 1949

Rosenne reports on the meeting of 3 July. After both sides had agreed to Bunche's compromise proposal and to his clarifications [see Nos. 329, 343], Vigier submitted a draft agreement [see note 3,

p. 200 below] based on the armistice agreement between Israel and Lebanon, except for Article V, which is to include Bunche's compromise proposal.

[For text of draft armistice agreement see Appendix to this document, Main Volume, pp. 636-7].

352. M. Makleff to Y. Dori and M. Sharett. 6 July 1949 (19:30)

Makleff reports that agreement has been reached on the armistice line up to the area east of Samakh, and that the Syrians were attempting to include the town of Samakh within the demilitarized zone.

353. M. Makleff to Y. Dori and M. Sharett. 10 July 1949 (19:40)

Makleff reports that the dispute over Samakh is still unresolved (see No. *352*): the Syrians agreed to accept Riley's proposal to include the Frontier Force camp east of Samakh in the demilitarized zone, but they stipulated that the inhabitants of Samakh be allowed to return to their village.

Riley and the Israeli delegation rejected this condition, maintaining that the refugee problem should not be dealt with in the armistice talks. But the Syrians insisted on their demands.

Another meeting is to be held on July 12.

NOTES

The internal references (e.g., "See No. 42") direct the reader to the serial numbers of the documents in the main volume. Serial numbers of Hebrew documents in the references are printed in italics. For English summaries of these documents see companion volume.
All map references are to the main volume.
Notes to Hebrew documents are included in this translation.

No. 1

(1) The cease-fire went into effect at 2 p.m. Israel time, noon G.M.T., 7 January. (See Sharett to Lourie, LS9, 7 January 1949, 130.09/2328/6).

No. 2

(1) Eytan informed the Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, through A. Lourie, that Israel preferred to hold the talks on board a U.N. ship, but would agree to Rhodes. The Israeli government would also agree to the participation of its Foreign Minister if the Egyptians were represented on a similar level. (See exchange of telegrams, Lourie—Eytan, 7, 8 January 1949, 130.02/2425/7). Bunche replied that in view of the short time available, it had been decided to open the talks in Rhodes on 12 January. He hoped that both the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers would attend. (See Iversen to Eytan, 9 January 1949, *ibid.*). (2) Riyad al-Sulh, Prime Minister of Lebanon. (3) Fourteen Lebanese villages, along the border with Israel, were captured by Israeli forces in October 1948. (4) See No. *158*.

Editorial Note preceding No. 3 (Main Volume, p. 7)

When the cease-fire went into effect at 2 p.m. on 7 January, the Israeli forces were engaged in a battle for control of the roads leading from Rafah to al-Arish and of the Rafah—Auja road. The aim of the offensive, which had started on 3 January, was to cut off the Egyptian forces from their bases at al-Arish. The Israelis failed to secure this objective, though they did succeed in erecting a road-block on the Rafah—al-Arish road, thus cutting off the Egyptian

forces in the Gaza Strip. This was accomplished a few hours before the cease-fire went into effect, but the fighting in that area continued until the early hours of the evening. In the afternoon of the same day, Egypt complained to the United States that the Israelis were continuing their attacks against Egyptian-held territory despite the cease-fire. (See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 629-30). Egypt also informed the U.N. that it would not take part in the Rhodes talks as long as Israeli forces were occupying Egyptian territory.

Bunche requested the United States to persuade the Israelis to withdraw immediately from Egyptian territory (*ibid.*, p. 629). The request was submitted on 8 January by the U.S. Special Representative, James McDonald. (See Eytan to Elath, W45T, 9 January 1949, 130.09/2308/2).

In a consultation held at G.H.Q. and attended by the Foreign Minister it was decided to withdraw the Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 9 January 1949). The decision was taken against the opinion of the G.O.C. Southern Front, Yigal Allon. The withdrawal took place during the night of 9/10 January.

No. 3

(1) Iversen to Eytan, 10 January 1949, 130.02/2425/7. Iversen forwarded a communication from Vigier relating to the composition of the Egyptian delegation to the Rhodes talks. He further informed Eytan that the Egyptian government would not proceed with the arrangements relating to the negotiations until the military situation existing when the cease-fire went into effect was restored. He requested an urgent answer with regard to this demand.

No. 4 (Hebrew)

(1) The meeting took place on 6 December. Ben-Gurion explained Israel's position regarding Faluja, and at Bunche's request it was subsequently submitted in written form. (See Eytan to Bunche, 6 December 1948, Ben-Gurion Archives 1532, Vol. 2).
(2) The Israelis replied that they preferred an official U.N. summary record, but would not insist on it. The Egyptians objected to an official record signed by the parties, and it was eventually agreed

that the official record would include only subjects on which agreement had been reached. Records kept by the parties or by U.N. representatives were not considered as binding. (See minutes of meeting of Israeli delegation, 13 January 1949, 130.16/2951/1; Provisional Government, Minutes, 16 January 1949).

Editorial Note preceding No. 5 (Main Volume, p.12)

The opening meeting of the Rhodes talks was held at the Hotel des Roses in the afternoon of 13 January 1949 and lasted half an hour. The meeting was attended by part of the Egyptian delegation, the Israeli delegation and the U.N. Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche. Journalists were not admitted. Bunche was elected Chairman of the conference. He then delivered the opening speech, and was followed by the heads of the Egyptian and Israeli delegations (see below). The conference then approved the agenda. (See No. 6).

No. 5

(1) Count Folke Bernadotte, U.N. Mediator on Palestine, assassinated on 17 September 1948. (2) See Vol. I, Appendix F. (3) Sayf al-Din spoke Arabic; his speech was then read in English translation by Col. Sherine.

No. 6

(1) The parties agreed on the agenda before the opening session, and it was officially approved in the course of that session. On the difficulty which arose with regard to the Faluja item see No. 7.

No. 7

(1) This material included documents Nos. 2 and *4* and minutes of a meeting of the Israeli delegation held on 13 January (in file 130.02/2442/10). (2) See No. 6. (3) See No. 5.
(4) Azcarate to Eytan, 27 December 1948, 130.02/2424/23.
(5) Menahem Rivlin, press liaison officer at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (6) See No. 171, note 2.

Editorial Note preceding No. 8 (Main Volume, p. 21)

The following document was discussed and approved under item 1 of the agenda (see No. 6). Bunche prepared the first draft, which was delivered to the delegations on the morning of 14 January. It was first discussed separately by each delegation, several amendments were suggested and discussed with Bunche, and the final formulation was approved by a joint meeting held later on the same day. Approval was given on the strength of Bunche's clarification that the declaration would constitute a preamble of the armistice agreement and would become effective only upon signature of the agreement.

The main reservations of the parties to the initial draft were:
1) The Egyptians wished the word "governments" to be omitted from the preamble, because of its political connotations. The Israelis and Bunche opposed this suggestion and the Egyptians did not insist.
2) The explanatory note attached to article 2 was added at the request of the Israelis, who argued that normal staff planning could not be forbidden.
3) The Egyptians objected to the words "its national security" which appeared in Bunche's draft of article 3, on the ground that they had political connotations which did not accord with the military nature of the talks. They suggested that they be replaced by the words "the right to security". Bunche accepted this argument and the Israelis were obliged to content themselves with the retention of the word "its". (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 16 January 1949; meeting of the Israeli delegation, 14 January 1949; second joint meeting of the delegations, 14 January 1949. All documents are in file 130.02/2442/10).

Editorial Note preceding No. 9 (Main Volume, p. 22)

On 13 January the Israeli Provisional Council of State met in closed session to discuss the conclusions of its Foreign Affairs Committee with regard to negotiations with Egypt and other Arab states. The Committee submitted a majority proposal as well as a minority proposal of Mapam (United Workers Party). The majority proposal read: "1) The Provisional Council of State notes the declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at its meeting on 11

January to the effect that the starting-point for negotiations with Egypt would be the demand for the evacuation of its invading army from Palestine, and requires the Government to submit its conditions for peace with Egypt to the Council for its approval when peace negotiations reach a practical stage. 2) With regard to the possibility of peace negotiations with the other Arab states which are in a state of war with Israel, the Council of State obligates the Government to submit to it the conditions which will serve as a basis for such negotiations when they are actually initiated."

The minority proposal read: "1) The Provisional Council of State regards the withdrawal of the Transjordanian army from Western Palestine [i.e., west of the Jordan river] as a condition for peace with Transjordan; annexation of any part of Western Palestine to Transjordan cannot serve as a basis for negotiations. 2) The Council of State regards the withdrawal of the Egyptian army from Palestine as a condition for peace with Egypt; annexation of any part of Palestine to Egypt cannot serve as a basis for negotiations. 3) The Council of State holds that the lifting of the siege of Rafah was a grave mistake both from the military and the political point of view. The Council of State regrets that the withdrawal from the Egyptian border, which was the result of Anglo-American intervention and endangers our security and political positions in the Negev, was effected without prior discussion in the Council of State. 4) The Council of State determines that the Prime Minister's proposal regarding a regional alliance was made without the consent of the Council and does not accord with its political line."

Speaking for Mapam, Y. Riftin declared that the minority proposal did not contradict the majority proposal but complemented it.

The majority proposal was approved by 17 votes against 4. (The Revisionist representatives abstained because their draft resolutions had not been submitted to the Council. The Committee Chairman explained that they had been received too late).

(See *Provisional Council of State, Record of Discussions,* II, 36th Session, second part, 13 January 1949).

No. 9 (Hebrew)

(1) See Eytan to Sharett, 12 January 1949, 21.30, 130.02/2453/16; Nos. *4*, 6. (2) Sharett to Bunche, 13 January 1949,

130.16/2951/1. The letter confirmed that the Israeli delegation "has been empowered to represent the Government of Israel at the Rhodes armistice conference and to negotiate and conclude an armistice agreement." The members of the delegation were: W. Eytan, R. Shiloah, E. Sasson, S. Rosenne and Y. Yadin. (3) See editorial note above. (4) Sharett to Eban, IN62, 14 January 1949, 130.09/2329/3. (5) 16 January 1949. See No. 185. (6) King Abdallah. (7) Rosenne doubted whether such an exchange of prisoners could be effected without the consent of the Egyptians, who might claim that it infringed their rights under the Geneva Convention. He suggested a tripartite agreement under Red Cross auspices. (See undated telegram, 130.02/2454/3).

No. 10

(1) For cause of delay see last paragraph in No. 13. (2) See No. 11. (3) See No. *4* and note 1 there. (4) See No. *158* and appendix.

No. 11

(1) No. 10. (2) See No. 10, note 1. (3) Original reads "interlocutory". Correction as in incoming text. (4) Lt. Colonel Mordechai Makleff, Israeli representative to the armistice talks with Lebanon. (5) See editorial note, pp. 105-6 above. (6) In a further telegram of same date, received in Rhodes on 17 January, Sharett instructed the Israeli delegation that Israel would consent to the immediate release of all the wounded from the Faluja pocket, to the release of a quarter of the garrison when agreement was reached on the armistice lines, and to the release of the rest — in later stages of the negotiations. Sharett instructed the delegation to emphasize that hitherto Israel had made the main concessions and that the concessions made to the Lebanese were minor in comparison to those demanded by the Egyptians. (Telegram in file 130.02/2453/15). Yadin sent a similar telegram to Shaltiel. Cf. No. *15,* note 1.

No. 12

(1) James McDonald, U.S. Special Representative (from February — Ambassador) in Israel. (2) Cf. No. 2, note 1; editorial note, pp. 105-6 above; No. 3 and note 1 there.

No. 13

(1) No. 10.

No. 14

(1) See No. 10; No. 11 and note 6 there. (2) Muhammad Amin al-Shanqiti. (3) For armistice talks with Lebanon see No. 35, note 2. (4) No. 8. (5) See No. *9* and note 7 there. (6) See Riley to U.N. Deputy Chief of Staff, Haifa, 16 January 1949, 130.02/2442/10: instructions for evacuation of sick and wounded from Faluja and dispatch of food and medical supplies to garrison.

No. 15 (Hebrew)

(1) Of 16 January 1949, 19.50 (130.02/2453/15). For content see No. 11, note 6. (2) Cf. No. 10. (3) Allusion to British pressure on Egypt — Cf. No. *19* and note 2 there. (4) See Nos. *17, 20*.

No. 16

(1) Cf. No. *9* (second paragraph). Sharett's instruction had perplexed the Israeli delegation. Yadin discussed the matter with Ben-Gurion and telegraphed on the same day to Eytan that according to the Prime Minister the instruction concerning Egyptian withdrawal from Palestine did not constitute an absolute condition with regard to the Gaza Strip. (Telegram TR3, 16 January 1949, 130.02/2453/17).

No. 17 (Hebrew)

(1) Baruch Baruch (Komarov), chief Israeli liaison officer with U.N. observers. (2) Sent in reply to No. *15*.

No. 18 (Hebrew)

(1) See "Draft Plan for Withdrawal from al-Faluja", 130.02/2442/10. (2) The Israeli delegation objected to the evacuation of the heavy equipment, at least until the final evacuation of the Faluja pocket. Cf. definitive formulation in No. *21*, para. (e), and see editorial note below.

No. 19 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 11. (2) Sharett to Eytan, telegram TR5, 16 January 1949, 130.02/2453/17. Sharett transmitted the contents of a telegram from Eban, conveying the opinion of the U.S. delegation at the U.N. that a stiff Egyptian attitude at the Rhodes negotiations must be anticipated.

No. 20 (Hebrew)

(1) Sent in reply to No. *15*.

Editorial Note preceding No. 21 (Main Volume, p. 32)

The agreement reported in the following document was approved at a joint meeting of the Israeli and Egyptian delegations on 17 January. The original document is entitled "Withdrawal from al-Faluja (Item 4a of the agenda)"; it has an annex entitled "Plan of Withdrawal from al-Faluja." (Record of meeting and appended documents in file 130.02/2442/10).

The original document entitled "Withdrawal from al-Faluja" reads:

It is agreed between the parties that:

1. In pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 4th

November, 1948, and with a view to the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 16th November, 1948, the Egyptian Military Forces in the al-Faluja area shall be withdrawn.

2. This withdrawal shall begin on Monday 24 January 1949 at 0500 hours GMT and shall be beyond the Egypt—Palestine frontier.

3. The withdrawal shall be under the supervision of the United Nations and in accordance with the Plan of Withdrawal annexed hereto.

The annex was eventually appended to the armistice agreement — see full text in Main Volume, pp. 698-700.

There are several differences between the final text of the agreement and the original draft submitted by Riley to the Israeli delegation on 16 January (see No. *18* and note 1 there): a) the date of evacuation was changed from 23 to 24 January; b) the garrison was to be evacuated through Rafah instead of Gaza; c) a clause (5) was added to the annex, stating the evacuation stages of the infantry and heavy equipment. In the course of the negotiations, Israel had objected to the evacuation of the heavy equipment, but Riley refused to transmit this demand to the Egyptian delegation. Israel then agreed to total evacuation, on condition that the heavy equipment be evacuated only in the final stage. (See No. *25;* Provisional Government, Minutes, 19 January 1949).

No. 22

(1) No. *21.* (2) Cf. No. 11 and note 6 there, and Nos. *17, 20.* (3) In a further telegram of the same day Sharett rebuked the delegation for having concluded an agreement "on such vital point" without authority and contrary to instructions. The Hebrew press, he added, had reported that the heavy equipment would not be evacuated, and when the true facts were revealed, the effect would be "most unfortunate." Sharett asked Eytan to come home for consultations. (Telegram TR11, 130.02/2453/17).

No. 23 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 22. (2) See No. 22, note 3.

No. 24 (Hebrew)

(1) See last paragraph in No. *21*. For Sharett's censure of the delegation see No. 22 and note 3 there. (2) See editorial note, pp. 112-13 above. (3) A third paragraph, dealing with Lebanon, is not printed here.

No. 25 (Hebrew)

(1) Yadin returned to Rhodes on 18 January. (2) See Nos. *17, 20*. (3) Cf. editorial note, pp. 112-13 above.

No. 26 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 22. (2) No. *21*. (3) No. *23*. (4) For Eytan's reply see No. 29.

No. 27 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *25*. (2) See No. *34*.

No. 28 (Hebrew)

(1) G. Meron, Director of the Economic Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 29

(1) Elkana Galli, of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department. (2) See Nos. *17, 20*. (3) Nos. *23, 25*. (4) No. *21*. (5) See No. *31*. (6) No. *27*. (7) No. *34*. (8) See No. *28*. (9) Finn Moe. At their meeting, in the middle of January, Moe informed Eban of the decision of the Scandinavian states to support Israel's request for admission to the U.N. (Eban to Sharett, telegram 1126, 14 January 1949, 93.03/79/17 — see Vol. 2). (10) Approximately 11,000 detainees (men of military age

and part of their families) still remained in the Cyprus detention camps for "illegal" Jewish immigrants. The British refused to release them pending the termination of fighting in Palestine.

No. 30 (Hebrew)

(1) Rosenne replied that no time-limit on the armistice had yet been discussed, but in his opinion such a limitation was advisable, and the delegation would demand it. As for the initiation of peace negotiations, Rosenne pointed out that the subject was mentioned only in the preamble of the Security Council resolution of 16 November. (Telegram of 19 January 1949, 13.45, 130.02/2454/3). Cf. Appendix C, Main Volume, p. 685. (2) No. *25.* (3) A notation on the form of the incoming text confirms this correction.

No. 31 (Hebrew)

(1) According to the U.N. partition resolution of 29 November 1947, Beersheba was to be included in the Arab Palestinian State. (2) Eytan met with Bunche the same evening — see No. 32.

No. 32

(1) No. 29. (2) No. *31.* (3) Last part of sentence not printed here. (4) See No. 33. (5) Bunche to Eytan, 19 January 1949 (130.02/2398/10), and Eytan to Bunche, 19 January 1949 (130.02/2442/10). Bunche transmitted a message sent by U.N. headquarters at the request of the British delegation, conveying the British Government's decision to release the Cyprus detainees. Bunche assumed that the message was meant for the Government of Israel. (6) Reference is apparently to a complaint made by the U.N. staff in Jerusalem to Bunche, with regard to the refusal of the Israeli Military Governor of Jerusalem, pending instructions from the Foreign Ministry, to assist them in preparing the former residence of the British High Commissioner for use of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. (See Golan to L. Allon, 20 January 1949,

130.02/2442/3. (7) According to the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948, the headquarters of the Conciliation Commission were to be located in Jerusalem. (8) Dov Joseph, the Military Governor of Jerusalem.

No. 33

(1) See below. (2) See No. 8 and editorial note, pp.108-9 above. (3) See Appendices A, C, Main Volume, pp. 681-2, 685. (4) The cease-fire line before the Israeli offensive in the Negev in October 1948.

No. 34 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *27.* (2) Six words missing in incoming text. (3) This possibility is not mentioned in Eytan's telegram (No. *27*).

No. 35

(1) See Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 682-4.
(2) Reference is to the preparatory meeting to the armistice talks with Lebanon, which took place at Rosh Haniqra on 19 January. It was attended by Israeli and Lebanese representatives, under the chairmanship of Col. T.R. Kimpton, Senior U.N. Observer in Tiberias. (See record in I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055).

No. 36

(1) The text of the working-paper was transmitted to Sharett on the same day. (Telegram, 16.00, 130.02/2454/3). (2) Maps untraced.

No. 37 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 36, note 1. (2) See No. 40 (Appendix II) and notes 7, 9, 10 there. (3) Yadin and the other military repre-

sentatives in the delegation rejected this suggestion. They argued that if the armistice agreement was signed while certain issues remained unresolved, Israel would then be in a weaker position because of the elimination of the Faluja pocket. (See Yadin to Chief of Staff, 21 January 1949, 17.10, 130.02/2453/16). (4) Sharett had complained about the lack of news from Rhodes. (Telegram, 21 January 1949, 11.00, 130.02/2453/16). (5) See contents in No. *19*, note 2. (6) Cf. No. *21*. (7) The first Israeli parliamentary elections, on 25 January. (8) Sharett replied that he willingly supported the third possibility, i.e., to compromise on the existing military lines. The Chief of Staff cabled Yadin that the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs as well as the Chief of Staff held that the delegation should persist in upholding the first possibility but may agree to the third if that proved unavoidable. They ruled out the second possibility suggested by Eytan. (See Sharett to Eytan, 22 January 1949, midnight, 130.02/2453/16; Chief of Staff to Yadin, 21 January 1949, 19.50, I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1056).

No. 38 (Hebrew)

(1) There are numerous small discrepancies between the outgoing text printed here (apparently a draft, in the handwriting of Sharett) and the text received in Rhodes. But the contents are the same. (2) See No. *37*, note 8. (3) No. *37*. (4) Eytan cabled in reply that Bunche had "not acted cordially" towards the Israeli delegation, but that was "part of the diplomatic game", as understood by Bunche. The latter also mismanaged the discussions in such a way that the Israeli delegation was never able to foresee the next Egyptian move, but it was impossible to say whether that was his intention. The Egyptians impressed him as serious and frank, but he assumed that they were constantly being directed by Cairo. (See Eytan to Sharett, 24 January 1949, 17.30, 130.02/2453/16).

No. 39 (Hebrew)

(1) See map facing p. 136.

No. 40

(1) No. *39*. (2) Colonel Sherine. (3) A few words are not printed here. (4) Appendix I, Main Volume, pp. 56-8. (5) Appendix II, Main Volume, pp. 58-62. (6) Map untraced. (7) Rosenne's first draft, of 20 January 1949, is in file 130.02/2442/10. Stylistic differences between the two drafts are not noted here. Substantial differences occur only in articles 4 and 5. The formulation of these articles was not completed in the first draft (see No. *37*), but it is complete in the second. Subsections 4 and 5 of article 4, which were not included in the first draft, and the full text of article 5 are printed in italics. The analogous sections in the first draft are printed in notes 9 and 10 below. (8) Appendix not printed here, but see Annex I to Egyptian—Israeli armistice agreement, pp. 698-700. (9) The first part of this sentence in the first draft reads: "The lines described in the Annex to this Article..." Article 4 is followed by a heading: "Annex to Article 4", and a note: "Not yet agreed". (10) The partially formulated article 5 in the first draft reads: "In the Gaza—Rafah area, from which in pursuance of the provision of Article 4 hereof the military forces of one party shall withdraw and into which the military forces of the other party shall not advance, the following provisional arrangements shall be put into effect: *Not yet agreed.*" (11) Map untraced. (12) Left open for insertion of Acting Mediator's letter.

No. 41

(1) This word is missing in the incoming text.

No. 42

(1) See No. *21*.

No. 43 (Hebrew)

(1) This accusation was made following Israel's refusal to permit the evacuation of Faluja. See Nos. 42, 45 and last paragraph in No. 50. (2) See No. *46*.

No. 44

(1) Sharett cabled: "Deadlock Rhodes threatens breakdown conference. Egyptian intransigently insist armistice lines according 4 November as interpreted by Bunche November 13..." (see Nos. 36, *39*, 40 [Appendix I]). He conveyed Israel's position that the armistice lines should roughly coincide with cease-fire lines, and instructed Elath to make urgent representations in Washington. He pointed out that while Israel had evacuated the Egyptian territory it had occupied, the suggested arrangement left the Egyptians for the time being in possession of the Gaza Strip. (Sharett to Elath, IW20, 24 January 1949, 130.09/2308/2). (2) Joseph C. Satterthwaite. (3) Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to Director, Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State. (4) Stuart W. Rockwell, of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. (5) See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 693-5.

No. 45

(1) Senior United Nations Military Observer. (2) See No. *21* and editorial note, pp. 112-13 above. (3) See No. 8 and editorial note, p. 108 above. (4) No. 42. (5) No. 40, Appendix II. (6) Eytan cabled Sharett the contents of the last part of the letter, from this point. (See telegram, 24 January 1949, 15.00, 130.02/2453/16). (7) *Sic.* This should obviously read "July 15th", referring to the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of that date — see Vol. I, Appendix F (2). (8) For the first letter, of 6 December, see No. *4*, note 1. The second letter (to P. Mohn, 9 December, 1948) is in file 93.03/103/4 — see Vol. 2.

No. 46 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *43*. (2) See No. *52*, note 1.

No. 47 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *21* and editorial note, pp. 112-13. (2) See Appendix D, Main Volume, p.686. (3) Word inserted in accordance

with English draft of outgoing text. (4) See editorial note below and No. 49, note 1. (5) No. 45.

Editorial Note preceding No. 48 (Main Volume, p. 69)

The first draft of the cease-fire agreeement was submitted to the Israeli delegation on the afternoon of 24 January. The agreement was signed the same evening. On 25 January, the agreement was published at Lake Success as U.N. document S/1225.

The fact that representatives of Egypt and Israel had signed a joint document was seen by Eytan as an important political achievement. (See Eytan to Sharett, 25 January 1949, 00.05, 130.02/2453/16).

The differences between the first draft and the final text were: 1) In paragraph 3 of the draft the powers of the observers are enumerated in considerable detail, while the same paragraph in the final text merely cites the Security Council resolution of 29 December 1948. 2) Paragraph 4 was not included in the draft.

No. 48

(1) See No. 1. (2) See Appendix E, Main Volume, p. 687.

No. 49

(1) Bunche submitted a draft of the following document to the Israeli delegation on the afternoon of 24 January. Shortly after, the Israelis submitted an amended draft, and the agreement was signed by Eytan the same evening. (The drafts are in file 130.02/2442/10). The document was published at Lake Success on 25 January as U.N. document S/1227. (2) In accordance with this agreement, four convoys carrying food and medical supplies reached Faluja between 28 January and 18 February. (See U.N. documents S/1236, S/1243, S/1255, S/1262).

No. 50

(1) See No. 52, note 1. (2) On 14 March 1939, the President of Czechoslovakia, Emil Hacha, was summoned to Berlin and

forced to sign a "request for German protection over Bohemia and Moravia." On the following day, the two provinces were annexed by Germany as "autonomous protectorates."

No. 52

(1) On the same day, the Israeli Cabinet decided not to consent to the evacuation of the Egyptian garrison from Faluja. Sharett instructed the delegation accordingly. (See telegram of 27 January 1949, 00.45, 130.02/2543/16). (2) According to the U.N. resolution of 29 November 1947, Auja was to be included in the Arab State. (3) See No. 62. (4) Bevin spoke at the opening of the Palestine debate in the House of Commons on 26 January. He dwelt on the strategic importance of Palestine for the security of Europe and mentioned Britain's obligation and responsibility for security and stability in the region. He declared that Britain would continue to support the Security Council resolutions and to honour its obligations to the Arab states. Bevin criticized Israel for its invasion of Egypt and the threat it posed to Jordan. Bevin emphasized the basic community of interests of Great Britain and the United States in the Middle East, in spite of differences of opinion as to the means of settling the Palestine problem. (See *460 H.C. Deb.* 5s cols. 925-45).

No. 53

(1) See in file 130.02/2442/10. (2) No. *21*, and see editorial note, pp. 112-13 above. (3) See No. 8. (4) Bunche told the head of the Egyptian delegation of his conversation with Eytan in which he had expressed his disappointment over the misunderstanding which had arisen with regard to Faluja and the postponement of the evacuation. He conveyed Eytan's explanation (see above) and appealed to both delegations not to permit this matter to interfere with the armistice negotiations. He expressed his appreciation to the Egyptian delegation for its readiness to proceed with the talks despite its disappointment and for the fine spirit shown by it throughout the negotiations (130.02/2442/10).

No. 54

(1) See No. 52. (2) S. Souky, United Press reporter in Rhodes.

No. 55

(1) Israel was represented at meeting by Sharett and Shiloah.
(2) Charles F. Knox, Counsellor at U.S. Mission in Tel Aviv.
(3) A. Guy Hope, of the U.S. Mission in Tel Aviv. (4) Elath replied that it had been repeatedly explained to the State Department that the evacuation of the Faluja pocket was conditional on the outcome of direct negotiations with the Egyptians, and they therefore had no reason to inquire in Tel Aviv "unless directed desire influence our position." (See telegram W124, 28 January 1949, 93.01/2180/32). (5) See No. 52, note 1. (6) See report on second talks in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 700-2.

No. 56 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *59*.

No. 57 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett complained about the lack of reports from Rhodes and asked for immediate information. (See telegram in file 130.02/2453/15).

No. 58

(1) Riley asked Yadin to define the terms "defensive forces", "offensive forces", "military police" and various other terms under these headings. The clarification was required for the purpose of the military discussions. (Letter in file 130.02/2442/10). (2) The enclosed paper is in the same file. It is identical with Annex III of the armistice agreement, except for clause IV, which was added later — see Main Volume, pp. 700-1. (3) "Proposal for the Reduction

and Withdrawal of Forces." Yadin submitted his paper to Riley on the same morning. It defines the areas in which the parties will be permitted to maintain only defensive forces. See No. *61* and map facing p. 136. (The document is in file 130.02/2442/10).

No. 59 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *56*. (2) Eytan reported that there had been no notable development during that day. He complained about the reports of the Israeli broadcasting service: "When there is nothing to report, the broadcasts excel in wild inventions." (28 January 1949, 21.40, 130.02/2453/16).

No. 60 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *186*. (2) No. 52. (3) See No. *64*.

No. 61 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 58, note 3. (2) See No. 58 and note 2 there.

No. 62

(1) Uriel Heydt (Heyd), First Secretary at the Israeli Mission in Washington. (2) No. 52. (3) On the efforts of the State Department in Cairo and Washington to persuade the Egyptians to accept Israel's proposal regarding Auja and to continue the Rhodes negotiations see No. 63; *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 705-6. (4) See No. 52, note 4. (5) See No. 63; *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 707-8.

No. 63

(1) Mark F. Ethridge, the American member of the Conciliation Commission. (2) See also No. 62 and note 3 there.
(3) See contents of telegram in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 691, note 1. Bunche denied that he had sent such a telegram (see No.

90). (4) No. 52. (5) Sharett cabled the contents of this telegram and of No. 71 to Eytan on 30 January (17.15), 130.02/2453/15.

No. 64 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *60.* (2) See Main Volume, p. 107 (No. 77, Appendix II, paragraph II, 7). (3) Nos. *65, 66.*

No. 65 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *60.* (2) No. *61.* (3) Part of this sentence is missing in incoming text. It was cabled separately on the same day, 23.50 (130.02/2454/3). (4) No. *64.* (5) No. *66.*

No. 66 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *60.* (2) See last paragraph in No. *65.* Sharett conveyed the text of that paragraph and of this telegram (No. *66*) to Eban, on behalf of the delegation. (Telegram IW26, 30 January 1949, 130.09/2308/2).

No. 67 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett transmitted to Eban the contents of Nos. *56* and *59*, as well as of the first paragraph of this telegram. He described the proposal to extend the Rhodes talks, adumbrated in Bevin's speech, as a "British manoeuvre... designed put British spoke in Rhodes wheel." (Telegram Y84, 30 January 1949, 130.09/2329/3).
(2) No. *61.*

No. 68 (Hebrew)

(1) Sent in reply to telegram of Eytan and Yadin to Sharett and Chief of Staff (13.00, 130.02/2452/16): "Send urgently your comments regarding Auja, i.e., Auja will be seat of Armistice Commis-

sion. As long as Commission situated there, our forces will not be stationed in village, but will hold strongpoints to north, west, south and east." (2) Eban to Sharett, X191, 28 January 1949, 93.01/2180/31. (3) See No. *65* and note 3 there.

No. 69

(1) Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 706, note 1. (2) No. 63.

No. 70

(1) See No. *61*. (2) In file 130.02/2442/10. This is a covering letter sent together with the "Proposal for the Reduction and Withdrawal of Forces" — see No. 58, note 3.

No. 71

(1) Nos. 62, 63, 69.

No. 72

(1) Telegram of 29 January 1949, 13.20, 130.02/2454/3. Rosenne reported that "U.N. and Egypt oppose" the Israeli proposal. (2) Article 40 is the second article in Chapter VII ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"). The article authorizes the Security Council to call upon the parties to a dispute to comply with provisional measures, pending a decision as to the ultimate measures to be taken. (3) See No. 73 and note 1 there.

No. 73

(1) Robinson transmitted the full text of the telegram to Sharett on 30 January (130.16/2951/1). (2) See No. 72 and note 2 there. (3) See Vol. I, Appendix F. (4) See also No. *151*, and S. Rosenne, *Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States*, pp. 33-40.

No. 74

(1) See Nos. *56, 67.* (2) See No. 82. (3) Bunche signed his initials at the head of this and other documents printed in this volume. In all such cases the signature has been transferred to the end of the document.

No. 75 (Hebrew)

(1) The incoming text is signed by Yadin. (2) See No. 77 and appendices.

No. 76

(1) See No. *57* and note 1 there; No. *59*, note 2. (2) See No. *61.* (3) Abd al-Muni'm Mustafa and Omar Lutfi. (See Yadin to Ben-Gurion, 30 January 1949, 22.10, 130.02/2453/16).
(4) See telegram of 30 January 1949, 16.20, *ibid.* (5) See No. *75.* (6) See No. 82 and note 2 there. (7) In the second half of January most West European, Scandinavian and British Commonwealth countries either recognized Israel or announced their intention to recognize it.

No. 77

(1) See Appendix I below. (2) See Appendix II below. (3) See Appendix III below. (4) See Annex IV to armistice agreement, Main Volume, pp. 698-700. (5) Of 30 November 1948 — see Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686. (6) Bunche had transmitted this part of the draft to the Israeli delegation on 28 January (130.02/2442/10). (7) This committee was established in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 681-2.

Editorial Note preceding No. 78 (Main Volume, p. 110)

Since the opening of the Rhodes negotiations, the Israeli representatives had not kept a verbatim record of their meetings with Bunche (cf. No. *4*, note 2). In view of the importance of the stage now reached, Eytan decided to have an almost verbatim record of this meeting, which was continued on 1 February (see No. 84). The record was sent to Sharett on 3 February. (See Eytan's covering note in file 130.02/2442/10).

No. 78

(1) See No. 77, appendices. (2) Eytan sent Bunche's letter and all enclosed material to Sharett the same morning. He asked him to transmit his views and instructions immediately, especially with regard to Article IV, par. 3 of Bunche's draft agreement. (See covering letter and telegram, 13.25, in file 130.02/2442/10). For Sharett's reply see No. *81*. (3) Harold Beeley, Palestine expert in the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office and Alternate Representative to the Security Council. (4) At the time of the Paris session of the U.N. General Assembly, in the autumn of 1948. (5) Of 29 January 1949 (No.70). (6) See No. 84.

No. 79 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 77 and Appendix II there. (2) No. 70. (3) See No. *80* and note 2 there.

No. 80 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *79*. (2) See Bunche's amended text in No. 91, and see note 2 there. (3) No. 78. (4) For Sharett's reply see No. *88*. (5) Colonel Sherine. (6) See Nos. 62, 63, 69.

No. 81 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 70. (2) No. 77, Appendix III. (3) In a further telegram of the same night, Sharett instructed Eytan not to act on his telegram pending a further message next morning. On the following morning, Sharett cabled that he wished to get Cabinet approval for the instructions transmitted in this telegram (No. *81*), and inquired whether it was possible to draw out the negotiations until the following evening "and in the meantime to press in the direction of Yadin's letter to Riley." Eytan sent an affirmative reply. (See Sharett to Eytan, 1 February 1949, 01.10, 130.02/2453/15; 1 February 1949, 10.30, 130.02/2453/17; Eytan to Sharett, 1 February 1949, 15.50, 130.02/2453/16). (4) See No. 78, note 2.

No. 82

(1) No. 74. (2) See Sharett's instructions for the formulation of this letter in telegram to Eytan, 31 January 1949 (130.02/2453/17). The instructions said, *inter alia,* that unless it became evident within a week that an armistice with Egypt could not be achieved, no date should be fixed for the beginning of negotiations with other Arab states before an armistice with Egypt was signed.

No. 83

(1) See No. *66*, note 2. (2) No. 71. (3) Israel's compromise proposal with regard to Auja — see No. *68* and cf. No. 70, paragraphs 3-5. Sharett conveyed the proposal to Eban (telegram Y83, 30 January 1949, 130.09/2329/3). He mentioned Israel's demand for strongpoints north and south of Auja, but added that it was not yet clear whether the Egyptians would accept nor whether Israel could militarily forgo maintenance of a position west of Auja. Eban transmitted Israel's proposal to J. Ross, the American deputy representative at the U.N. (Letter of 31 January 1949, 130.02/2414/22). (4) See No. 48.

No. 84

(1) Continuation of meeting of 31 January (see No. 78).
(2) Of 29 January — see No. 70.

No. 85 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett cabled in reply that he was awaiting Shiloah's arrival in order to elucidate why it was difficult to explain the matter to the Americans just then. (Telegram of 1 February 1949, 24.00, 130.02/2453/17). In another telegram, Elath told Sharett that in view of the Egyptians' acceptance of Bunche's draft (see No. 94) — which meant that there would be no substantial change in their position — American pressure on them with regard to Auja might be "very helpful." (Telegram, 3 February 1949, 15.00, 130.02/2453/16). See also No. 90, and No. 139, note 2.

No. 86 (Hebrew)

(1) On 1 January 1949, three non-permanent members of the Security Council — Belgium, Colombia and Syria — were replaced by Cuba, Egypt and Norway. (2) Sharett transmitted the full text of the telegram to Eban and asked for his and Robinson's opinion. Eban replied that an explicit repudiation of a previous Security Council resolution was most unlikely, but it could "implicitly disappear" under the following circumstances: 1) conclusion of an armistice agreement with resultant invalidation of the truce regime; 2) a statement by Bunche and a general discussion indicating that the resolution of 4 November was no longer realizable; 3) a resolution of the Security Council urging immediate implementation of the resolution of 16 November without mentioning that of 4 November. Eban added that the Council would not meet before Bunche reported from Rhodes, whereupon Israel could attempt to weaken or supersede the 4 November resolution. (See Sharett to Eban, LS112, 2 February 1949, 130.09/2328/6; Eban to Sharett, telegram 1217, 4 February 1949, 130.09/2328/5).

No. 87 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *81*, which empowered the Israeli delegation to make concessions with regard to Auja (cf. No. 70). Although the telegram is addressed to the Chief of Staff, it is marked for attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence. Yadin had earlier sent a telegram addressed solely to the Chief of Staff, informing him that he was "firmly opposed" to Bunche's proposal, and inquiring whether Sharett had consulted him before sending the instructions. The Chief of Staff replied that Sharett had not consulted him, but in reply to his inquiry had informed him that he had temporarily suspended his instruction to Eytan (see No. *81*, note 3). The Chief of Staff added that he agreed with Yadin and that the matter was being discussed by the Cabinet. (See Yadin to Chief of Staff, 1 February 1949, 10.00, 130.02/2453/16; Chief of Staff to Yadin, 1 February 1949, 17.00, 130.02/2453/15). The Cabinet met on 2 February; but see No. *88*.

No. 88 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *80*. (2) No. 70. (3) See No. *95* and note 2 there. (4) On a certain easing of the tension which had marked the negotiations see No. 90.

No. 89 (Hebrew)

(1) Apparently the telegram mentioned in No. *87*, note 1. It was received at 18.55. (2) No. *88*. (3) Sharett commented in a telegram to Eytan of 1 February 1949 (130.02/2453/17): he had originally thought that the area in question covered only 50 square kilometres. In any case, Israel's concession on this point was conditional on the achievement of a fair agreement on other points. He was not impressed by the enumeration of the advantages accruing to the other side (point 6) because these would be included in any agreement. The main consideration was the size and importance of the area. Sharett added that Yadin's last point also carried considerable weight, and that they were awaiting Shiloah's explanations. (Shiloah left Rhodes the next morning and attended the Cabinet meeting in the afternoon. See No. 90; No. *95* and note 2 there).

No. 90

(1) See No. 77 (appendices). (2) See No. 78. (3) See No. 84. (4) "Observations of the Israeli Delegation on the Draft 'Egyptian—Israeli General Armistice Agreement' of 31st January 1949." The document was handed to Bunche in the evening of 1 February (130.02/2442/10). The first part deals with the general articles, the second — with the military articles. The observations are included in the composite version incorporating amendments proposed by the two delegations — see No. 96, Appendix.
(5) See No. *75*. (6) Colonel Sherine. (See No. *80*, note 5).
(7) On 2 February, Shiloah reported to the Cabinet on informal talks with the political advisers of the Egyptian delegation in Rhodes. According to this report, the Israeli representatives told the Egyptians that there were several issues on which no Israeli concessions must be expected, namely, Beersheba, Asluj and Auja. Shiloah told the Cabinet that the Egyptian political advisers "try to say that they are ready to compromise, that they are prepared to accept our position, but that the army is determined not to yield." The Israelis had tried to persuade their interlocutors that the Israeli occupation of Beersheba was in Egypt's interest, because an Israeli withdrawal would leave a gap through which the British might enter. This argument, Shiloah reported, had impressed the Egyptians, who had thereupon asked Cairo whether they might yield on this point. But there were as yet no signs of an affirmative reply. Shiloah thought the Egyptians would hesitate to bring about a breakdown of the negotiations. They had a serious interest in signing an agreement before the other Arab states did so, and failure to achieve it would oblige the Egyptians to ask for British assistance. (8) See No. 63 and note 3 there.

No. 91

(1) See No. 70. (2) No. 77, Appendix II. The amendments refer to the second part of the document ("Israeli Position") — see Main Volume, p. 106. According to a handwritten note on the original document, it was prepared after the meeting between Bunche and the Israeli delegation on 31 January (see No. 78). See also Nos. *79, 80* and cf. No. 96 (Appendix).

No. 92

(1) See No. 42. (2) In a further telegram of same date, Rafael suggested that the evacuation of the Egyptian garrison in Faluja be allowed to start immediately, except for the heavy equipment. He gave the following reasons: The released troops will have no military value in the next few months; American public opinion objects to the keeping of hostages for bargaining purposes; the release will prove Israel's desire to achieve agreement and will eliminate pressure to make concessions on the main issues; if the negotiations fail, the release will counteract allegations of Israel's responsibility; Israel has previously declared that it will allow a gradual release of the garrison following Egyptian agreement to negotiate; the Security Council will presumably order the release if the negotiations fail. (Telegram X201, in file 93.01/2180/33).

No. 93

(1) Telegram Y86, 3 February 1949, 130.09/2329/3. Sharett reported to Eban on the Rhodes negotiations: Bunche's compromise formulation (see No. 77, Appendix III); the divergences between this formulation and Israel's demands; the talks with the Egyptian political advisers (see No. 90, note 7); and the need to keep up American pressure on the Egyptians. (2) John C. Ross, deputy U.S. representative at the U.N. (3) No. 92. (4) Sharett replied on 6 February (telegram Y88, 130.09/2329/3). Eban transmitted the contents of his telegram to Ross (see No. 106).

No. 94

(1) See Appendix to this document. (2) See No. 77, Appendix I. (3) See No. 90, note 4. (4) See No. 96, Appendix. (5) See note 2 above. Bunche apparently sent the same text to both delegations.

No. 95 (Hebrew)

(1) Apparently refers to a telegram of Eytan to Sharett of 3 February, in which he reported that Bunche's proposal (see No. 96) would be discussed at a joint meeting with the Egyptians on the following day. Eytan inquired whether there were any new instructions. (Telegram in file 130.02/2454/3). (2) At the Cabinet meeting on 2 February, Ben-Gurion spoke of the importance of an armistice agreement with Egypt, which would constitute "a historic triumph, no less than the military victories." He pointed to the need to make concessions with regard to formulations, though not on matters of substance. He said that it was not in Israel's interest "to humiliate them further. They are not enemies in the way the Nazis were. Israel wishes to live in peace and honour with the Egyptians."

No. 96

(1) See Appendix to this document, and see also No. 77, Appendix I, and No. 90, note 4. (2) Only the paragraphs to which the delegations submitted amendments are printed here. For the text of the other paragraphs see No. 77, Appendix I. (3) Here — italics. (4) See No. 72, note 4. (5) Map untraced. (6) See Annex III to the armistice agreement, Main Volume, pp. 700-1. (7) See Annex I to the armistice agreement, Main Volume, pp. 698-700. (8) *Sic.* Should read: 8 (see document cited in No. 90, note 4).

No. 97

(1) Original is marked "uncorrected" — see Bunche's explanation at beginning of following day's meeting (No. 99). (2) See No. 96, Appendix. (3) Map untraced. (4) See No. 96 and note 5 there.

No. 98 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 97. (2) See No. 99.

No. 99

(1) No. 97. (2) No. 96, Appendix. (3) Word missing in original. (4) See Vol. 2.

No. 100

(1) Bunche delivered this letter to Eytan when they met on 6 February. (See Eytan to Sharett, 6 February 1949, 15.00, 130.02/2453/16). (2) See Nos. 97, 99. (3) See Article VII(2) in Appendix to No. 96; No. *102*. (4) No. 77, Appendix III. (5) See No. 58, note 3; No. 96, Appendix, Article VI(2), Israeli amendment. (6) Eytan cabled a summary of the telegram to Sharett and requested his comments. (Telegram of 6 February 1949, 15.30, 130.02/2453/16).

No. 101

(1) One paragraph not printed here. (2) Nos. 97, 99. (3) See No. *102*. (4) No. 77, Appendix I. (5) No. 77, Appendix III. (6) See No. *105*.

No. 102 (Hebrew)

(1) Of 28 January. See No. 58, note 3. (2) See No. *105*.

No. 103

(1) Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in succession to G. Marshall on 7 January. The appointment took effect on 20 January. (2) For report of meeting see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 727-9. (3) See Nos. 92, 93. (4) See No. 115. (5) For report on meeting see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 725-7.

No. 104

(1) No. 100. (2) See No. 100, note 6. (3) See No. 96, Appendix; No. *102*.

No. 105 (Hebrew)

(1) Of 28 January. See No. 58, note 3.

No. 106

(1) See No. 93, note 4.

No. 107

(1) On 6 February, James McDonald delivered to Sharett an oral communication from the U.S. Government, requesting the Government of Israel to accept the compromise draft of the Acting Mediator (No. 77, Appendices I, III) as a possible basis of agreement. The note said that the appeal was being made "in the same spirit of friendship" with which the U.S. had approached Egypt at the request of Israel (see No. 62 and note 3 there), and in view of Egypt's apparent acceptance of the draft. Sharett replied orally. (See Sharett to Elath, T15, 7 February 1949, 130.09/2308/2; the text of the communication, signed by McDonald, is in file 130.02/2414/26. See also *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 730-2).

No. 108

(1) Sharett to Eytan, 6 February 1949, 21.30, 130.02/2453/15.
(2) No. 77, Appendix I. (3) No. 77, Appendix III.
(4) No. 100. For Sharett's reply see No. 110.

No. 109

(1) No. 100. (2) No. 104.

No. 110

(1) No. 108. (2) No. 77, Appendix I. (3) No. 77, Appendix II. (4) No further information on this episode was found, but cf. Nos. 35, *37, 39*. (5) Should apparently read 5 and 7 February — see Nos. 100, 109.

No. 111

(1) Nos. 100, 109, 104, 108. (2) See No. 108 and note 1 there. (3) See No. *117*. (4) No. 110. (5) Cf. No. 115 and note 5 there; No. 157. (6) Rosenne also reported by letter to J. Robinson in New York (10 February 1949, 130.16/2951/1). He wrote that the Egyptians were certain that Israel would not resume fighting and that Egypt would be able to achieve its objectives with regard to Faluja and Auja through the Security Council even if there was no agreement. There was therefore little likelihood that the talks would be renewed if an agreement was not attained immediately. Failure of the negotiations with Egypt would preclude agreements with other Arab states, except perhaps Jordan. Rosenne held that Israel must make substantial concessions if it wanted an agreement, since "all concessions made up to now are not really concessions but rather retreats from exaggerated demands." (7) See No. *118*.

No. 112 (Hebrew)

(1) Bunche's résumé was based on the talks between the military delegations and General Riley on 5-7 February. (See No. *102*; Yadin to Ben-Gurion, 7 February 1949, 24.00, 130.02/2453/16).
(2) See last paragraph in No. 111 and note 1 there.

No. 114

(1) U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie. (2) Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Representative at the U.N.
(3) See No. 119.

No. 115

(1) See No. 103. (2) David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President of the U.S.A. (3) Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President of the U.S.A. (4) See Eban's memorandum on the Egyptian—Israeli armistice talks, 7 February 1949, 130.02/2425/7. (5) On the same day, Eban complained that he was not receiving an orderly flow of information about the Rhodes talks, and asked to be kept fully informed in order to enable him to explain the position to the American and other delegations. (See Eban to L. Allon, telegram 1231, 8 February 1949, 93.01/2205/3). See also Nos. 111, 157.

No. 116

(1) Abraham Feinberg. (2) Sharett sent to Eytan the text of this telegram in Hebrew (9 February 1949, 24.00, 130.02/2453/17).

No. 117 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 111. (2) Reference is apparently to the change in Ben-Gurion's attitude to Bunche's compromise proposal with regard to Auja (see No. 77, Appendix III; No. *81* and note 3 there; No. *87*; No. *88*; No. *89* and note 3 there. Cf. No. *95*). (3) See No. *120*.

No. 118 (Hebrew)

(1) The two meetings took place, respectively, on 7 and 8 February. (See Yadin to Ben-Gurion, 7 February 1949, 19.30, and 9 February 1949, 22.20, in file 130.02/2453/16). (2) Nuri al-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq.

No. 119

(1) See No. 114.

No. 120 (Hebrew)

(1) On 9 February. (2) Eytan requested clarification with regard to the first condition, in particular — whether it referred to the intersection of the international border with the Auja—Abu Agheila road or with the Auja—Rafah road, "since there is no direct road from Auja to el-Arish." (Telegram of 10 February 1949, 13.15, 130.02/2453/16). Sharett replied that the first condition was meant principally to reduce the area which Israel would have to evacuate, and in particular that it would be permitted to maintain a force at the intersection of the border with the Auja—Rafah road. This was needed as a protection against a possible Egyptian attack from two directions — the Abu Agheila—Auja road and the Rafah—Auja road. (See Sharett to Eytan, 10 February 1949, 17.20, 130.02/2453/17). (3) No. 77, Appendix III. (4) No. *112*.

No. 121 (Hebrew)

(1) On the first two meetings see No. *118* and note 1 there. A third meeting, at which Israel was represented by Sasson, Rabin and Yadin, and Egypt by Mustafa, Lutfi and Sherine, took place on 9 February. This meeting, too, dealt with the outstanding military questions. It ended "without results, though in a friendly spirit", and it was decided that Sasson would again meet with the Egyptian political advisers the same evening in order to "sum up the meeting." (See Yadin to Ben-Gurion, 9 February 1949, 22.20, 130.02/2453/16).

No. 122 (Hebrew)

(1) Eban to Sharett, X206, 8 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33. (2) Andrew J. L. McNaughton, Canada's Permanent Representative at the U.N. and President of the Security Council in January 1949.

No. 123

(1) See Appendix I below, and No. 96, Appendix. (2) Appendix II below. (3) See No. 125, Appendices I, II. The articles were renumbered in the amended text — Articles VII and VIII correspond respectively to Articles VIII and IX in the former draft. (4) Appendix III below. (5) Untraced. (6) No. 77, Appendix I.

No. 124 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *120*. (2) See No. 70, paragraphs 3-5; No. 96, Appendix I (Article VIII — Israeli amendment); No. 123, Appendix III (paragraph 3 — Israeli position). (3) For Sharett's reply see No. *128*.

No. 125

(1) Appendix I below. (2) See No. *121*. (3) According to a handwritten note on original, this appendix was delivered to the Israeli delegation together with the covering letter, at 19.30. See also No. 123 and note 3 there. Italics indicate additions or amendments (cf. No. 77, Appendix I). (4) Mistake in original ("067").

No. 126

(1) See No. 123, Appendix, and No. 125, Appendices. (2) Rina (Irenne) Broza, Secretary in bureau of Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Sharett was puzzled by Eytan's letter and inquired whether it had perhaps been written before he had received the telegram informing him of the Cabinet's decision — No. *120*. (See telegram of 11 February 1949, 14.05, 130.02/2453/17). For Eytan's reply see No. *129*.

No. 127 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *118* and note 1 there; No. 121 and note 1 there.

No. 128 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *124* and note 2 there. (2) See No. *120.* (3) See No. 100 and note 6 there.

No. 129 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *128.* (2) No. 126, and see note 3 there. (3) No. *127.*

No. 130

(1) This document contains Bunche's amended draft of the Preamble and Articles 1-5 of the armistice agreement, prepared in the light of the amendments proposed by the parties (see No. 96, Appendix). An untraced covering letter by Bunche, dated 12 February, is mentioned in an attached note by the secretary. The working paper is filed among documents of 16 February. (2) Printed here in italics.

No. 131

(1) See Appendix below. (2) Sub-paragraphs 1-4 are identical with the corresponding sub-paragraphs in the former draft and are not printed here. See No. 125, Appendix I, and cf. revised formulation in No. 136, Appendix I.

No. 132 (Hebrew)

(1) Reference is evidently to Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Dori. (2) See No. *124* and note 2 there. (3) See No. 123, Appendix III. (4) Paragraph crossed out in outgoing text but included in incoming text.

No. 133 (Hebrew)

(1) Yadin returned to Israel for consultations. See Nos. 126, *132*. (2) Part of the letter, dealing with the Lausanne talks, is not printed here.

No. 134 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 125, Appendix I.

No. 135

(1) The former draft of this article was handed to Eytan on the same day (see No. 136, note 9). (2) For a revised formulation of Article V see Appendix II below. For an earlier draft of the two articles see No. 130. Only the last sentence of Article II was revised: Bunche proposed adding the phrase "or give assistance to any third party engaged in any such activity directed against either party to this Agreement" after the words "or violate the international frontiers." (3) See No. 136. (4) Eytan replied later that day (130.02/2454/4). He accepted the revisions of Articles II and V and suggested two slight changes in Article VIII: omission of the words "under U.N. supervision" from paragraph 1 and addition of the words "by either party" after the word "failure" in paragraph 5. Eytan added that he "should feel happier about paragraph 3" if it was made clear that the Egyptian positions on the Auja—Rafah road would not be closer to Auja than the distance between Auja and Quseima. (5) The Egyptians apparently accepted this formulation with the second amendment proposed by Eytan. They requested that the following sentence be inserted after the first sentence of paragraph 1: "This demilitarized area shall be under the full supervision and effective control of the United Nations." They also requested that the following words be omitted from the first part of the second sentence: "attached to the staff of the Mixed Armistice Commission." (See two drafts of the article, of 19 February, in file 130.02/2442/11; Eytan to Sharett, 20 February 1949, 14.30, 130.02/2453/16. Cf. final formulation, Appendix F, Main Volume, p. 693).

No. 136

(1) Of 14 February 1949, 19.30, 130.02/2453/16. (2) See No. *128*. (3) See No. 130 and note 1 there; No. 123, Appendix II. (4) Reference is to paragraph 4 of Article V. (5) Cf. amended text of article in No. 135, Appendix III. (6) In paragraph 2 of Article II. (7) Cf. amended text of article in No. 135, Appendix II. (8) Telegram of 13 February 1949, 19.00, 130.02/2453/16. (9) See No. 135 and Appendix I there. The draft mentioned by Eytan is enclosed with the letter in the file. There are only slight differences between this draft and the revised text submitted to the Egyptians: a) the order of the paragraphs is different; b) the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the draft reads: "A United Nations Observer team shall be maintained at el-Auja for the purpose of ensuring the full implementation of this provision"; c) the words "to respect or fulfil any of the other provisions of this Article" in paragraph 5 of the revised version are not included in the corresponding paragraph of the draft. (10) Appendix II below. (11) Allusion to the evacuation of the Faluja pocket. (12) Because of a delay in the forwarding of the mail, Eytan cabled Sharett the contents of the letter and appendices on the following day (130.02/2453/16). (13) Completed in accordance with former draft of this article — see No. 131, Appendix.

No. 137

(1) See text of this article amended in line with Eytan's proposals, 19 February 1949, in file 130.02/2442/11, and cf. final text in Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 694-6. (2) See No. 90, note 4.

No. 138

(1) Col. Burton C. Andrus. His predecessor, Lt. Col. Robert W. van der Velde, was also present. See also McDonald's report to Acheson, 17 February 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 752-3. (2) Eban met J. Ross on 11 February and reported optimistically about progress made at the Rhodes talks and prospects of a successful outcome. Ross understood that Israeli concessions with regard to

Auja and Beersheba could be expected. This contrasted with information received from Bunche that Israel was refusing to make concessions on these issues. Satterthwaite and McClintock inquired of Elath if he could reconcile the conflicting reports, but he had no up-to-date information. Acheson thereupon instructed McDonald to call on Sharett at once in order to clarify the matter. (See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 748-9; Eban to Sharett, NI15, 11 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33; Elath to Sharett, W77T, 16 February 1949, 130.09/2308/8).

No. 139

(1) Eban met Ross on 15 February. (See Eban to Sharett, X213, 15 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33). (2) In a note attached to Eban's telegram, dated 18 February, Sharett's secretary, Eiga Shapiro, wrote that at the time she had not transmitted the contents of Eytan's telegram (No. *85*) to Elath because it had reached her only some time after its receipt and because "the settlement of [Jewish residents in] Beersheba by us is a very delicate matter *vis-à-vis* the State Department." (130.09/2337/11).

No. 140

(1) No. 137. (2) Eiga Shapiro and Regina Medzini-Hamburger, secretaries in the Foreign Minister's bureau. (3) Michael Simon, Chief of Protocol at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (4) No. 194.

No. 141

(1) Moshe Pearlman, Army Spokesman and Director of the Government Press Division. (2) No. *192*. (3) I.e., Operation *Uvda* — occupation of the southern Negev up to Elath, see editorial note, p. 165 below. (4) Michael Comay, Director of the British Commonwealth Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 142

(1) Sharett transmitted the text of the telegram to Eytan, adding that he had approved the line suggested by Eban. (Telegram of 20 February 1949, 130.02/2453/17).

No. 143 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett approved, but according to his instruction Eytan added the following passage to his reply to Bunche: "The Government of Israel reserves the right to treat as prisoners of war any persons identified as having taken part in the fighting in Palestine." (See Sharett to Eytan, 20 February 1949, 15.20, 130.02/2453/17; Eytan to Bunche, 20 February 1949, 130.02/2442/11. See also exchange of letters appended to the armistice agreement, Main Volume, pp. 702-3).

No. 144

(1) The draft, of 19 February 1949, is in file 130.02/2442/11. Its finalization involved only a number of slight amendments. (See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 688-704). (2) Of 20 February 1949, *ibid.* Bunche pointed out that according to his understanding, the two delegations agreed with the draft, except that the Egyptian delegation desired that a paragraph be added to Article VII providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Beersheba, and that it had not yet given its final word as to Annex III (Definition of Defensive Forces). The Egyptians were therefore not ready to accept the draft pending consultations with their government, while the Israeli delegation was prepared to accept it as it stood. (3) Eytan informed Sharett the same evening that the members of the Egyptian delegation were returning to Cairo. The majority, representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, would recommend acceptance of the draft, while Col. Sherine, a member of the royal entourage, held that Egypt must insist on its demand for Israeli withdrawal from Beersheba. Eytan suggested that an effort be made through McDonald and Elath to bring about immediate American intervention at the Egyptian Court. (See Eytan to Sharett, 20 Febru-

ary 1949, 21.30, 130.02/2453/16). For the action initiated see No. *150* and notes 4, 9, 10 there. (4) No. 77, Appendix I. (5) Eytan immediately transmitted the contents of the letter to Sharett, who on the following day conveyed the contents to Eban. (See telegrams in files 130.02/2453/16, 130.09/2329/3).

No. 145

(1) Mahmud Fawzi, Permanent Representative of Egypt at the U.N. (2) See telegram to Sharett, 21 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33. The telegram includes the text of the letter which Eban sent to Trygve Lie on the same day, enumerating Israel's arguments with regard to Beersheba. Eban sent copies to "leading delegations" in the Security Council. (Copy of letter in file 130.02/2425/7).

No. 146

(1) See Eban's letter to Cadogan, 21 February 1949, 130.02/2425/7. Similar letters were sent to the other members of the Security Council. (2) On the results of Elath's endeavours see No. 156 and note 2 there.

No. 147

(1) Sharett was unaware of the fact that the Israeli delegation had agreed to the evacuation of the Israeli forces from Bir Asluj, and consequently misinformed the press. On learning of his mistake, he asked Eytan to supply him with a reasonable explanation. (See exchange of telegrams between Sharett and Eytan, 21 February 1949, in files 130.02/2454/3, 130.02/2453/15, 130.02/2453/16). (2) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 701-2. The first draft of the exchange of letters of 19 February is in file 130.02/2442/11. (3) See Annex III to the armistice agreement, Main Volume, pp. 700-1. (4) See Annex II to the armistice agreement, Main Volume, p. 700.

No. 148 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *150.* (2) See No. 82, note 2.

No. 149 (Hebrew)

(1) The Egyptian delegation returned from Egypt on the following day, after getting Cairo's approval for signing the armistice agreement. The Egyptians requested only a single amendment: an explicit undertaking that the reduction of forces would be completed within four weeks after the signing of the agreement. The Israeli delegation accepted this amendment. (See Annex III, paragraph 4, to the armistice agreement, Main Volume, p. 701; Eytan to Sharett, 23 February 1949, 15.10, 130.02/2454/3).

No. 150 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *148.* (2) Mistake in original. (3) Incoming text reads: "his position." See No. *148* and note 2 there. (4) See Nos. 145, 146. (5) Mistake in original ("your position"), cf. No. 145. (6) See No. 145, note 2. (7) See No. 146, note 1. (8) See No. 139. (9) See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 759-60. (10) See No. 156 and note 2 there.

No. 151 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 111, note 6. (2) A few words are not printed here. (3) See No. 72 and note 1 there; No. 73 and note 1 there. (4) See also S. Rosenne, *Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States*, pp. 24-8. (5) Cf. Article XII in armistice agreement, Main Volume, pp. 696-7. (6) Article 102 of the U.N. Charter requires that all treaties and international agreements entered into by members of the U.N. be registered with the U.N. Secretariat and published by it. Paragraph 2 of the article states that "No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered... may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations."

No. 152 (Hebrew)

(1) Eytan informed Sharett that the armistice agreement with Egypt would be signed on the following day, at 10.30. (Telegram of 23 February 1949, 15.00, 130.02/2454/3). (2) Ben-Gurion, congratulating the delegation after the armistice had been signed, described it as "a great event" and requested the delegation to convey his congratulations to Bunche and Riley and his appreciation for their "sincere efforts to achieve the agreement." (Telegram of 24 February 1949, 14.00, 130.02/2453/15). (3) No. 147.

No. 153

(1) Untraced.

No. 154 (Hebrew)

(1) Israel was initially represented by an observer at the International Wheat Conference which opened in Washington on 26 January. When Egypt threatened to withdraw from the conference if Israel was elected a full member, the U.S. advised Israel to wait till after the signing of the armistice agreement. Sharett thereupon asked Sasson to persuade the Egyptian political advisers in Rhodes, Omar Lutfi and Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa, to prevail upon their government to give new instructions to its representatives at the conference. (See Sharett to Eytan, 22 February 1949, 130.02/2453/17). Israel was admitted as a full member on 17 March, against the opposition of Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

No. 155 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *154*.

No. 156

(1) See No. 146. (2) See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 760-1, 764-5.
(3) President Truman expressed his gratification over the signing

of the Egyptian—Israeli armistice agreement and his hope that it would be followed by similar agreements with the other Arab states, which would subsequently lead to the attainment of general peace. (*Ibid.*, p. 765).

No. 157

(1) See No. 115 and note 4 there. (2) See No. 103. (3) See note 1 above. (4) See No. 145. (5) See No. 103, note 5; No. 116. (6) See also No. 115, note 5. (7) Kenneth W. Bilby, *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent in Europe and the Middle East. (8) Sam P. Brewer, *New York Times* correspondent in Israel.

No. 158 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 2, note 3. (2) See appendix below and map facing p. 312. (3) The official negotiations with Lebanon started only on 1 March. The Lebanese, who did not wish to be the first Arab state to sign an armistice with Israel, deferred the opening of the talks until after the signing of the armistice agreement with Egypt. (See Hirsch to Fischer, telegram 74, 22 January 1949, 130.09/2344/2. See also No. *191*). (4) The map references of the first three places refer to the Lebanese grid, while the other two refer to the Palestine grid.

No. 159

(1) See No. 74. (2) The Foreign Minister of Lebanon sent a similar letter of credentials to Vigier. It listed the members of the Lebanese delegation and confirmed that they were authorized to negotiate and conclude an armistice agreement with Israel. (Letter of 1 March 1949, 130.02/2425/5).

No. 160

(1) Delivered by Vigier to the delegations of Israel and Lebanon.

No. 161 (Hebrew)

(1) The meeting between Vigier and the Israeli delegation was held in Nahariya on 1 March. See also No. *162*. (2) On 6 December 1948, Eytan to Sharett, telegram MH 2227, 6 December 1948, 130.02/2424/23—see Vol. 2. (3) For Sharett's reply see Nos. *162, 163*. See also similar reply by Yadin to Shiloah, 3 March 1949, 09.25, 130.16/2950/1.

No. 162 (Hebrew)

(1) See record of meeting in file 130.02/2425/5. (2) See No. 160. (3) No. *161*. (4) This part of sentence missing in incoming text. (5) Sharett cabled the contents of this telegram to Eban, adding the following comment: "Believe this will be defensible stand even if dice loaded against us by Lebanese accepting, ourselves rejecting, Vigier's proposals... There is second defence line, but meanwhile we stick as above." (Telegram Y114, 3 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34).

No. 163 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *161*.

No. 164 (Hebrew)

(1) Record in file 130.02/2425/5. (2) See No. 160. (3) See Rosenne to Robinson, 10 February 1949, 130.16/2951/1. (4) Reference is to unofficial meeting of the heads of the two delegations, on 3 March. See No. 165. (5) Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon in the U.S.A. and its representative at the U.N.

No. 165

(1) No. 160. (2) See Rosenne's redaction of French text of agreement, in file 130.16/2950/1. (3) Mistake in original ("tuard").

No. 166

(1) See No. *158* and appendix there.

No. 167

(1) Prepared by drafting committee established at the meeting of the two delegations on 10 March (see record in file 130.02/2425/5), on basis of Bunche's draft of 1 March (No. 160). The text printed here includes only the amended parts of the draft. (2) Note in margin of original reads: "Draft English translation of French draft amendment proposed by the Lebanese delegation." (3) Note in margin reads: "Draft proposed by the Lebanese delegation." (4) Note in margin reads: "This Article is under consideration by the military sub-committee." (5) Mistake in original ("Article IV"). Note in margin reads: "This article has not been discussed by the drafting sub-committee." (6) Note in margin of paragraph 2 reads: "Note: the location will be determined by the military sub-committee." (7) In paragraph 3, the numbers of the articles were changed to accord with the numbers in the new draft. (8) Note in margin of paragraph 5 reads: "This addition was agreed at the full conference of the 10 March 1949 but has not been considered by the drafting committee."

No. 168 (Hebrew)

(1) Replying on 14 March, Eytan assured Yadin that he would issue instructions to the Foreign Ministry representatives in the delegation not to let differences of opinion between them and the military representatives show in the course of negotiations, on the understanding that they were to be ironed out directly with Yadin. (Telegram in file 130.02/2425/5).

No. 169 (Hebrew)

(1) The record of the first meeting is in file 130.02/2425/5. For the record of the second meeting see No. 165. (2) No. 160. (3) The meeting took place on the morning of 10 March

(record in file 130.02/2425/5). It dealt with the exchange of prisoners of war and Articles VI and IX of the draft armistice agreement. Agreement was reached on the constitution of the military and drafting sub-committees. In the course of the discussion on prisoners of war, differences of opinion arose with regard to five members of a Haganah reconnaissance unit who had been arrested on Lebanese territory in October 1947 and sentenced to two and three years' imprisonment. The Israeli delegation demanded that they be recognized as prisoners of war and released together with the three other Israeli prisoners held by the Lebanese. The Lebanese argued that the five had been captured before the beginning of hostilities. They undertook to release them within twenty-four hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, but insisted that the usual amnesty procedures must first be completed. The Israelis maintained that the Lebanese had earlier agreed to an exchange of all prisoners even before the final signing, and they declared that Israel would release the thirty-eight Lebanese prisoners it held only if all Israeli prisoners were released at the same time. The discussion, which turned on various points of international law, did not lead to agreement, and Vigier finally suggested that the parties should meet with Red Cross representatives who were present at Rosh Haniqra at the time, in order to try to reach an agreement. On further developments with regard to this issue see No. *170* and note 5 there; No. *177*. (4) Apparent mistake in original.

No. 170 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett left for New York in the middle of March and returned to Israel in the middle of April. (2) See Sharett to Makleff, 9 March 1949, 130.16/2950/1. (3) See Appendix below. (4) The conference, which met in Beirut, was called by the Palestine Conciliation Commission in order to discuss the problem of the Arab refugees. It was attended by the Prime Ministers of Jordan and Syria, the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Lebanon and representatives from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (5) Telegram of 16 March 1949, 10.30, 130.02/2425/5; English text in telegram IN70 to Eban, 16 March 1949, 130.09/2329/3. According to Rosenne, the talk between Pellman and Hamada indicated a mitigation of the Lebanese attitude to the problems of prisoners of war, frontier rectification and demilitarization. Rosenne believed that Riley's

milder reaction might "indicate difference in French and American approach." He added that "while we can anticipate strongest pressure on us during next few days, imperative we mobilize maximum pressure on Beirut meet us on essential points, as well as on Damascus to clarify her attitude and start talking either directly or through Mediator if internal situation renders difficult direct participation formal armistice conference." (6) See No. *169*, note 3.

No. 171 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 175. (2) Following the Israeli advance to Elath (see editorial note, p. 165 below), the British reinforced the force which had been stationed in Aqaba since January 1949. The Foreign Office announced on 8 January that the forces had been sent in fulfilment of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Shiloah's telegram was sent in reply to a telegram from Eytan of 15 March (17.00, 130.16/2948/1). Eytan transmitted the text of a telegram from Eban, stating that the reinforcement of the British troops in Aqaba should not be permitted to pass unnoticed, since it constituted a second breach of the Security Council's truce resolutions. Eban suggested addressing a public inquiry to Bunche as to whether the British move had taken place with his knowledge and consent. (See Eban to Eytan, telegram 1414, 14 March 1949, 93.03/79/9). (3) See No. *241* and note 2 there. (4) Eytan transmitted to Sasson the contents of the first part of his telegram, adding: "Reuven [Shiloah] recommends signing, Ben-Gurion agrees, but the Army objects." (Telegram of 17 March 1949, 14.00, 130.02/2425/5). (5) Eytan cabled Shiloah on the morning of 18 March: "Tell Bunche that we shall sign with Lebanon. Let U.N. arrange a meeting at Rosh Haniqra as soon as possible." (Telegram of 18 March 1949, 08.45, 130.02/2425/5). See also No.*173*; No. *234* and note 4 there.

No. 172

(1) First part of letter not printed here. (2) See text of telegram in note of Political Department to Eytan, 20 March 1949, 130.02/2425/5. (3) See No. *173*.

No. 173 (Hebrew)

(1) The meeting was attended by Ben-Gurion, Yadin, Dayan, Eytan, Rosenne and Shimoni. In his diary, Ben-Gurion noted the reasons which prompted him to change the instructions: "1) This agreement will bolster our position in Elath; 2) it will strengthen our position in the discussions with Transjordan; 3) it will facilitate the military action in the Triangle if we have to undertake it. It will strengthen our demands *vis-à-vis* the Syrians. Also, it is inadvisable for us to link one Arab country with another." (Ben-Gurion Diary, 17 March 1949, Ben-Gurion Archives). (2) Cf. No. *176* and note 3 there. (3) Makleff commented on these instructions in a letter to the Chief of Staff dated 19 March 1949 (I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055). He wrote that the decision to change the instructions had been taken without consulting him, and asked to be given an opportunity to explain his position "in order to change the results, if possible." He pointed out that in the course of the last meeting, the Lebanese had evinced a willingness to change their attitude and would have made substantial concessions at the next meeting; but the likelihood of this happening had probably been eliminated by the new instructions. As for the Syrian forces in Lebanon, Makleff held that there was no point in demanding their withdrawal to Syria as long as there was no agreement with that country, because such a withdrawal would only strengthen the Syrian army by one brigade. However, Lebanon agreed to the insertion of a clause into the armistice agreement whereby she would undertake not to permit her territory to serve as a basis for an attack against Israel. Makleff stated that Israel must insist on permission to use the Metulla—Misgav Am road until a new road was constructed to the latter place, and demand essential border rectifications in the Manara—Malikiya sector that would not involve occupation of Lebanese villages. Makleff held that the signing of the agreement with Lebanon would increase the difficulties of negotiating with Syria, because Israel would lose the means to put pressure on her — "I do not know how we shall attain the minimum conditions we require in Upper Galilee unless we resort to military action." Only the Lebanese would derive advantage from the proposed agreement, while Israel would get nothing. Makleff requested that the task of negotiating with Syria should not be assigned to him.

No. 174 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *171*, note 5. (2) The last part of the telegram, dealing with negotiations with Jordan, is not printed here.

No. 175

(1) This message was conveyed by the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General, A. Cordier, in the course of a meeting with Eban on 17 March. (See No. 314). (2) See No. *171*. (3) See Eban to Lie, 18 March 1949, 130.02/2425/5.

No. 176 (Hebrew)

(1) Telegram of 18 March 1949, 21.50, I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055. (2) Untraced. For contents see telegram cited in note 1. (3) Eytan replied: a) Israel will not evacuate the Lebanese villages unless Lebanon withdraws from Rosh Haniqra; b) the Metulla—Misgav Am road will be used for civilian traffic only until a new road is constructed. The instructions to the delegation state explicitly that this is not an absolute condition, but Israel hopes that Lebanon will consent; c) strategic considerations require slight border rectifications in the Malikiya—Sheikh Abbad sector. Eytan added that "Bunche should be told that all these conditions are very reasonable and the private talks without participation [of the U.N.] have shown that the Lebanese tend to accept them." Eytan took exception to Vigier's interference and explained that "these are the army's minimal conditions." (Cf. No. *173*, note 2). Shiloah reported in reply that Bunche had suggested that Israel try to settle the problems of the road and border rectification in direct talks with the Lebanese, and refrain from making the signing of the agreement conditional on the acceptance of these demands. Bunche had undertaken to instruct Vigier to try to persuade the Lebanese to accept them. (See Eytan to Shiloah, 19 March 1949, 12.00, 130.16/2950/2; Shiloah to Eytan, 19 March 1949, 19.00, 130.02/2425/5).

No. 177 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *170.* (2) See No. *173.* (3) No. *174.* (4) See No. *176* and notes 1—3 there. (5) See exchange of letters between Riley and Salim on arrangement for use of the Metulla—Adeissa road by Israeli traffic; Makleff to Riley, 21 March 1949, confirming Israel's agreement (130.16/2950/2). (6) Record in file 130.02/2425/5. The meeting took place at 1 p.m. (7) See note from H. Beilin to Makleff and Rosenne, 20 March 1949, 13.00, 130.16/2950/2. It informed them that the Prime Minister wished the armistice negotiations to be concluded as soon as possible — preferably the same night — so that the agreement could be signed "as soon as technically possible." (8) See No. *169,* note 3.

No. 179 (Hebrew)

(1) Sent also to Eytan, Shiloah, Sasson, Eban and Yadin. (2) See No. 178. (3) See No. *154*, note 1. (4) See No. *177*, note 5.

No. 180 (Hebrew)

(1) Untraced. (2) Dayan and al-Tall met several times at the end of November and during December 1948. The meetings were also attended by representatives of the Security Council Truce Commission and of U.N. headquarters in Jerusalem. On 30 November, a special cease-fire agreement for the Jerusalem area was signed (see Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686). Various proposals for the settlement of territorial questions, as well as problems concerning the truce, were also discussed. At the meeting of 12 December Dayan conveyed the views of Ben-Gurion and declared that there was no point in continuing the talks until Jordan gave official notice of its intention to start armistice negotiations (see Nos. *181, 182, 183, 184*). (3) See No. *181.* (4) See editorial note, p. 156 below. (5) On Sasson's meetings with Arab personalities during the session of the U.N. General Assembly in Paris see Vol. 2.

Editorial Note preceding No. 181 (Main Volume, p. 331)

The Jericho Conference (the "Second Palestinian Convention") took place at the beginning of December 1948. It was attended by delegations from towns and villages in the Jordanian-controlled part of Palestine, representatives of the military authorities, officers of the Arab Legion and military governors, representatives of the Supreme Moslem Council and guest delegations from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The conference called for the unification of Palestine and Jordan as a step towards a full Arab union and proclaimed Abdallah King of all Palestine. The conference also called upon the Arab states to continue the struggle for the redemption of Palestine, and declared that Palestine was indivisible and that any solution that did not accord with this principle could not be regarded as final. As King Abdallah refused to accept this formulation, the resolutions were reformulated. The revised resolutions, published on 2 December, included an expression of no-confidence in the Arab Higher Committee and the "Gaza Government", and established the union of Jordan and Palestine as the Arab Hashemite Kingdom. Abdallah was proclaimed king and it was decided that Palestinian representatives be admitted to the Jordanian Parliament. King Abdallah was authorized to solve the problem of Palestine as he saw fit. The resolutions of the Jericho Conference were approved by the Jordanian Cabinet on 7 December and ratified by Parliament on 13 December. The resolutions were criticized by the heads of the Gaza Government, King Faruk and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, as well as by Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

No. 181 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *180*, note 2. (2) See No. *180*. (3) The resolution of the U.N. General Assembly of 11 December 1948, establishing the Palestine Conciliation Commission, includes a clause on the internationalization and demilitarization of Jerusalem. (4) On 15 December, Sasson reported to the Cabinet on his contacts with Arab representatives during the General Assembly's session in Paris. On 18 December, at a consultation with Ben-Gurion, Dayan and others, he recommended that negotiations with the Jordanians be initiated. (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 15 December 1948; Sasson to Sharett, telegram of 17

December 1948, 130.09/2344/1; M. Dayan, *Story of My Life*, p. 105). On the following day, the Cabinet discussed political questions: resumption of fighting in the Negev, possible military action in the "Triangle", Jerusalem's political status and relations with King Abdallah, including conditions for the opening of negotiations. Various views were expressed, but no decision was reached. Summing up, Ben-Gurion said: "For the time being we do not change the status of Jerusalem, we try to bring the matter of the Negev to a conclusion, and we open negotiations with Abdallah. If the talks reach a turning-point, the matter will be submitted to the Cabinet, which will decide on the changes." (See Provisional Government, Minutes, 19 December 1948).

No. 182 (Hebrew)

(1) Mistake in Hebrew date (corrected in printed text). (2) See Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686. (3) Untraced. (4) See No. *183*.

No. 183 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *182*. (2) See Vol. I, editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 164. (3) *Sic.* Should apparently read: "...of Western Palestine." (4) See No. *181*. (5) Abd al-Ilah. (6) The Jerusalem cease-fire agreement of 30 November 1948, see Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686. (7) See No. *184*.

No. 184 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *183*. (2) A copy of the letter of credentials is in file 130.15/3738/8. (3) Original — *ibid.* (4) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948*, editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 45; Main Volume, Nos. *31*, 105, 506. (5) See Vol. I, No. 416; No. 428 and note 1 there. See also *ibid.,* Nos. 461, 488, 499, 522.

No. 185

(1) See No. *171*, note 2. (2) See No. *188*, note 1. (3) Robert A. Lovett, U.S. Under Secretary of State up to 20 January 1949. (4) The State Department received detailed information about this meeting through the U.S. Embassy in London. (See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 684-5.)

No. 186 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 74. (2) Cf. No. *191*. (3) On 29 January 1949. (4) The "Gaza Government" was established by the Arab Higher Committee in the summer of 1948 as an executive body of the Palestinian Arabs. It was recognized by the Arab States, except Jordan, but in fact the Egyptian authorities did not give it any real powers even in the Gaza Strip, and it ceased to exist in 1952. (5) See No. *188*, note 1. (6) In May 1948 — see *Documents, December 1947—May 1948*, No. 506 and note 1 there. (7) Sharett cabled a report of the meeting with King Abdallah to Eban, adding that he and his colleagues were inclined to view these contacts as mere public relations on the part of the King, "since he is not master [of the] situation in relation either [to] Britain or his own government." Sharett stated that a durable armistice with Jordan was hardly conceivable without permanent access to Elath and a link between Mount Scopus and Jewish Jerusalem. He had conveyed the gist of this conversation to James McDonald, mainly in order to show that Israel was exploring every avenue to peace. (Telegram Y85, 2 February 1949, 130.09/2329/3. See also *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 721-2).

No. 187 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *186*. (2) The Palestine Truce Commission ("Consular Commission") was established in April 1948 in pursuance of the Security Council resolution of 23 April. The Commission was supposed to supervise the implementation of the truce ordered by the Security Council, but because of the circumstances prevailing in April—May 1948, its activities were in fact limited to Jerusalem. After the appointment of the Mediator and his staff, the functions of

the Commission were gradually transferred to him, and though it was still in existence at the beginning of 1949, it was in fact devoid of any real authority.

No. 188 (Hebrew)

(1) Israel held only a few Jordanian prisoners of war and about 4000 Palestinian Arabs. Jordan held 670 Israeli prisoners (most of them taken in the Etzion bloc and the Old City of Jerusalem) as well as five political prisoners. Dayan had agreed with Tall that in return for the release of all Israeli prisoners, Israel would release part of the Arab prisoners, according to a list to be submitted by Jordan. The implementation of the agreement was delayed because of the opposition of the Red Cross to "private arrangements". The exchange of prisoners was actually started on 20 February and concluded on 3 March. In the course of the exchange, Dayan demanded that the Israeli authorities should not delay the release of the Arab prisoners and that the exchange be concluded before the opening of the Rhodes talks with Jordan, because he feared that a delay might result in a Jordanian demand for release of all local Arab prisoners. (See exchange of telegrams between Dayan and the Chief of Staff, 12-27 February 1949, 130.16/2948/1; M. Dayan, *Story of My Life*, pp. 102-3).

No. 189 (Hebrew)

(1) The names of the addressees are missing on the extant copy. They are probably the same as those of another telegram (not printed here) written and sent at about the same time (Dayan to Dori and Sharett, 12 February 1949, 13.45, 130.16/2948/1). (2) Dr. Shawkat Aziz al-Sati, see No. *190*.

No. 190 (Hebrew)

(1) Yaacov Shimoni, Deputy Director of the Middle East Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 191 (Hebrew)

(1) For full report see No. *190*. (2) Members of the Conciliation Commission. (3) King Abdallah. (4) See No. *186*. (5) Operation *Uvda* — see editorial note, p. 165 below. (6) Apparently Lt. Col. Kimpton, Senior U.N. Observer in Tiberias. (7) See No. *158*, Appendix.

No. 192 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *191*. (2) In an earlier telegram, Eytan had informed Sharett that the Jordanians were pressing for an early start of negotiations in Rhodes, and that Bunche could not put them off any longer. Eytan requested Sharett's confirmation for opening the talks on 24 February. (See telegram of 15 February 1949, 13.40, 130.16/2948/1). (3) Tuvia Arazi, of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Division. At that time was assisting E. Sasson in contacts with Arab personalities in Paris.

No. 193 (Hebrew)

(1) See Nos. *190, 191*.

No. 194 (Hebrew)

(1) The treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Transjordan, of March 1948. The treaty provided for mutual aid in case one of the parties became engaged in war, subject to the rights and obligations of the parties under the United Nations Charter or other international agreements.

No. 195 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *192*, note 2; Dayan to Chief of Staff, 15 February 1949, 20.25, 130.16/2948/1. (2) Dayan to Chief of Staff, 19 February 1949, 09.45, *ibid.* (3) Reference is obviously to Operation

Uvda for occupation of the southern Negev (see editorial note, p. 165 below). (4) Sentence in square brackets — only in incoming text.

Editorial Note following No. 195 (Main Volume, pp. 356-7)

In reply, Eytan cabled that Sasson should not be recalled from Rhodes until the agreement with Egypt was signed. Tall must be told that if King Abdallah insisted on Sasson's participation, the meeting must be postponed to 24 or 25 February. Eytan added that the King should be told that haphazard meetings were useless; there should be consecutive meetings, attended by representatives of the Jordanian Government. On the following day, Sasson suggested that the meeting with the King be either postponed or held without his participation, as he wished to continue his talks with Arab personalities in Paris. (See Eytan to Sharett, 19 February 1949, 13.40, 130.02/2454/3; Sasson to Sharett, 20 February 1949, 17.50, 130.02/2453/6). The Jordanians however insisted on Sasson's participation, while the latter remained adamant in his refusal, maintaining that the meeting should be held later, if negotiations in Rhodes reached a dead end. He also argued that an immediate meeting would foster the King's excessive demands and impede the official talks. (See Eytan to Sharett, 22 February 1949, 12.00, 130.02/2454/3). The meeting was eventually cancelled. The official talks with the Jordanian delegation opened in Rhodes on 28 February. (See exchange of telegrams between Dayan, the Chief of Staff and Sharett, and between Eytan and Sharett, 21-23 February 1949, 130.02/2454/3, 130.02/2453/17, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 196

(1) Rosenne replied that a Security Council resolution confirming that the armistice agreement with Egypt disposed of the 4 November resolution was indeed desirable, but he failed to follow Robinson's argument that such confirmation would close the Negev question in relation to Jordan, since the armistice agreement expressly left open the question of the eastern Negev. (See Rosenne to Eban, Y112, 27 February 1949, 130.09/2329/3).

No. 197 (Hebrew)

(1) On 27 February, the Cabinet discussed the instructions to be issued to the Israeli delegation to the Rhodes armistice talks. Sharett submitted to the Cabinet a considerable part of the instructions included in this document. Several of the ministers proposed additional instructions, concerning, *inter alia*, the problem of the railway to Jerusalem and access to the Wailing Wall and to the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. It appears that Sharett then prepared the document printed here in the light of the Cabinet discussion and submitted it to Ben-Gurion, who had not attended the Cabinet meeting because of illness. Apparently it was Ben-Gurion who added the queries written on the document (see notes 2 and 3 below). The subject was not discussed again by the Cabinet and it seems that the instructions were issued to the delegation without amendments. (2) The following note was added by hand: "This is the area controlled by the Iraqi army, and if Iraq has not given official authorization, how can we address this demand to Transjordan?" (3) Handwritten note reads: "As above."

No. 198 (Hebrew)

(1) See reports on these meetings in Shiloah's telegrams to Sharett, 1 March 1949 (20.00), 2 March 1949 (16.20), 3 March 1949 (17.00), in file 130.02/2431/1. (2) Telegram of 1 March 1949 — see note 1. (3) See agreed agenda in No. 201, Annex II, and cf. draft of 28 February in file 130.02/2442/9. (4) See Sharett to Shiloah, 2 March 1949, 13.45, 130.02/2431/1. (5) See note 2. (6) Sharett opposed the suggestion of Shiloah and Dayan that Israel should initially demand only freedom of movement on the Latrun road as a prerequisite for a cease-fire agreement and that a demand for the evacuation of the area by Jordan be raised only in the course of the armistice negotiations. Sharett told the delegation to act according to its instructions, i.e., to demand immediate evacuation (see No. *197*, paragraph 2c). Sharett pointed out that "logically it is better to start with a far-reaching demand and to withdraw if necessary than vice versa." (See Sharett to Shiloah, 2 March 1949, 23.00, 130.16/2948/1). (7) Shiloah to Sharett, telegrams F11 and F16, 30 November 1948, 5 December 1948, 130.02/2344/1 — see Vol. 2. (8) See also

Dayan and Shiloah to Sharett, 3 March 1949, 11.15, 130.16/2948/1. (9) For Sharett's reply see No. *200* and note 1 there. (10) See draft of 28 February 1949, delivered to the Israeli delegation on 1 March, 15.30, in file 130.02/2442/9. (11) See Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686. (12) During the war, the Egyptian authorities prevented Israel-bound shipping calling at Egyptian ports from proceeding to Israel and confiscated goods destined for Israel. These measures were not cancelled after the signing of the armistice agreement. Israel maintained that they were no longer justified and demanded that the Acting Mediator press for their removal. See also No. *256*, note 1. (13) Allusion to Operation *Uvda* for occupation of the southern Negev, which was underway at that time. See editorial note, p. 165 below.

No. 199 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *198*, notes 3, 10. Reference here is to a new draft cease-fire agreement, of 3 March 1949, which was handed to the Israeli delegation at 21.00 (in file 130.02/2442/9). (2) See No. 48. (3) See copy of letter from Bunche to Iraqi Foreign Minister, 3 March 1949, 130.16/2948/3. (4) For Sharett's reply see No. *200*. (5) Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686.

No. 200 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *198* and note 6 there. Sharett's telegram is a reply to a telegram from Shiloah and Dayan of 3 March, 19.00, 130.16/2948/1. (2) Yadin cabled to Shiloah the same arguments against the Shiloah—Dayan proposal (4 March 1949, 11.25, 130.16/2948/1). (3) See No. *199*. (4) *Ibid*. (5) See No. *163*.

No. 201

(1) In the official records the name is spelled erroneously: "Alm". (2) Of 4 March 1949 (130.02/2442/9). (3) See Appendix D,

Main Volume, p. 686. (4) See No. *188*, note 1. (5) See Annex I (1,2) below. (6) See Annex II below. (7) No. 74.

No. 202 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 201. (2) Apparently Shiloah did not pursue the matter further after receiving Bunche's oral explanation and a letter of apology. Bunche expressed appreciation Shiloah's restraint and promised to do everything he could to repair the damage. (Letter of 4 March 1949, 130.16/2948/3). (3) Sharett cabled in reply: "Inform Bunche that if they continue to behave like savages, we shall break off the negotiations and resume them only after being satisfied that they have learnt a lesson in elementary courtesy..." (Sharett to Shiloah, 4 March 1949, 130.16/2948/1). Shiloah informed Sharett that Bunche had taken a tough line and cabled both Amman and the U.N. Secretary-General. At a further meeting the same night, the head of the Jordanian delegation apologized, stating that the incident had resulted from a misunderstanding because they had expected the official introduction of the delegation to take place at the end of the meeting. Shiloah and Dayan felt that the explanation should be accepted at its face value. (Shiloah to Sharett, 4 March 1949, 23.00, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 203 (Hebrew)

(1) Of 6 March 1949, 130.09/2344/2. Shiloah criticized the composition and powers of the Jordanian delegation and urged replacement of its members. The gist of his message is included in Sasson's telegram to King Abdallah — see below. (2) Jordanian politician. Served intermittently as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. (3) In reply, the King cabled Sasson: a) he had instructed the Jordanian delegation to take a more flexible line; b) Col. Jundi had a longer record of service than Col. al-Tall, and the latter was subordinate to the former; c) the Rhodes negotiations were of a purely military nature, and the King saw no reason to send political representatives like Rifa'i. The latter would subsequently take part in political negotiations; d) the King was ready to intervene whenever the Israeli delegation met with difficulties in the course of

the negotiations. (For text of telegram see Sasson to Eytan, 9 March 1949, 93.03/87/24).

Editorial Note preceding No. 204 (Main Volume, p. 372)

Operation *Uvda* for occupation of the southern Negev and the concurrent Operation *Yitzuv* for occupation of the Dead Sea shore from Sdom to Ein Gedi took place on 5-10 March 1949.
According to the U.N. partition resolution of 29 November 1947, the Negev was to be included in the Jewish state, but its ultimate fate depended on actual occupation, and the Jordanians on several occasions put forward claims for its partial annexation to Jordan.

The planning of Operation *Uvda* had to take into account severe military and political limitations resulting from Israel's delicate political situation. As according to the armistice agreement with Egypt only defensive forces were permitted in the western Negev, the forces had to advance east of the Beersheba—Aqaba line. The operation was planned as a two-pronged advance: the Negev Brigade crossed the mountain massif of the central Negev, while the Golani Brigade advanced south along Wadi Araba, west of the Jordanian border. The latter force was involved in a number of incidents with Jordanian forces, the most serious of which occurred in the Gharandal area (see No. 210, note 4). The Jordanians also occupied a position near Ras al-Naqeb, on the Egyptian—Israeli border, as well as positions at Um Rashrash (Elath), but they withdrew during the night of 9/10 March, and on the following day Israeli forces reached Um Rashrash.

The Jordanians tried to stop the advance by diplomatic means. They submitted complaints to the Acting Mediator (see No. *207* and note 1 there; No. 210), and King Abdallah sent several personal messages to Sharett (see Nos. *204, 208, 209, 211, 215*); the Jordanians also approached the British, who transmitted their complaints to the Israeli authorities, warning them that the British forces in Aqaba would open fire if the Israelis attacked them or crossed the border in that area (see No. *215* and note 6 there).

Operation *Uvda* was followed by a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Jordan (see No. 214). U.N. observers were sent to Um Rashrash in order to report on the situation (see No. *213* and note 3 there), and Bunche's subsequent report to the Security Council established that Israel was in effective control of the area. (See report of 22 March, in file 130.16/2948/3).

No. 204 (Hebrew)

(1) Yosef Nevo, Operations Officer of the Sixth (Etzioni) Brigade. (2) On the same day, Sharett cabled Sasson the contents of the King's message (telegram 080/70, in file 130.09/2344/2). For Sasson's reply see No. *208*. (3) See Sharett to Sasson, 082/51, 9 March 1949, 130.09/2344/2. Sharett reprimanded Sasson particularly for his statement that Israel would expand eastward if blocked in the south. Sasson explained that he had made the statement in an off the record talk with the United Press correspondent in Rhodes, who had nevertheless published it. (See Sasson to Eytan, 11 March 1949, 93.03/87/24).

No. 205 (Hebrew)

(1) Of 7 March, 21.15, 130.02/2431/1. (2) See No. *154*. (3) See No. *198*. (4) The discussion took place at a meeting with Bunche on 8 March. See report in telegram from Shiloah to Yadin and Sharett, 20.40, 130.02/2431/1. (5) Reference is to the blowing up of the Latrun pumping station on 12 August 1948 (see Vol. I, editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 145), and to an attack by an Arab Legion unit on an Israeli convoy to Jerusalem, on 22 September 1948, in which four people were killed. (6) See No. *206* and note 1 there. (7) On 10 February, the Knesset elected Chaim Weizmann as first President of the State of Israel.

No. 206 (Hebrew)

(1) Record in file 130.02/2442/9. (2) Near the Arab village of Beit Nuba.

No. 207 (Hebrew)

(1) A former complaint, of 8 March, was transmitted to Shiloah through Bunche on the morning of 9 March and was then forwarded to Sharett (130.16/2948/1). Jundi now conveyed a complaint alleging that an Israeli motorized force with air support had crossed the

Jordanian border near Bir Ibn Ode on the morning of 7 March. Jordan demanded withdrawal of the Israeli force. Israel denied the border crossing, pointing out that Bir Ibn Ode was in Israeli territory, and demanded withdrawal of the Jordanian forces. (See Eytan to Shiloah, 9 March 1949, 18.30, 130.16/2948/1). (2) No. *204*. (3) Nos. *183, 184*.

No. 208 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *204*, note 2. (2) Telegram in file 130.09/2344/5.

No. 209 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *204*. (2) Nos. *183, 184*. (3) Reference is to infiltrations, sniping and robberies by Arabs from across the cease-fire line.

No. 210

(1) See No. *207*. (2) See No. *207*, note 1. (3) Telegram in file 130.16/2948/3. (4) A few hours later, Shiloah handed Eytan's reply to Bunche. It stated: a) Israeli forces have not crossed the border at any point south of the Dead Sea. b) No Israeli forces have attacked Jordanian positions or patrols. c) There has been only one incident — on 8 March, near Gharandal, when a Jordanian patrol on the Israeli side of the border fired at Israeli units and then moved away; the Israelis did not return fire. (See Shiloah to Bunche, 10 March 1949, transmitted at 23.45, 130.16/2948/3; Sharett to Shiloah, 10 March 1949, 20.30, 130.16/2948/1).
(5) See No. *212*.

No. 211 (Hebrew)

(1) Abdallah al-Tall handed the message to Y. Nevo on 10 March, and the latter transmitted it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (See Nevo to Chief of Staff, 10 March 1949, 16.00, 130.02/2431/1).
(2) See editorial note, p. 165 above; Nos. *204, 207,* 210.
(3) For Sharett's reply see No. *215*.

No. 212 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 210. Bunche's letter was handed to the Israeli delegation at 15.35 and cabled to Sharett at 16.00. (130.16/2948/3). (2) No. 48. (3) See drafts of annex and alternative additional paragraph which Bunche prepared during the afternoon meeting of 10 March. In file 130.02/2442/9 these drafts are attached to the draft agreement submitted by Bunche at the same meeting. (4) See Bunche to Shiloah, 10 March 1949, handed to Israeli delegation at meeting at 17.00 (130.16/2948/1). (5) Sharett replied: "Prime Minister in Tiberias and cannot reply without consulting him. Shall reply tomorrow. Repeat once more: no fighting in Negev, all their talk is nothing but lies. Let the observers testify." (Telegram of 10 March 1949, 24.00, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 213 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *212*, note 5. (2) In file 130.16/2948/1 (outgoing text. Time there: 00.30). Sharett cabled: "May be obliged to reply tomorrow morning on my own responsibility, therefore answer immediately: a) Will signature apply automatically to Triangle if Jordanians replace Iraqis, as Willi [Abdallah al-Tall] says, or can agreement be understood to apply from Budrus southwards only? b) Can you accompany your signature with oral declaration that we regard line in south as border, as you declared earlier, and will Jordanians sign in view of such declaration? c) If we change our dispositions at southern end after the signing, shall we be accused of violating the cease-fire agreement? d) Are the observers ready to reach southern end...?" (3) Next morning, Sharett instructed Shiloah to sign the cease-fire agreement without the additional paragraph and to demand that a permanent team of observers be sent to Um Rashrash. In the absence of the Prime Minister, he took the decision in consultation with the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Operations and the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (Sharett to Shiloah, 11 March 1949, 10.10, 10.15, 130.16/2948/1).

Editorial Note preceding No. 214 (Main Volume, p. 382)

The agreement was signed at an official meeting of the two delegations on 11 March, at 13.30 (record in file 130.02/2442/9), after the text had been finalized at an unofficial meeting on the preceding day (see No. *212*). Three earlier drafts had been submitted by Bunche on 1, 3 and 10 March (130.02/2442/9). See also No. *198*.

No. 214

(1) The filed copy does not include the names of the signatories. They are printed here as they appear on U.N. document S/1284 of 11 March 1949.

No. 215 (Hebrew)

(1) The file contains a draft of the letter in Sharett's hand with an Arab translation of some of the terms used as well as a complete Arab translation. The Arab text includes a few words of greeting and courtesy. (2) No. *211*. (3) No. *204*. (4) See also No. 210, note 4. (5) The Arab text of the King's message reads "the Naqeb area" (al-Naqeb is the Arabic term for the Negev, and it appears thus in the original Hebrew translation — see No. *211*). But Sharett evidently understood the King to have meant the Ras al-Naqeb area, on the Israeli—Egyptian border (see editorial note, p. 165 above). (6) See Eytan to Shiloah, 10 March 1949, 18.20, 130.02/2431/1. (7) See Sharett to Eban, LS/288, 12 March 1949, 130.02/2328/6.

No. 216

(1) Relating to the cease-fire in Jerusalem. (2) The Jerusalem power station, near Abu Tur, was in the Israeli-controlled area. (3) No. 214. See also editorial note, above. (4) See No. *205*.

No. 217

(1) See No. 216. (2) I.e., the line held by Israeli forces in Jerusalem — see No. 216, pp. 391-2. (3) The dots and question marks in this and the following paragraph are in the original. The places mentioned here are Beit Nuba, Deir Aiyub and Yalu. (4) The Security Council resolutions of 22 and 29 May 1948 called for the maintenance of a cease-fire in Jerusalem and protection of the city. The resolution of 15 July 1948 included an instruction to the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of Jerusalem. In its resolutions of 19 August and 19 October 1948, the Council drew the attention of the parties to their obligations set forth in former resolutions. (See Vol. I, Appendices D-G; and *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49,* p. 177).

No. 218 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 216. (2) See No. 217. (3) See No. *221.* (4) See also No. *219* and note 4 there. (5) Eytan cabled that because of the Prime Minister's absence, a consultation could be held only on the following day (Eytan to Shimoni, 13 March 1949, 11.30, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 219 (Hebrew)

(1) Cf. No. 217; No. *218.* (2) See No. 217, note 4. (3) In a further telegram, Dayan repeated his proposal, adding the following explanation: "If some mixed commission visits the place and finds it uninhabited, there will be U.N. pressure with a view to an evacuation of the area so as to leave a neutral road to Bethlehem, contiguous to the sectors." Yadin replied that the matter was being discussed, but in his opinion Dayan's argument was not cogent. (Dayan to Yadin, 15 March 1949, 09.30, 130.02/2431/1; Yadin to Dayan, 16 March 1949, 10.40, 130.16/2948/1). (4) In a further telegram to Yadin, Dayan explained: "Bunche and Riley propose demilitarization not as a solution but as a stage towards peace. Their proposal: withdrawal of the military positions and their replacement by police. In practice, it does not make any difference to us because the only change will be in the colour of the hats. In any

case, one cannot argue that the time has arrived for peace arrangements and therefore demand restoration of normal conditions on Mount Scopus and in use of the railway, and at the same time oppose *a priori* replacement of the army by police. One must only be watchful of their plot with regard to a united Jewish and Arab Jerusalem, separate in its arrangements from the State of Israel." (Telegram of 13 March 1949, 11.00, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 220

(1) See Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686. (2) See No. *221*. (3) See Vol. I, Nos. 424, 476, 477, 507.

No. 221 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 220. (2) See No. *218*; No. *219* and note 4 there- (3) See No. 228 and note 1 there.

No. 222 (Hebrew)

(1) See editorial note, p. 165 above. (2) See No. 214. Actually, the agreement was signed on 11 March. (3) *Sic.* Reference is apparently to General Sadiq, commander of the Egyptian forces in Palestine. (4) Yadin replied that it had been decided to oppose the replacement of Iraqi by Jordanian forces in the Triangle. As to the accusation that Israel had violated the cease-fire, Yadin suggested that Bunche be reminded of the British statement concerning the reinforcement of their forces in Aqaba (See No. *171,* note 2) and be told that this constituted a cease-fire violation "just as our movement in the Negev." With regard to the Egyptian complaint, Yadin asked Dayan to tell Bunche "not to worry" as the matter was being investigated by the Mixed Armistice Commission. (Yadin to Dayan, 14 March 1949, 10.00, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 223

(1) According to an intelligence report of 11 March, it had been decided at a meeting held in Amman on the previous day that the

Jordanians would take over the Iraqi line on 12 March. The Iraqis were to concentrate in the Nablus—Tubas—Jericho area; the local forces would be put under Jordanian command and their salaries paid by the Iraqis. The agreement was subject to confirmation by the Iraqi government. (See Intelligence Service I to Y. Harkabi, 11 March 1949, 16.45, 130.16/2948/1). (2) See Vol. I, No. 156, and note 1 there. (3) See Vol. I, Appendix F.
(4) See Vol. I, Appendix G. (5) Bunche replied that he could not issue any ruling pending clarification of the proposed arrangement. This did not mean that he accepted the Israeli interpretations or conclusions. (See Mohn to Eytan, 16 March 1949, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 224 (Hebrew)

(1) In file 130.16/2948/1. Yadin instructed Dayan to address his telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with copies to the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff and to himself. (2) Untraced. (3) See No. *222*, note 4. (4) See Nos. 220, 228.

No. 225 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *215*. (2) See No. *204*.

No. 226 (Hebrew)

(1) Original Arabic translation in file. (2) No. *225*. (3) See No. 223. (4) The King agreed. (See Nevo to Chief of Staff, 16 March 1949, 09.20, 130.16/2948/1). For the King's reply to this letter see No. *240*.

No. 227 (Hebrew)

(1) See record of meeting in file 130.02/2442/9. (2) Yadin agreed that the armistice line should run along horizontal grid line 90 up to its junction with vertical grid line 180, and from there in a straight line to Ein Gedi. (Yadin to Dayan, 16 March 1949, 09.35, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 228

(1) Bunche presented the document at a joint meeting of the Israeli and Jordanian delegations, in the afternoon of 15 March (see No. 229). The two parts of the document were appended to the record of the meeting (see in file). (2) See No. 220. "Fifth" should read "sixth". (3) See No. 217 and note 4 there.

No. 229

(1) See No. 228 and note 1 there. (2) Agreement of 30 November 1948 — see Appendix D, Main Volume, p. 686. (3) See No. 228. (4) See No. 228, pp. 420-3.

No. 230 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *226*. (2) See Hebrew translation of letter, of 15 March 1949, in file 130.16/2948/1. (3) See No. *226*, note 4. (4) See No. 223 and note 5 there. (5) See Eban to Eytan, X243, 14 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34; Eytan to Eban, Y125, 14 March 1949, 130.09/2329/12. Eytan had informed Eban of a planned operation aimed at straightening the line in the Triangle. He requested Eban's view as to the likely reaction of the Security Council and his advice "on tactics best calculated to soften likely Security Council blow."

Nos. 231

(1) See Nos. 228, 229.

No. 232 (Hebrew)

(1) Record of first session in file 130.02/2442/9. Record of second session — see No. 231. (2) No. 228.

No. 233

(1) *Sic.* (2) Mistake in original ("defensive").
(3) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 692-3; 700-1.
(4) General Ahmed Fuad Sadiq, commander of the Egyptian forces in Palestine since November 1948. (5) *Sic.*

No. 234 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 233. (2) See Eytan to Eban, Y137, 17 March 1949, 130.09/2329/3. (3) For Yadin's reply see No. *238*, note 1. (4) Eytan cabled in reply that a decision on the agreement with Lebanon would be taken the same night, at a consultation with the Prime Minister. (See No. *171* and note 5 there; telegram of 17 March 1949, 19.00, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 235 (Hebrew)

(1) The last part of the telegram is missing from the extant copy of the outgoing text. This part is printed here as it appears in the incoming text. (2) For Yadin's reply see No. *238*, note 1.

No. 237 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *236*. Eytan replied that he thought the question of the Triangle should be handled by "us and Dayan" and that they should await the outcome of the latter's meeting with Tall. (Telegram of 18 March 1949, 20.20, 130.16/2948/1).

No. 238 (Hebrew)

(1) Telegrams in file 130.02/2431/1. Both comment on the plan for a reduction of forces outlined in Nos. *234* and *235*. The first telegram contains preliminary remarks, while the second conveys the results of a survey prepared by the General Staff Branch of the General Staff. Its main conclusions are: a) Agreement to the forces suggested for the first sector. b) One battalion should be added to the forces

suggested for the second sector, as "otherwise it would in effect amount to the demilitarization of Jerusalem and an excessive reduction of the forces in the [Jerusalem] corridor." c) Agreement to the forces suggested for the third sector, but only after improvement of the security situation there. d) Agreement to the principle that only defensive forces be allowed up to a distance of 10 kilometres from the armistice lines. But this principle must not apply to the line south of horizontal grid line 97[0] [i.e., in the southern Negev] because of the proximity of the Jordanian and Egyptian positions in this area. Furthermore, the army demanded that for the purposes of the agreement, the British troops at Aqaba be considered as part of the Jordanian forces. (2) Yadin replied in two telegrams. In the first, he made it clear that his attitude remained unchanged (see note 1); he also agreed to Loehner's suggestion with regard to armoured vehicles. (Telegram of 18 March 1949, 23.30, 130.16/2948/1). For second telegram see No. *239.*

No. 239 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *238.*

No. 240 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *226.* (2) Omar Zaki al-Afiuni, the Jordanian Minister in Paris. Sasson corresponded with King Abdallah from Paris; copies of the correspondence were sent to Eytan in Tel Aviv. (3) See No. *186.* (4) The Habaniah military air base in western Iraq.

No. 241 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *240.* (2) Dayan and Harkabi met King Abdallah on 18 March. For details of the meeting and the agreement in principle with regard to the Triangle see Nos. *242,* 248.

No. 242 (Hebrew)

(1) At the meeting with Dayan and Harkabi. See Nos. *241*, 248.

No. 243 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *242*.

No. 244 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *238*, note 1. (2) Sic. (3) From this point the numbering of the paragraphs is faulty. (4) *Sic.* Should perhaps read "ships". (5) *Sic.*

No. 245

(1) Untraced. (2) See No. 214. (3) No. 211. (4) See No. *186*.

No. 246

(1) No. 245. (2) Prime Minister of Jordan.
(3) Eytan to Sasson, 21 March 1949, 130.09/2344/2. For details of the meeting see Nos. *242*, 248. (4) See No. *186*, note 4. (5) At the beginning of March, U.N. representatives received a number of complaints concerning alleged attacks by Israeli soldiers on Arab civilians who had remained in Faluja after the evacuation of the Egyptian garrison, including indiscriminate firing, as a result of which 2400 residents had asked for U.N. protection and transfer to Hebron. Bunche referred the complaints to Shiloah, pointing out Israel's formal responsibility for the safety of those civilians. Sharett referred the matter to the Chief of Staff; he described it as extremely serious and requested that orders be issued to the Israeli troops in the area to refrain from any molestation of Arab civilians. In reply, the Chief of Staff informed Sharett that appropriate orders had been given to the local commanders. (See Bunche to Shiloah, 4 March 1949, 130.16/2948/3; exchange of letters beetwen Sharett and Chief of Staff, 6 and 15 March 1949, 130.02/2425/7). (6) See No. *270*. (7) See Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs (Muhammad Fadil Jamali) to Bunche, 20 March 1949, enclosed with letter of Bunche to Shiloah of 21 March 1949, in file 130.16/2948/3.

No. 247 (Hebrew)

(1) In file 130.16/2948/3. Earlier on the same day Shiloah had informed Eytan that he could not resume the talks unless he received information and clear instructions (telegram of 23 March 1949, 14.25, *ibid.*). Eytan replied that, though understanding Shiloah's predicament, he could not convey the required information by telegram; Shiloah was to await Dayan's arrival. (2) For Eytan's reply see No. *250.*

No. 248

(1) Dr. Shukat Aziz al-Saty, King Abdallah's private physician and adviser. (2) See No. *186.* (3) See No. 223. (4) See No. *226.* (5) See Shiloah to Eytan, 18 March 1949, 15.30, 130.02/2431/1. (6) Jamil al-Rawi. (7) Saib Salih al-Jabburi. (8) Director of Arabic broadcasts in the Israeli broadcasting service. (9) Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (10) Rest of paragraph not printed here. (11) One sentence not printed here. (12) See *Documents, December 1947—May 1948,* Companion Volume, p. 126 (editorial note). (13) Avraham Rutenberg, Director of the Palestine Electric Corporation. (14) See Eytan to Sharett, 24 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34, and No. *243.* (15) See Appendix below. (16) Yitzhak Efrat, in charge of the Foreign Ministry's telegraphic service. (17) See also No. 265 (amendments to agreement). (18) In file 130.02/2431/1.

No. 249 (Hebrew)

(1) In file 130.02/2431/1. Shiloah repeated his request for detailed instructions, especially with regard to the Iraqi-held line. He reported on a talk with Riyad Muflih, who had shown him instructions received from King Abdallah to the effect that the Jordanian delegation should agree that the armistice line be congruent with the border in Wadi Araba. He had also told him about the Israeli—Jordanian agreement with regard to the Triangle. (2) See No. *256* and note 1 there; Eytan to Shiloah, 23 March 1949, 16.10, 130.16/2948/3. (3) See No. *238*, note 1. (4) See No. *244.* (5) See No. 248, Appendix.

No. 250 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *247.* (2) No. *249.* (3) For details of the meeting, which took place on 22 March, see *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 853-6; Elath to Eytan, W172, 25 March 1949, 130.09/2308/8.

No. 251 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 248, Appendix.

No. 252

(1) Document in file 130.02/2442/9. (2) For Jordanian complaints see letters of Bunche to Shiloah, 17, 18, 23 and 24 March 1949, 130.16/2948/3. See also Jundi's statement below, and No. *253.* (3) See Bunche's letter to Shiloah of 24 March (see note 2), containing the Jordanian complaints and the observers' conclusions. (4) See No. 246, note 5. (5) See No. 214. (6) The southern part of Wadi Araba. (7) See also No. *253* and note 3 there. (8) See No. 180, note 2. (9) See correspondence in file 130.02/2426/11. (10) See No. 246, note 7.

No. 253 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 252. (2) See No. 252, note 3. (3) Yadin to Shiloah, 24 March 1949, 11.10, 130.16/2948/3. Yadin replied to a telegram of Shiloah to Eytan (of 23 March 1949, 21.15, *ibid.),* conveying the contents of Bunche's letter of 23 March 1949 (see No. 252, note 2). Bunche wrote that U.N. observers had confirmed that Israeli forces had advanced in the Bethlehem—Hebron—Dead Sea sector and had expelled the inhabitants of two Arab villages. Bunche added that he regarded these activities "not only as violations of the truce but as endangering our entire effort to achieve an early peace in Palestine." Yadin cabled in reply that "we know nothing of expulsions"; he instructed Shiloah to tell Bunche that "we had issued clear instructions and there were no cases of cease-fire violations."

No. 255 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 248, Appendix. (2) Yadin rejected Dayan's proposal, arguing that a concession on this point would oblige Israel to dodge the agreement later on. Dayan agreed that the concession suggested by him was not essential; however, he held that it was inadvisable to give an exaggerated impression of the Israeli forces if the army did not intend actually to hold the line opposite the Jordanians with five brigades. (Yadin to Dayan, 26 March 1949, 14.10, 130.16/2948/3; Dayan to Yadin, 26 March 1949, 18.20, 130.02/2431/1).

No. 256 (Hebrew)

(1) In file 130.16/2948/3. Eytan replied as follows to a telegram of Shiloah's (25 March, 20.10, 130.16/2948/3): a) He rejected Shiloah's suggestion that Sasson write to Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa with regard to the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping (see No. *198*, note 12); the closure constituted a grave violation of the armistice agreement and Bunche must demand its immediate cancellation. b) In reply to Shiloah's suggestion that Bunche be informed of the agreement with the Jordanians, Eytan wrote that Ben-Gurion disagreed, but that he himself was inclined to support Dayan's suggestion that it be revealed to him (see No. *251*). c) Eytan instructed Shiloah to put pressure on the Jordanian delegation with a view to resuming the operation of the Naharayim power station (see No. *249*); he suggested that Bunche be told that the electricity was required for agriculture. He added that Ben-Gurion took a lively interest in the subject and that Rutenberg held that the electricity was of vital importance to Israel in the near future. d) In reply to another telegram of Shiloah (24 March 1949, 15.30, 130.16/2948/3) concerning Bunche's complaint regarding Israeli interference with the movements of U.N. observers, Eytan replied that the complaints were being investigated. He added, however, that U.N. observers were making frequent applications to visit Arab villages "in order to investigate expulsions of Arab infiltrators." Bunche or Riley should be asked to put a stop to this, as the matter was outside the observers' competence. (2) Sasson requested that the question of the Jews of Iraq should be raised in the course of negotiations concerning the Triangle. (Sasson to Shiloah, 24 March 1949, 93.02/182/8;

see also Eytan to Shiloah, 25 March 1949, 15.30, 130.16/2948/3). (3) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948. (4) For Tall's reply see No. *259*.

No. 257

(1) See No. 246, note 5.

No. 258 (Hebrew)

(1) See Nos. *244, 249*. (2) Yadin agreed to a limitation to three battalions plus armoured vehicles in that sector. (Telegram of 28 March 1949, 08.55, 130.16/2948/3). (3) No. 257. (4) Eytan instructed Shiloah to continue to avoid discussion of the Iraqi line. If necessary, he should inform Bunche that he had been instructed by this government to "postpone the matter of the Triangle." (Telegram of 28 March 1949, 09.30, 130.16/2948/3).
(5) See No. *259*.

No. 259 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *260*.

No. 260 (Hebrew)

(1) See Eytan to Nevo, 28 March 1949, 10.20, 130.16/2948/3.
(2) Mistake in original ("the government"). Corrected in accordance with incoming text and the above-mentioned telegram to Nevo.

No. 261 (Hebrew)

(1) See Nos. *259, 260*. (2) Eytan instructed Nevo to agree to the proposed date. (Telegram of 28 March 1949, 22.05, 130.16/2948/3). On the meeting and its outcome see No. 267.

No. 262 (Hebrew)

(1) In an earlier telegram, Dayan requested confirmation for the following arrangement: Budrus—Jerusalem sector — one battalion; Jerusalem — two battalions; Jerusalem—Ein Gedi — one battalion; Ein Gedi—Elath — three battalions and 13 light armoured vehicles. Yadin approved. (See Dayan to Yadin, 28 March 1949, 17.50, 130.16/2948/3; Yadin to Dayan, 29 March 1949, 09.25, *ibid.*). (2) See No. *263.*

No. 263 (Hebrew)

(1) Record in file 130.02/2442/9. (2) See draft Israeli—Jordanian armistice agreement, *ibid.*

No. 264

(1) Untraced. (2) See undated telegram in file 93.02/182/6. Eytan transmitted to Sasson the information contained in No. *259.* He asked him to inform King Abdallah that the attempt to change the agreement undermined the trust put in him. (3) For the meeting see No. *259*; for the Jordanian proposals see No. 267. (4) Untraced. (5) Two paragraphs, dealing with other subjects, are not printed here.

No. 265

(1) For developments preceding the signing of the agreement see No. 267. (2) See No. 248, Appendix. (3) In file 130.02/2431/3.

No. 266 (Hebrew)

(1) The instructions conveyed the Israeli—Jordanian agreement of 23 March and the subsequent amendments (see No. 248, Appendix; and No. 265). Drafts of the document transmitted to Bunche are in file 130.02/2442/9. (2) See draft agreement enclosed with Bunche's letter to Shiloah of 3 April 1949, *ibid.* (3) Draft and

amendments — *ibid.* (4) Telegram of 3 April 1949, 00.30, 130.16/2948/3. Shiloah reported that the Jordanian delegation rejected the Israeli amendments to Annex II of the armistice agreement (definition of defensive forces — see No. *268*, and editorial note below). He suggested an approach to Tall with a view to ensuring "a quick and affirmative instruction to their delegation if the latter decided to refer the question to Amman."

No. 267

(1) No. 248, Appendix. (2) See No. *259*. (3) Telegram Y167 of 31 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34. (4) For full text of agreement see No. 265. (5) Telegram X261, 93.01/2180/35. Sharett cabled: "Am thrilled by tremendous diplomatic victory re Triangle lines and immensely proud this achieved in my absence." (6) See No. *273*, note 2.

Editorial Note preceding No. 268 (Main Volume, pp. 500-1).

No. *268* relates to amendments which Israel wished to make in Annex II of the armistice agreement with Jordan ("Definition of Defensive Forces"). The document is based on Annex III of the armistice agreement with Egypt (see Appendix F, Main Volume, pp.700-1, and cf. draft of annex which Bunche submitted to the parties on 3 April, in file 130.02/2442/9). Israel proposed the following amendments to the Annex: a) Omission of paragraph A (4) in the draft, prohibiting the establishment of naval bases in areas in which defensive forces only were to be allowed, and the entry of warships into adjacent territorial waters. b) Cancellation of the exclusion of armoured cars from the term "Defensive Forces" (paragraph A[2a] in draft, I[2a] in final text). c) The armoured cars permitted in the Ein Gedi—Elath sector to be allowed to carry guns (paragraph B[4] in draft, II[4] in final text, and see No. *262*, note 1). These questions were still being debated by the parties shortly before the signing of the agreement. The Jordanian delegation declared that it could not accept the amendments without authorization from Amman. Acting on Dayan's suggestion (see No. *266*, note 4), Nevo transmitted Israel's demands to Amman through Abdallah al-Tall early on 3

April. The Israeli delegation at Rhodes was instructed to postpone the signing of the agreement scheduled to take place later in the day. (See Harkabi to Shiloah, 3 April 1949, 07.30, 130.02/2431/1; Nevo to Yadin, 3 April 1949, 12.40, 130.16/2948/3).

No. 268 (Hebrew)

(1) Eytan instructed Shiloah to postpone the signing of the agreement pending receipt of the expected affirmative reply from Tall, who had gone to Amman (see editorial note above). He suggested that in case of a negative reply, the question of the naval bases should be dealt with by the Mixed Armistice Commission. Shortly after, Ben-Gurion instructed Eytan not to postpone the signing because of this issue. (Eytan to Shiloah, 3 April 1949, 17.25, 130.16/2948/3; Ben-Gurion to Eytan, 3 April 1949, 18.00, *ibid.*). In the event, the Jordanians agreed to the omission of the naval clause. As to the armament of the armoured cars in the Ein Gedi—Elath sector, it was agreed that the Mixed Armistice Commission was to determine the permissible weapons. The agreement was signed on the same day, at 19.30. (See Shiloah to Eytan, 3 April 1949, 20.05, 130.16/2948/3, and No. 269).

No. 270 (Hebrew)

(1) See Bunche to Shiloah, 20 March 1949, 130.02/2454/10. The draft of the telegram which Shiloah sent to Eytan at 18.40 on the same day is written on Bunche's letter. (2) Acting Secretary-General of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) The armistice negotiations with Lebanon were concluded on 23 March — see No. 178. (4) The Syrians held a large bridgehead in the Mishmar ha-Yarden area, with a northern extension between the international border and Lake Hula. They also held the eastern bank of the Jordan River south of the Mishmar ha-Yarden bridgehead as well as a small bridgehead west of the influx of the Jordan into the Sea of Galilee. In the southern sector the Syrians held an area between the international border and the Sea of Galilee south of Ein Gev, and in the northern sector — a small area west of the international border between Banias and Dan.

No. 272 (Hebrew)

(1) The Syrians held a number of Jews who had tried to reach Palestine through Syria before the end of the British Mandate. The Syrians wanted to return them to their countries of origin. Their problem remained unsolved when the armistice with Syria was signed, and the question was raised again at the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission's sub-commission for the location of missing persons, on 19 August 1949. (Record in file 130.02/2433/4).

No. 273 (Hebrew)

(1) Rosenne cabled the contents of the talks to Eytan. (Telegram of 30 March 1949, 17.25, 130.02/2425/6). (2) On 30 March, a military coup, headed by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Husni al-Zaim, took place in Syria. Zaim appointed himself President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior. (3) See No. *271*. (4) See No. *270*, note 4. (5) See Appendix G, Main Volume, p. 707. (6) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the letter, which relate to other subjects, are not printed here.

No. 274

(1) See No. *273*, note 2.

No. 275

(1) Presumed date — according to No. *276*.

No. 276 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 275. (2) For text of letter of credentials and the discussions relating to it see No. 277. (3) See No. 159.

No. 277

(1) See Nos. 48, 214. (2) No. 74.

No. 278 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 277. (2) Nos. 275, *276*. (3) See No. 48. (4) See No. 111, note 6. (5) On 3 March, the Security Council resolved to recommend acceptance of Israel's application for membership in the United Nations. The recommendation was submitted to the General Assembly, which convened for the second part of its Third Session on 5 April. The matter was referred to the Assembly's First Committee, which approved the recommendation, and on 11 May the Assembly resolved by a majority of 37 against 12 to admit Israel to the Organization. (See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49,* pp. 395-405). (6) Actually, the meeting did not take place — see No. *283*.

No. 279

(1) See No. 280 and note 1 there. (2) See No. 280, note 2.

No. 280

(1) Reference is to an Israeli incursion into Syrian territory, near Kibbutz Shamir. (2) Eytan to Eban, MH3893, 6 April 1949, 130.09/2328/6. Eytan cabled the full text of an exchange of letters with Bunche, conducted through Mohn (see letters, 5—6 April 1949, I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055). Bunche wrote that the presence of Israeli forces on Syrian territory constituted "a most flagrant and dangerous violation of the truce"; he demanded immediate withdrawal. Eytan replied that the Syrian allegations were unfounded and there had been no violation of the truce. Israel had merely replaced standing patrols by fixed positions, as a precautionary measure in view of the military coup in Syria. Israel was nevertheless prepared to comply with the withdrawal instruction of the U.N. Chief of Staff, provided the Syrians complied with similar instructions, especially that of 22 October 1948, ordering them to withdraw from Hill 223, near Mishmar ha-Yarden, which they had occupied in contravention of the agreement of 3 August. See also No. 282.

No. 281

(1) No. 280. (2) See No. *278*, note 5. (3) Eytan informed Sharett on the following day that the matter had been amicably settled. Bunche had expressed appreciation for Israel's helpfulness and had promised to press the Syrians with regard to Hill 223. Eytan described the affair as "a storm in a tea cup." (Eytan to Sharett, Y189, 7 April 1949, 93.01/2180/35).

No. 282

(1) See No. 280, note 2. (2) See Mohn to Eytan, 6 April 1949, I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055. (3) See Decision No. 29 of U.N. Chief of Staff (Riley), of 22 October 1948, in file 130.02/2427/1. (4) The reply was sent to Mohn on 7 April. (Copy in I.M.D.E.A. 922.75/1055).

No. 283 (Hebrew)

(1) 8 April (see No. *278*). (2) See Nos. 280, 282. (3) See No. *278*, note 5. (4) See No. 284.

No. 284

(1) The meeting took place in Tel Aviv at the request of the Israeli delegation. (See No. *283*). (2) See No. 282, note 3. (3) At an unofficial meeting of the delegations on 12 April, the Syrians agreed to evacuate Hill 223 within ten days. They also agreed to an exchange of letters instead of a cease-fire agreement, subject to authorization by their government. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y208, 12 April 1949, 130.09/2329/3).

No. 285 (Hebrew)

(1) This was the second unofficial meeting between the Syrian representatives and the Israelis (Makleff and Pellman). The first meeting, which took place on 15—16 April, is recorded in Ben-

Gurion's diary: "Makleff and Pellman met the Syrians without U.N. participation... but they want border rectifications, half the Sea of Galilee. I told them to inform the Syrians in unqualified terms that first of all there must be an armistice on the basis of the former international border and thereafter — discussions on peace and alliance. We shall be prepared for maximum cooperation." (2) See No. 286.

No. 286

(1) For full text of letters see record of meeting of 13 April, in file 130.02/2454/10. (2) The original French text of the proposal is in the same file. The demarcation line proposed by the Syrians was based on the Syrian truce line in the Banias and Hula sectors (see map facing page p.520). In the Hula sector, which included the Syrian bridgehead around Mishmar ha-Yarden and a Syrian-held salient west of the influx of the Jordan into the Sea of Galilee, the Syrians straightened the line in their favour. In the Samakh sector, the Syrians demanded the south-eastern part of the Sea of Galilee and the adjacent territory, excluding the Ein Gev area. (3) See *Documents, December 1947 — May 1948*, editorial note, Companion Volume, p. 127.

No. 287

(1) The Lausanne conference was due to open on 27 April.

No. 288

(1) For records of the first and third meetings see Nos. 277, 286. On the second and fourth meetings see, respectively, No. 286 and note 1 there, No. *292* and note 2 there. (2) Sharett cabled the text of the letter to Eban. (Telegram LS334, 27 April 1949, 130.09/2328/6).

No. 289

(1) See No. 307, note 1. (2) See No. 287.

No. 290

(1) No. 289. (2) The Syrians evacuated Hill 223 on 27 April. (3) This was said by Bunche — see No. 295.

No. 291

(1) No. 290. (2) The United States recognized Zaim's regime on 26 April.

No. 292 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 286. (2) Record of meeting in file 130.16/2953/3. (3) Of 1916. Cf. No. 307 and note 1 there. (4) One paragraph, relating to Jerusalem, is not printed here.

No. 293

(1) During those days a plan for military action against the Syrians was under consideration. It was eventually shelved because of military and political considerations. (See Ben-Gurion's diary, 27 and 30 April 1949). (2) Last two sentences added by hand.

No. 294

(1) See No. 307, note 1. (2) For Elath's reply see No. 297.

No. 295

(1) Telegram of 29 April 1949, 130.09/2329/3. In reply to Nos. 290 and 291, Sharett expressed his fear that Eban had been "a bit rash" in stressing Bunche's compromise proposal (in his talk with Ross) when Israel was fully justified in insisting on restoration of the *status quo ante*. He referred Eban to his telegram to Elath (No. 294), repeating some of the arguments presented there. (2) No. 289. (3) No. 290.

No. 296 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *292.* (2) No. 288, and see note 2 there. (3) Record of meeting in file 130.16/2953/3. (4) See Ben-Gurion's diary, 30 April 1949. Makleff, Sharett, Shiloah, Rosenne, Shimoni and Pellman took part in the consultation. Pellman reported on his meeting with Lt. Colonel Nassir (see above). The possibility of military action against the Syrians was also discussed (see No. 293, note 1). (5) On date and outcome of meeting see No. *298,* note 2.

No. 297

(1) No. 294. (2) At the same meeting, Elath handed to Satterthwaite a copy of Sharett's letter to Bunche and the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission (No. 288.) [See Secretary of State to Legation in Switzerland, 28 April 1949, *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 956-7]. (3) See No. 290. (4) The last paragraph, relating to the Lausanne talks, is not printed here.

No. 298 (Hebrew)

(1) The memorandum was sent to Sharett, Shiloah, Eytan, Eban and Robinson. A précis was cabled on the same day to Eban and Eytan in Lausanne (130.09/2329/12 and 130.02/2442/7, respectively). (2) For background of meeting see No. *296.* The meeting, which was organized by Riley and Vigier, convened in Rosh Pinna at 10.30. Syria was represented by Lt. Colonel Nassir and S. Tarazi, Israel — by Shiloah and Yadin. (See exchange of letters between Vigier and Rosenne, 1—2 May 1949, 130.16/2953/3; Sharett to Eban, Y138, 2 May 1949, 130.09/2329/12). (3) See No. 301. (4) No. 288. (5) Eban informed Sharett on 2 May that Bunche had confirmed that the complete removal of Syrian troops from Israeli territory would be implied in any proposals or compromise that he would suggest. (Telegram X336, in file 93.01/2180/37). Commenting on Vigier's statement, Eban advised Rosenne to protest against it, because Bunche had told him on at least seven occasions that any compromise of his would secure the absence of the Syrians from Israeli soil. (Telegram 1705, of 18 May 1949, 130.09/2328/5).

No. 299

(1) Date of telegram — according to No. 302 and a copy of incoming text. (2) Reference is evidently to the compromise proposal discussed at the meeting of Makleff and Rosenne with Riley on 6 May. Rosenne reported on it to Eban on 8 May (see No. *298* and note 1 there). (3) See No. 301. (4) No. 300, and see note 1 there. (5) See No. *278*, note 5. (6) Elath and Yuval met with Rusk, Satterthwaite and Rockwell on 11 May. Rusk, who had initiated the meeting, wanted to discuss the question of the Arab refugees in order to facilitate the Lausanne talks. In the course of the conversation, Elath referred to the armistice negotiations with Syria and requested American intervention, similar to the American intervention in the negotiations with Lebanon. Rusk and Satterthwaite, he reported, had promised to deal with the matter immediately. (See Elath to Sharett, WIA2, 11 May 1949, 130.09/2308/9).

No. 300

(1) A copy of Bunche's letter, dated 9 May, was handed to Eban, who on the same day cabled the full text to Tel Aviv. (Letter and telegram in file 93.03/71/25). (2) See No. 303.

No. 301

(1) Of 16 November 1948 (see Appendix C, Main Volume, p. 685). (2) Contour line — 98. (3) Agreement of 1926 — see No. 307. (4) See No. 286.

No. 302

(1) See No. 299. (2) Telegram MH4266, 10 May 1949, 130.02/2425/6. (3) See No. 301. (4) *Ibid.*, pp.559-60.

No. 303

(1) No. 300. (2) Shiloah cabled the full text of the letter to Sharett. (Telegram LS411, 12 May 1949, 130.02/2425/6).

No. 304

(1) See Bunche's proposal in No. 301 (pp. 559-60), and cf. Nos. 302, 303.

No. 305

(1) This telegram was also sent to Eytan in Lausanne (telegram NA2, in file 93.01/2180/37).

No. 306 (Hebrew)

(1) This document was also sent to J. Robinson in New York and to Eytan in Lausanne. (2) Meeting of the Israeli delegation with Riley and Vigier. (3) See No. 301 (pp. 559-60). (4) See Eban to Rosenne, telegram 1674, 10 May 1949, 93.03/74/19. (5) The meeting took place on the same day; it lasted only five minutes. (Record in file 130.16/2953/3). (6) See No. 309.

No. 307

(1) According to the Anglo-French convention of December 1920, the border between Palestine and Syria was to pass across the Sea of Galilee, from Samakh in the south to the mouth of Wadi Massadiye in the north, thence in a north-easterly direction to the vicinity of Quneitra, and from there in a north-westerly direction to Banias. However, the definitive international border was fixed only in 1923, through an exchange of notes between the British and French governments. According to the new agreement, the border passed east of the Lake of Galilee, and thence northward, along the eastern bank of the Jordan River. (See documents in file 130.02/2425/6. For

text of agreement of 1923 see also Cmd. 1910). (2) See his letter to Rosenne, 12 May 1949, 130.16/2953/3. (3) Agreement of 31 October 1931, see copy in file 130.02/2425/6.

No. 308

(1) See No. 309.

No. 309

(1) See No. 301, pp. 559-60. (2) See No. *306.* (3) See No. 301 and Appendix; see also earlier Syrian proposal in No. 286. (4) See No. 286, pp. 531-32, 534, and Annex. (5) See No. 284, note 3. (6) See No. *306*, note 5. (7) See *ibid.* (8) See No. 301, pp. 559.60.

No. 310 (Hebrew)

(1) The letter was sent to Eban in New York and to Eytan in Lausanne. On the same day, Rosenne cabled the contents to both. (Telegrams Y158 in file 130.09/2329/12, and LS27 in file 130.02/2442/7). (2) No. 309. (3) Sharett was about to return from a visit to the United States.

No. 311

(1) Telegram of 18 May 1949, 130.09/2328/6. Rosenne reported on 17 May to Eban on the meeting with the Syrians (see No. 309). (2) Eban met with Bunche on the same morning. (3) In his telegram to Eban (see note 1), Rosenne enumerated Israel's terms for her acceptance of Bunche's proposal as a basis for discussions. The first condition was: complete withdrawal of the Syrians to the international border. (See Bunche's proposal in No. 301 [pp. 559-60] and the discussion relating to it in No. 309).

No. 312

(1) Telegram to Eban of 18 May 1949 — see No. *310*, note 1. (2) In reply, Rosenne pointed out that the fundamental weakness of Riley's proposal lay in the uncertainty as to whether the Conciliation Commission would succeed in compelling the Syrians to retire to the international border. Rosenne informed Eban that the final decision had been deferred until Sharett's return. (See telegram Y159, 20 May 1949, 130.16/2953/3). For Eban's reply see No. 313.

No. 313

(1) See No. 312, note 2. (2) See No. 317.

No. 314

(1) On the same day, Eban sent a copy of the letter to Bunche and to the permanent members of the Security Council. (See in file 93.03/71/25). (2) See No. 175. (3) Under this paragraph, members of the United Nations undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. (4) See Nos. 288, 303. (5) See No. *298*, note 5. (6) See No. 309, p. 576.

No. 315

(1) See No. 309.

No. 316

(1) See No. 305. (2) Rosenne replied that if the total exclusion of the Syrians from Israeli territory and the resumption of civilian activities was assured, Israel would not wreck the conference because of her other demands. Rosenne expressed doubt as to Vigier's ability to steer the negotiations properly. (Telegram Y166, 20 May 1949, 130.09/2329/12).

No. 317

(1) See No. *310.* (2) See No. 315. (3) See No. 318. (Lourie deputized for Eban during the latter's absence from New York).

No. 318

(1) See No. 317. (2) See No. 316, note 2. (3) See Nos. 300, 303.

No. 319

(1) See No. 301 (pp. 559-60).

No. 320

(1) Adil Arslan, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 321

(1) See Nos. 319, 320. (2) See No. 303. (3) For Ben-Gurion's reaction to Shiloah's recommendation see No. 325.

No. 322

(1) Telegram IN75, of 31 May 1949, 130.09/2329/3. Sharett instructed Eban and Rafael to do everything possible to resolve the deadlock in the negotiations with Syria. He pointed out that the failure to reach an agreement was holding up demobilisation and causing a considerable waste of money, "all this in desperate financial straits." He asked Eban and Rafael to consider whether "shouldn't hint our stock patience not inexhaustible."
(2) See No. 314 and note 1 there.

No. 323

(1) See No. 320.

No. 324

(1) Actually, the proposal was submitted to the parties only on 8 June. (See No. 329, and draft of a letter [not sent] from Eban to Bunche, 6 June 1949, 93.03/71/25). (2) Sharett replied that Ben-Gurion was ready to meet Zaim only if he could be assured that the Syrians realized that they would have to evacuate Israeli territory. (Telegram S168, 4 June 1949, 130.09/2335/12). (3) See No. 325.

No. 325

(1) Ibrahim al-Ustwani, Administrative Director of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2) No. 321.

No. 326

(1) Telegram of 1 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3. Eban reported that Bunche had phoned him in connection with Mohn's proposal for a preliminary meeting between Eytan and the Administrative Director of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see No. 325). Bunche was inclined to the view that this meeting should be confined to the fixing of the high-level meeting and should not deal with matters of substance. (2) See No. 319. (3) Telegram of 2 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3. Eban suggested that, in order to expedite receipt of Bunche's latest proposals, Sharett should ask Mohn to give him a copy of the proposals "submitted to Zaim and Ben-Gurion", a copy of which Bunche had conveyed to Eban. Eban also suggested that Riley be made to understand that there was little prospect of a high-level meeting or a meeting of the delegations until Bunche's view with regard to a Syrian withdrawal was submitted. (4) Eban suggested that Israel accept Bunche's proposal in principle, on the explicit assumption that details could be discussed further, especially the question of equilibrium on the two

sides of the armistice line in the Ein Gev area. The formulation should give no ground for accusing Israel of rejecting the proposal. Eban's impression was that Bunche rather regretted the proposal "as weighing too heavily against [the] Syrians" and "would probably welcome never having [to] press it." (Telegram X389, 6 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3).

No. 327

(1) No. 325. (2) No. 326. (3) See Rosenne to Mohn, 5 June 1949, 130.02/2454/10. He suggested that the meeting with Zaim take place on 9 June and that the two subjects mentioned in the telegram should be discussed.

No. 328

(1) See letter and paraphrased telegram of Eban to Bunche, of 9 June, in file 130.02/2454/10. (2) See No. 327 and note 3 there.

No. 330

(1) Of 8 June 1949, 130.09/2328/6. Sharett asked Eban to cable immediately how Bunche justified the inclusion of Ein Gev in the demilitarized zone (see No. 329, paragraph 5, p. 600). (2) See No. 326, note 4.

No. 331

(1) 10 June, the day on which Bunche wished to convene the two delegations in order to discuss his compromise proposal (see No. 329, pp. 599-600). (2) Cf. No. 322, note 1.

No. 332

(1) Eban reported further that he had met with the President of the Security Council and warned him that a Syrian refusal to withdraw

from Israeli territory would have grave results. He explained to Sharett that the purpose of these visits was to prepare for contingencies. (Telegram X395, 9 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3).

No. 333

(1) See No. 329. (2) Eban replied that Bunche confirmed Riley's interpretation, adding that demilitarization on the Syrian border, unlike that in Jerusalem, would not involve U.N. administration. (Telegram 1826, 10 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3).

No. 334

(1) Felix Albert Vanthier, French Chargé d'Affaires in Tel Aviv. (2) See No. 329 (pp.599-600). (3) Sentence missing in incoming text. (4) "Cannot" added in accordance with incoming text.

No. 335

(1) Of 13 June 1949, 130.09/2329/12. Sharett cabled that Vigier had informed Dayan that according to the Syrians, the question of civilian jurisdiction (in the demilitarized zone) was a matter for agreement, and the Syrians would probably not accept it. Sharett feared that Vigier, "acting as French agent nursing Zaim for Quai", would "take care" that Syrians rejected it. (2) See No. 333.

No. 336

(1) See No. 333, note 2. (2) See No. 335, note 1. (3) For Bunche's reply see No. 338. (4) Eban on the same day cabled Sharett the full text of this telegram. (Telegram 1840, in file 93.01/2181/3).

No. 337

(1) See No. 329. (2) The Appendix is not printed here. It is identical with the draft in No. 329. (3) See paragraphs discussed in No. 329, pp. 599-600. (4) See No. 301.

No. 338

(1) No. 336. (2) Eban cabled to Sharett the text of the telegram from this point up to the penultimate sentence. (Telegram 1862, 20 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3). (3) *Sic*, but should read "article five". (4) See No. 329 (pp. 599-600). (5) See note 3. (6) See No. 336 and note 1 there. In a telegram to Sharett of 22 June, Eban emphasized that under the influence of the people on the spot — Riley and Vigier — Bunche had withdrawn from the position he had previously accepted. Eban stated that he would "continue working" on Bunche, but advised that efforts be made to "enlist at least Riley." (Telegram X432, in file 93.01/2181/3).

No. 339

(1) Record of meeting in file 130.02/2452/6. (2) See No. 329. (p. 600). See also No. 338. (3) See Bunche's clarification in No. 343. (4) Reference is to a plebicite, which was due to take place in Syria on 25 June. (The voters confirmed Hussni al-Zaim in his post as President and gave him full powers to issue decrees pending the adoption of a new constitution and the election of a new parliament. Following the referendum, Zaim entrusted Muhsein al-Barazi with the formation of a new government). (5) See No. 338 and note 2 there. (6) In a further telegram, Sharett stated that Bunche's explanation (see penultimate sentence in No. 338) was inadequate also from Israel's point of view: the question of administration related to the entire area, not to single localities. Israel, he stated, would not tolerate any Syrian administrative authority on its side of the frontier, and returning Arab villagers would have to accept Israeli civil rule. See also No. 340. (Telegram Y223 to Eban, 23 June 1949, 130.09/2329/12). (7) See No. 336 and note 4 there.

No. 340

(1) I.e., Bunche. Replying to Sharett's telegram (see No. 339, note 6), Eban cabled: "Will make big effort with him tomorrow." (Telegram 1889, 23 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3). See No. 341.

No. 341

(1) Mistake in original. Corrected in accordance with incoming text.

No. 342

(1) Bunche also cabled the contents of the letter to Sharett — see No. 344. (2) No. 329 (pp. 599-600). (3) At the request of the Syrians, the meeting was eventually postponed to 3 July.

No. 343

(1) See No. 339 and note 1 there.

No. 344

(1) See No. 342. (2) 28 June, see No. 342, note 3.

No. 345

(1) 27 June 1949, 130.09/2328/6. Rosenne conveyed to Eban the text of Bunche's explanatory letter (see No. 343) and a précis of his letter to Sharett (No. 342).

No. 347

(1) The telegram was sent to Vigier on 29 June. See the full text sent to Eban, in file 93.01/2181/4. (2) See No. 349.

No. 348 (Hebrew)

(1) Mistake in original ("1948"). (2) See Nos. 329, 343. (3) Sharett further instructed the delegation that these were minimum terms; if the delegation could negotiate more favourable ones — so much the better. (See attached note by Harkabi, in file). (4) No. 342. See also No. 349.

No. 349

(1) See No. 329 (pp. 599-600). (2) These questions were asked at the meeting of the delegations on 21 June. (Record in file 130.02/2425/6). See report on meeting in No. 339. (3) See No. 343. (4) Annex not printed here. For text of explanation see No. 343. (5) See No. 342. (6) See No. 286. (7) See No. 337, pp. 609-10. The page numbers cited here do not tally with the page numbers of the extant copy and evidently refer to a different one. (8) *Ibid.*, p. 610. (9) See note 7 — the same applies to this record. (10) See also English draft agreement in file 130.16/2953/2 and Vigier's explanations in No. *350*.

No. 350 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 349. (2) No. 329, pp. 599-600. (3) See in file 130.16/2953/2. (4) See Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 705-11.

No. 351

(1) The draft agreement was based on the Israeli—Lebanese armistice agreement (see Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 705-11, and No. *350*). (2) See No. 349. (3) *Ibid.*, p. 629. (4) See No. *350*, Appendix. (5) See No. 329 (pp. 599-600). (6) See No. 343, Appendix. (7) See No. 277. (8) *Ibid.*

No. 352 (Hebrew)

(1) The agreement was reached at two sessions of the military sub-committee, chaired by Riley, on 5—6 July. (See reports by Yudin to Baruch, 5, 6 July 1949, 130.02/2454/10). (2) See No. *353*. (3) See report on meeting by Yudin to Baruch, 8 July 1949, 130.02/2454/10. The meeting, chaired by Riley, dealt with the size of the forces to be allowed in the reduced forces zone.

No. 353 (Hebrew)

(1) This became clear in the course of the military sub-committee's meeting earlier on the same day. (For a more detailed report see Yudin to Baruch, 8 July 1949, 10 July 1949, 130.02/2454/10). (2) See No. 356, notes 2,3,4.

No. 354

(1) See map facing p. 520. (2) See Appendix F, Main Volume, p. 702 . (3) At the meeting of the military sub-committee scheduled for the same day. (On the meeting and its outcome see No. 356, notes 2,3,4).

No. 355

(1) See No. 351, p. 642. (2) The meeting took place on 10 July (see record in file 130.02/2425/6). The parties agreed on the text of the Preamble and of Articles I, V and VII. The wording of several other articles remained in dispute and their discussion was resumed at the meeting recorded here.

No. 356

(1) Vigier and Riley met with Sharett on 14 July and it appears that on that occasion they handed him the letter printed here. No record of the meeting has been found. (2) The meeting took place on 12 July. The Israeli report of the meeting mentions difficulties with

regard to the armistice line in the Samakh area (see No. *352*): "The Syrians started a protracted bargaining. They gradually yielded various parts of the town and finally reduced their claims to the eastern part. Colonel Makleff refused to discuss their proposal. General Riley introduced his compromise proposal [see note 3 below]... Colonel Makleff eventually agreed to a compromise, on condition that the Syrians accept it unreservedly. At 22.00, the Syrians agreed to General Riley's proposal, but presented a document of reservations containing three paragraphs [see note 4 below]. The Israeli delegation did not wish to reply immediately and asked for time in order to consult the Government of Israel..." (Yudin to Baruch, [12 July 1949], 130.02/2454/10). (3) Riley's proposal reads: "Persons owning land within ten kilometres from the armistice demarcation line on the Israeli side and living on the other side are in principle entitled to receive passes allowing them to cross that demarcation line in order to cultivate their land. Such passes will be delivered by the Mixed Armistice Commission and countersigned by the Israeli authorities. Similar passes will be delivered to persons having fishing rights on the Israeli side of the demarcation line. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall deal with complaints submitted by any of its members in connection with the refusal or cancellation of passes." (4) The reservations read as follows: "We accept the proposal made by General Riley with the following reservations: a) The Israeli military outposts will be maintained at Samakh police station — Sha'ar ha-Golan village — Massada. b) The Israeli forces in the other sectors will not advance beyond the present truce lines. c) Syrians having rights in Palestinian territory in the border zone are entitled to enjoy such rights. The same shall apply to Palestinians having rights recognised before 15 May 1948." (5) The Israeli position was formulated at a consultation on the political level, on 13 July. (See document entitled "Consultation relating to Syrians", 13 July 1949, 130.02/2454/10). (6) See No. 305.

No. 357

(1) See No. 356 and note 4 there. (2) See No. 356 and note 1 there. (3) See No. 307. (4) See No. 358.

No. 358

(1) The draft, dated 18 July 1949, is in file 130.16/2953/2. It is identical with the final agreement — see Appendix J, Main Volume, pp. 723-34. For the discussions of the drafting committee see Nos. 351, 355. (2) See No. 359.

No. 359

(1) See No. 358. (2) See discussion relating to letters of credentials in Nos. 277 and 351 (p.655). At the second meeting of the Drafting Committee the Syrian delegation presented a letter of credentials dated 7 April, signed by the Chief of Staff and confirmed by the Secretary-General of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rosenne refused to accept this document which had been issued prior to the formation of the new Syrian government, and reiterated the demand that it be signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Replying to Rosenne, Tarazi pointed out that the Israeli letter of credentials had been signed by the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The parties finally agreed to present new letters of credentials before the signing of the armistice agreement. (See record of second meeting of the Drafting Committee, 10 July 1949, 130.02/2425/6).

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TO MAIN VOLUME AND COMPANION VOLUME

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* *Abbreviations*
b. — born
n — note
edn — editorial note
CV — Companion Volume
IDF — Israel Defence Forces